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Preface 
This study of the vegetable oil milling 
industry in East Africa is concerned primarily with 
the state of the industry in Uganda, together with a 
comparative analysis of the industry in Tanzania and 
Kenya. Its scope has been limited to the so-called 
soft edible oils, of which cottonseed oil is the 
most important in the three territories. 
The study was undertaken while I was an Assist-
ant Research Fellow at the East African Institute of 
Social Research, Makerere University College, 
Kampala, Uganda. The Fellowship was financed by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
I am indebted to the many oil millers in East 
Africa and Messrs. V.V. Vasant who gave evidence on 
the present state of the industry. I am also grate-
ful to the many others in Government and in the Lint 
Marketing Board of Uganda and the Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board of Tanzania who provided me with 
invaluable information.. I would also like to thank 
those with'whom I worked at Makerere, particularly 
my research director, Mr W.T. Newlyn, my colleagues 
in the East African Institute of Social Research, 
members of the Department of Rural Economy and Mr 
V.R. Apte of the Department of Agricultural 
Chemistry; also the typist who prepared the manu-
script for the press. 
Diana M.S. Coles, 
Makerere University College, 
Kampala, 
July, 1967-
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A distinction is often made between oils and 
fats according to their differing sources, the oils 
and fats being grouped into vegetable oils, animal 
fa.ts and marine oils. This report is concerned with 
the extraction of vegetable oils from oilseeds, 
firstly in Uganda, and then in Tanzania and Kenya, 
and does not cover the animal and marine oils, 
although it is realised that these oils and fats are 
consumed in East Africa. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations classifies oils into 'hard' and 'soft' 
oils, hard oils being those oils which take a SQjlid 
form under normal temperature at or below 15 C. 
Oils may also be classified according to their end 
uses, but as modern techniques can make oils which 
were formerly only useful as industrial oils into 
edible oils, this classification is not always use-
ful. ^  
The principle oils and fats for use as food 
given in the O.E.E.C. publication are edible animal 
fats and soft edible vegetable oils. These latter 
include olive oil, groundnut oil, soya bean oil, 
rape-seed oil, cottonseed oil, sesame oil and sun-
flower seed oil. Oils such as coconut oil, palm oil, 
palm kernel oil, shea butter oil, marine animal fats 
and tallow may be used for both food and soap manu-
facture. Oils such as linseed oil, castor oil and 
tung oil are only used for industrial purposes. 
The vegetable oils produced in Uganda mainly 
fall into the soft edible vegetable oils category. 
Some castor oil and shea butter oil is produced but 
only in very small quantities. 
Thus the report which follows is mainly concer-
ned with the production of soft edible vegetable 
oils in Uganda, and the comparisons which follow for 
Tanzania and Kenya are also limited to these same 
oils. It is known that some palm oil, palm kernel 
oil and coconut oil is produced along the coast in 
both Kenya and Tanzania, but these oils are outside 
the scope of this study, 
A comparison of the total production of ground-
nuts, cottonseed and sesame seed in the three East 
African countries and all Africa and the world is 
shown in Table 1.1. No significant quantities of 
the other oilseeds which yield soft edible oils are 
produced in East Africa. 
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Table 1 . 1 
Production in '000 Metric Tons 
1 9 4 8 / 9 - 1 9 5 2 / 3 1 9 6 2 - 3 1 9 6 3 - 4 1 9 6 4 - 5 
Groundnuts 
Uganda 1 5 3 * 1 6 3 * 163 * 163 
Kenya 3 4 4 -
Tanzania 20 17 20 18 
All Africa 2 , 3 9 0 4 , 3 8 0 4 , 3 4 0 250 
World 9 , 5 0 0 1 4 , 5 0 0 1 5 , 0 0 0 1 6 , 700 
Cottonseed 
Uganda 134 143 151 1 7 8 
Kenya 4 * 6 6 6 
Tanzania 20 56 67 100 
All Africa 46o 600 650 7 1 0 
World 1 3 , 9 0 0 2 0 , 3 0 0 2 1 , 3 0 0 21 , 900 
Sesame seed 
Uganda 3 0 . 5 2 8 . 0 * 30 . 0 * -
Kenya - 1 . 6 1 . 5 1 . 0 
Tanzania 5 . 0 8 . 8 10 . 1 4 . 8 
All Africa 100 130 130 130 
World 1 ,800 1 , 5 0 0 1 , 5 0 0 1 , 700 
* Estimates 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
UnitedNations, Production Yearbook Volume 
19 (F.A.O. Italy, 1966) 
The figures of Table 1.1 show that East Africa, 
and in particular Uganda, is a major producer in 
Africa of cottonseed and sesame seed, and also prod-
uces large quantities of groundnuts. But it will be 
found later that most of the groundnuts and sesame 
seed produced in East Africa are not used to make 
vegetable oils. East Africa produced over a third 
of all Africa production of cottonseed over the 
periods 1948-53 and 1962-5, and most of this cotton-
seed was retained for crushing within East Africa. 
The largest source of this cottonseed was Uganda, on 
which a major part of this study will be concen-
trated . 
The F.A.O. Commodity Review, 1966,^ notes that 
there has been an increase in oilseed production 
throughout the world, in the 1960's, most of this 
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increase being in the developing countries, where it 
was mainly home consumed. At the same time the total 
production of oils and fats in the world remained 
static, with decreased production in the developed 
countries being balanced by increased production in 
the developing countries. It is estimated that the 
seed crushing industry has expanded by 50 per cent 
over the past decade, this trend being particularly 
important in the developing countries in recent 
years. It is thought that this trend in the develo-
ping countries will continue provided that outlets 
for the oil can be found. It is pointed out that 
these oils compete in many import markets with oils 
produced by tariff protected industries. It is 
noted that cake does not present the same-problems 
of marketing. F.A.O. projections to 1970 show 
that if the production of soft oils continues to 
expand in the 19601s as it was expanding in the 
1950's, a surplus of soft oils would develop in the 
United States. But for the low-income countries, 
production would not be able to keep pace with the 
growing demand, although Africa, it was thought, 
would still remain a net exporting area. 
The chapters which folLow on the extraction of 
soft edible oils in East Africa describe one of the 
more important sources of these oils in Africa. 
The development of the extraction industries, their 
operation in the 1960's, and the relationship betw-
een supply and demand in each country of East Africa 
are considered. Projections of supply and demand 
are made in order to discover whether the supply and 
demand for soft oils in East Africa will remain bal-
anced in the future. 
One final chapter is added at the end of the 
report on the use of oilseed cake as a human food-
stuff. This case study is included because of the 
importance to developing countries of providing a 
low cost, high-protein food for prevention of malnu-
trition. It is felt that vegetable cake could have 
an important part to play in the provision of such a 
high-protein food in East Africa. 
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Footnotes 
1. Organization for European Economic Co-operation, 
The Main Products of the Overseas Territories. 
(O.E.E.G.,Paris, 1957] 
2. Ibid 
3. Ibid 
k. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Commodity Review, 1966 (F.A.0.,Italy, 
1966) 
5. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Commodity Review, 1962. Special Suppl-
ement Agricultural Commodities - Projections 
for 1970. (Eliograf, Rome, Italy, 1962) 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
TO THE 
UGANDAN OIL MILLING INDUSTRY 
A. Historical Background to the Industry 
The earliest oil mill in Uganda is believed to 
date from 1929, and according to^evidence obtained 
from the Registry of Companies, only five oil mil-
ling firms were incorporated prior to 19^0, although 
it is not known whether these five firms were crush-
ing oil at this time. 1938 Commission of Inquiry 
into the Cotton Industry mentioned that at that 
time there were a number of oil mills in Uganda, but 
that the extraction of oil from cottonseed had not 
proved successful for the following reasons:-
a) the small scale of operations 
b) the competition with sesame oil 
c) variable prices for oil 
d) the cost of freight and packaging 
e) the lack of an outlet for cake 
f) the need to delint seed before crushing 
Thus in the pre-war period most of the cotton-
seed produced in Uganda appears to have been burnt. 
However, with the sudden demand for oil created by 
the war-time era, the position with regard to the 
crushing of cottonseed was to drastically alter. In 
particular, there was a large demand for oil to feed 
the military forces then stationed in Africa, and 
this led to a renewed interest in all vegetable oil-
seeds . 
The Industrial Investigation Committee of 1 9 ^ 
found a total of twenty-four firms engaged in flour 
and oil milling, but most of the fii'ms wei'e reported 
to be small uneconomic units. There appear to have 
been five licensed and five unlicensed oil mills in 
Uganda at that time, including three which were to 
become the biggest firms in Uganda in 1 9 6 6 . 
TJie 19^3 Defence (Controlled Produce) Regula-
tions gave effective control over the oil milling 
industry to the Government by requiring that the 
millers must hold a licence in order to crush oil-
seeds. Further, the erection of new oil mills bec-
ame controlled under the Control of Industries Comm-
ittee, and the sale of both oil and cake was under-
taken by the Government. 
Almost from the beginning the necessity and 
efficacy of the Oilseeds Control was questioned. In 
19^5, it was suggested that oilseeds should be freed 
from the control and be sold through produce buyers, 
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although prices for exported seed, oil and cake 
should still be controlled. However, no changes 
were made. In 1946, the oil milling industry was 
removed from the Control of Industries Order, mean-
ing that any firm could now erect a new oil mill 
without official permission. This did not necessar-
ily mean, though, that the miller was entitled to an 
allocation of oilseeds, which were still under the 
control of the Vegetable Oilseeds Controller. 
The Government's reason for freeing the oil 
milling industry from the Control of Industries 
Qrder, while still maintaining control of the allo-
cation of oilseeds, seems to have been motivated by 
negotiations between Lever Bros, and the Government 
with a viewgto Lever Bros, constructing an oil mill 
in Uganda. This action, though, was most unfort-
unate, as following the withdrawal of the oil mil-
ling industry from the Control of Industries Order, 
a number of firms installed milling capacity only to 
find that they were then unable to obtain an allo-
cation of seed from the Vegetable Oilseeds Contro-
ller. 1 
The need to maintain the control over allo-
cations of s^pd was justified by the Government on 
three counts. Firstly, it was justified because of 
the need to maintain supplies for the Ministry of 
Supply in Great Britain. Secondly, it was justified 
because of the need, it was thought, to limit the 
amount of seed crushed in East Africa to the minimum 
requirements for oil in the area, and thirdly bec-
ause of the need to maintain control over seed and 
oil prices in the immediate post-war period. 
Such constraints meant that the Vegetable Oil-
seeds Controller was faced with the difficult task 
of deciding whether to allocate the available seed 
for crushing in East Africa to the thirteen millers 
existing prior to the release of the industry from 
the Control of Industries Order, or whether to allow 
the twelve new mills, which had been erected since 
the Order was repealed, to have a share in the allo-
cation. The decision was made that the new mills 
should not be given allocations of seed, as the 
crushing of smaller amounts of seed by a larger rmm-
ber of firms would lead to uneconomic operation. 
At the same time an attempt was made to remove unsa-
tisfactory millers from the industry by excluding 
firms who obtained less then 20 gallons of refined 
oil from each ton of cottonseed. But the average 
output of refined oil by millers in 1965 was found 
to be 32 gallons per ton of cottonseed and it is 
doubtful therefore whether any firms were excluded 
under this regulation. 
A new legal notice was introduced in 1948, 
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which allowed only replacement of existing machinery 
by the oil millers. This prevented any further 
firms from entering the industry, but did nothing 
about those already in existence who had not been 
able to obtain an allocation of seed. By 1950, the 
control of the oil milling industry had become such 
an administrative burden to the Government that re-
newed efforts were made to free the industry from 
all controls. At last, in 1953, the industry was 
finally freed from all controls, and responsibility 
for the sale of cottonseed was placed in the hands 
of the Lint Marketing Board which had been estab-
lished in 1949. Other oilseeds were to be sold 
through the produce traders on a free market. 
The attractiveness of the oil milling industry 
to the Asian community in the immediate post-war 
period is explained by the apparent profitability of 
the industry at that time. The price formula for 
determining the price to be paid to the miller for 
his oil was calculated in 19^7 o n the basis that the 
millers produced on averse 16 gallons of oil from 
each ton of cottonseed. ' This was changed to 24 
gallons per ton of seed in 1950. These formulae 
were in fact very favourable to the miller and yield-
ed a high profit, which is not surprising as much 
higher yields of oil could be obtained from the 
cottonseed. In 1 9 6 5 , the millers were found to be 
obtaining around 32 gallons of oil per ton of seed 
crushed. In addition to this factor, the market for 
oil was guaranteed by the Government in the immed-
iate post-war period, and thus the industry vias 
doubly attractive to the millers at that time. 
However, those who had obtained entry into the 
industry in the war and immediate post-war period 
were to experience a period of intense competition, 
in particular in the purchasing of their cottonseed 
when the industry was finally freed from all con-
trols in 1953. 
The millers were now required to bid for their 
cottonseed at monthly intervals during the cotton 
season at auctions arranged by the Lint Marketing 
Board. Initially two zones were used for the sale 
of cottonseed, the B.P. 52 variety only being sold 
to millers west of the Nile, while the S. 47 
variety was only sold to millers east of the Nile. 
This meant that for the seasons 1953-4 to 1957-8 
there were separate competitive groups of millers 
east and west of the Nile, the eastern group being 
led by the Jinja millers, and the western group by 
the Kampala millers. 
During the first season when cottonseed was 
sold through the Lint Marketing Board, 1953-4, 
agreement was reached through the Uganda Oilmillers 
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Association as to the sharing of the seed amongst 
the millers, but in the 1954-5 season no agreement 
could be reached amongst the millers, and the cotton-
seed was auctioned and sold to the highest bidders. 
There was intense competition for cottonseed 
amongst the millers at the auctions, and prices paid 
for seed were very high. In the 1957-8 season the 
millers west of the Nile formed another pooling 
agreement, and prices paid for cottonseed west of 
the Nile showed a considerable fall as compared with 
prices east of the Nile. 
These zoning arrangements, based on the fear of 
the Government that varieties of seed for planting 
might become mixed if millers were free to crush 
both varieties of seed, were revoked from the 1958-9 
season onwards, and this now meant that there was 
one competing group of millers for all the cotton-
seed. This marked the beginning of the sharp decline 
of oil mills in Kampala, as the Jinja millers now 
began to outbid the Kampala millers at the auctions. 
Prices paid for cottonseed continued to rise; and 
more and more of the smaller millers found them-
selves in financial difficulties. At this time the 
larger millers appear to have been off-setting their 
losses on oil milling against their profits from 
some other enterprise, and thus were able to survive 
this period of abnormally high prices for cottonseed. 
An attempt was made by the millers through the 
Uganda Oilmillers Association to form a third pool-
ing agreement for the 1961-2 season, so that allo-
cations of seed could be made to all millers and 
also so that seed prices might be held down. 
However, a.fter the first few auctions of the season 
the agreement was broken, and in later seasons no 
further pooling agreements were made. 
The intense competition for cottonseed contin-
ued, and a number of milling firms went into volun-
tary or forced liquidation. The Jinja millers con-
tinued to dominate in the purchases of seed, and 
more and more Kampala millers ceased to operate. 
The responsibility for the Uganda Oilmillers Assoc-
iation fell into the hands of the Jinja millers in 
1965, and since that time no Chairman or Secretary 
has been appointed to the Association, which may be 
considered in 1966 as defunct. There is therefore 
now no voice for the grievances of the smaller 
millers. 
In 1 9 6 6 , the industry appeared to be dominated 
by four large millers in Jinja, often termed "the 
big four". There seems to be some measure of agree-
ment between these firms and the 14 or so others 
which still operate in Uganda. In the 19 6 5 - 6 season, 
70,000 out of a total of 100,000 tons of cottonseed 
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were sold by private treaty by the Lint Marketing 
Board to one of the "big four". The cottonseed was 
then divided amongst the millers in proportion to 
their purchases in the previous season and those in 
the earlier pax't of the 1965-6 season. However, 
there is no reason to believe that this group of 
millers will continue to agree amongst themselves. 
Meanwhile, in 1966, there are a large number of 
mills that remain silent in both Buganda and the 
Eastern Region. Some millers have sold their mach-
inery, while others hang on hoping that oil milling 
conditions may become more favourable in the future. 
The waste of resources involved in the shut-
down of these oil mills is unfortunate, and lessons 
should be drawn from the factors which led to this 
wastage. The main factor appears to have been the 
high profitability of oil milling in Uganda when the 
industry was under Government control in the imme-
diate post-war period. This led to a clamour 
amongst Asian businessmen to enter the industry, and 
ultimately when the industry was freed from all 
controls to a mass entry of firms, leading to the 
intense competition, rising prices for seed, and the 
inevitable losses. Another factor was the inability 
of the Government to cope with the situation as it 
arose. A warning of what was to follow first came 
when the industry was removed from the Control of 
Industries Order, and around twelve new oil mills 
were immediately erected, but even though the 
Government was troubled by allocating small amounts 
of seed to a larger number of firms even then, they 
did nothing to prevent further entry of firms into 
the industry. 
While one feels sympathetic towards those mil-
lers who have been forced out of the industry, as 
will be seen later, even the eighteen remaining 
firms in 1965 were operating at well under capacity, 
and there would seem to be no case for continuing to 
support a periphery of small firms in the industry 
by allocating cottonseed amongst all who claim to be 
oil millers. 
B. The Growth of the Industry 
The number of firms recorded in the Registry of 
Companies with oil milling as an activity in their 
Articles of Association, together with the dates of 
incorporation of the firms give the figures in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Period 
No. of Firms 
entering 
Industry 
No. of Firms 
leaving 
Industry* Year 
Cumulative 
No. of 
Firms 
beforel940 6 - 1940 6 
1940-45 1 2 - 1945 18 
1946-50 8 1 1950 25 
1951-55 18 - 1955 43 
1 9 5 6 - 6 0 5 4 1960 44 
1 9 6 1 - 6 5 1 9 1965 36 
* This represents firms going into liquidation 
Source: Registry of Companies Kampala, Uganda. 
These figures have two limitations. Firstly, a 
number of firms which have now been liquidated may 
have been excluded, and secondly some of the firms 
may no longer be engaged in oil milling. There is 
no means of telling from the files in the Registry 
of Companies whether an oil mill is still active. 
However, if these figures are considered toget-
her with the figures of the number of purchasers of 
cottonseed from the Lint Marketing Board, it is pos-
sible to find the percentage of these mills which 
were at any point in time, active in oil milling. 
These figures are shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Year No. of Ugandan 
1955 35 
1957-8 11 
1958-9 12 
1959-60 24 
1960-1 20 
1961-2 34 
1962-3 20 
1963-^ 16 
1964-5 18 
1 9 6 5 - 6 17 
Source: Private Communication with the Lint Market-
ing Board. 
Table 2.1 shows that new entrants to the indus-
try reached a peak in the 1951-5 period, immediately 
after the industry was freed from all controls. 
This evidence is backed up by that given by the eig-
hteen operative millers in 1965 for their purchases 
of expellers over the period 1940-65. This is shown 
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in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 
Actual No. of Cumulative Total 
Period Expellers Bought of Expellers 
19^0-45 
1946-50 
1951-55 
1 9 5 6 - 6 0 
1 9 6 1 - 6 6 
58 
25 
12 
22 
10 10 
32 
90 
115 
127 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
After the 1951-5 period, the number of new 
firms entering the industry declined, and the number 
of firms leaving the industry due to voluntary or 
forced liquidation steadily increased. 
In 1955, thirty-five out of a total of forty-
three (or 81 per cent) of the firms purchased some 
cottonseed from the Lint Marketing Board. By 1 9 6 0 . 
only twenty-four out of forty-four (or 55 per cent) 
of the firms purchased cottonseed, while in 1965 
eighteen out of thirty-six (or 5° per cent) of the 
firms purchased cottonseed. 
Thus the impression is one of a declining oil 
milling industry both in terms of the absolute num-
ber of firms registered with oil milling as an acti-
vity in the Registry of Companies and in terms of 
the activity of those who were registered. These 
conclusions are in no way invalidated by the surpri-
singly high number of firms purchasing cottonseed in 
the 1961-2 season. In that season thirty-four out 
of approximately forty firms purchased cottonseed, 
yielding a considerably higher percentage of active 
firms than in either 1960 or 1965- However, this 
much greater participation by the firms in the indu-
stry was a direct result of the pooling agreement in 
that season organised through the Uganda Oilmillers 
Association. 
C. Supplies of Seed to the Industry 
1. Cottonseed. Cottonseed is the major oilseed 
used in the oil milling industry in Uganda. All 
cottonseed has been the property of the Lint Market-
ing Board since 1953 > and it is from this Board that 
the millers make their purchases. The total amounts 
of 'AR' and 'BR' seed sold to the millers by the 
Lint Marketing Board are shown in Table 2.4. These 
include small sales of seed to Kenyan millers in 
some years. 
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Table 2.4 
•AR' Cottonseed 'BR' Cottonseed Total 
(Tons) 
1954-5 87,651 -- -
1955-6 110,500 - -
1956-7 114,595 - -
1957-8 107,381 - -
1958-9 1 2 5 , 4 1 0 - -
1959-60 105,190 13,322 118,512 
1960-1 108,321 9 , 6 3 8 117,992 
196l-2b 3 5 , 7 0 9 8,592 44,301 
1 9 6 2 - 3 101,055 11,604 112,659 
1963-^ 104,982 13,283 118,265 
1964-5 118,714 13,116 131,830 
a. Prior to the 1959-60 season sales of 'BR' seed, 
i.e. stained cottonseed, were not registered 
through the L.M.B. 
h. This was the year of flooding. 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports 1955-65, 
(Uganda Argus Ltd., Kampala, Uganda) 
All imports of cottonseed are banned, lest such 
imports should lead to a mixing of varieties in 
Uganda, and exports of cottonseed have ceased 
because of the high ruling prices in Uganda. Evid-
ence from traders indicates that prices for cotton-
seed in Uganda must fall to around Shs. 300 per ton 
in order to make exports outside East Africa profit-
able. However, since the 1958-9 season, px-ices for 
1AR 1 cottonseed in Uganda have been continually 
above this level. A few Kenyan firms have made 
small purchases of cottonseed in recent years, 
although, except for the 1961-2 season, prices for 
cottonseed in Uganda have been consistently above 
those in Kenya. There have been no sales of cotton-
seed to Tanzania. Figures for exports and sales to 
Kenya are shown in Table 2.5-
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Table 2.5 
Exports of Cottonseed Sales of Cottonseed 
Outside East Africa(tons) to Kenya (tons) 
1955 37 -
1956 14 , 6 0 6 -
1957 1,3 96 -
1958 402 298 
1959 - -
1960 39 -
1961 - -
1 9 6 2 - 1 3 2 
1963 - 229 
1964 - -
1965 - -
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya, 1955-65. (Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise, East Africa) 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicate that a very high 
percentage of the marketable surplus of cottonseed 
in Uganda is sold to the Ugandan millers. It seems 
unfortunate that no imports of cottonseed were 
allowed for oil crushing in the light of the excess 
capacity in the industry. In the early 1950's, when 
the industry was critically short of seed, supplies 
of seed were readily available in the Mwanza region 
of Tanzania. A large oil milling industry has now 
emerged centred on Mwanza, and the opportunity to 
obtain supplies of seed from Mwanza Region has been 
lost. 
As noted earlier, prices paid by the millers 
for cottonseed have been strongly influenced by the 
intense competition amongst millers to obtain seed. 
These average prices are shown in Table 2.6 It 
v/ill be noted that no distinction has been made 
between the two varieties of cottonseed since the 
1958-9 season. 
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T a b l e 2 - 6 (Shs./Ton) 
'AR' Cottonseed 'BR' Cottonseed 
Season BP 5 2 S 47 
1 9 5 3 - 4 3 1 0 285 -
1 9 5 4 - 5 570 484 -
1 9 5 5 - 6 400 37 6 -
1 9 5 6 - 7 452 438 -
1 9 5 7 - 8 281 364 -
1 9 5 8 - 9 ? 6 ? ?5 9 -
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 467 424 
1 9 6 0 - 1 468 392 
1 9 6 1 - 2 354 396 
1 9 6 2 - 3 455 342 
1 9 6 3-4 403 244 
1964-5 499 373 
1 9 6 5 - 6 513 -
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 
1954-65, (Uganda Argus Ltd., Kampala, 
Uganda)" 
Also private communication with the Lint 
Marketing Board. 
It is interesting to note, from Table 2,6 the 
effect which pooling agreements have had on the pri-
ces of cottonseed. The 1957-8 pooling agreement in 
the BP 5 2 zone led to a fall of over Shs. 170 in the 
price received for BP 52 cottonseed as compared with 
the price of the previous season, while prices in 
the S 47 zone only fell around Shs. 70. The 1961-2 
pooling agreement led to a 24 per cent fall in the 
price as compared with the previous season, the 
price returning to almost its 1960-1 level in 1962-3 
Another interesting effect of the pooling agreement 
in 1961-2 was that 'BR' seed prices actually excee-
ded 'AR1 seed prices on average. The higher price 
for 'BR' seed was the result of a short crop in that 
year. Initially 'AR' prices were low due to the 
pooling agreement, but when the agreement broke down 
in the latter part of the season, and the millers 
realized the severe shortage of cottonseed for crus-
hing, prices bid for 'BR' seed rose sharply and act-
ually exceeded those paid for 'AR' seed in the earl-
ier part of the season. 
Cottonseed prices reached an all time high in 
the 1 9 6 5 - 6 season. Prices of Shs. 595, 575 and 545 
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were received for seed sold at the first three auct-
ions of this season, Shs •-^ •595 being a record price 
for cottonseed in Uganda. The remaining seed, as 
mentioned earlier, was sold by private treaty at 
Shsp490, giving an overall average price of Shs. 513 
for the season. The prices at the first three auct-
ions indicate that intense competition for seed still 
continued in the industry. 
It is also interesting to compare the number of 
firms making purchases of cottonseed (see Table 2.2) 
and the changes in price. In 1 9 6 0 , the number of 
purchasers doubled as compared with the previous year 
and cottonseed prices rose by 30 per cent. Apart 
from that year, the number of purchasers does not 
seem to have been an important factor in determining 
cottonseed prices. 
The intense competition for seed, leading to 
high prices has undoubtedly been in the best inter-
ests of the Lint Marketing Board. In every year 
since the Lint Marketing Board became responsible 
for the sale of cottonseed, the accounts of the 
Board have shown a trading loss on cotton lint off-
set in part or wholly by a trading profit on cotton-
seed. These figures are shown in Table 2.7-
Table 2.7 
Trading Losses Trading Pro 
on Cotton Lint on Cottonseed Loss 
fits Gross Trading 
195*+--55 320,640 1,578,144 -1,257,504 
1955--56 6 5 6 , 6 9 7 1 , 2 2 2 , 3 8 9 - 5 6 5 , 6 9 2 
1956-•57 1,379,936 1,544,476 - 164,540 
1957--58 3,507,5^5 834,776 2 , 6 7 2 , 7 6 9 
1958--59 3,454,7^8 1,087,149 2,367,599 
1959-.60 619,242 1,778,822 -1,159,580 
1960-• 61 2,326,711 1,552,091 7 7 4 , 6 2 0 
1961--62 1,732,102 229,625 1,502,477 
1962-•63 4 , 1 4 9 , 0 6 0 1,353,835 2,795,225 
1963--64 1 , 9 8 3 , 6 5 1 1,401,523 5 8 2 , 1 2 8 
1964-.65 4 , 1 2 2,447 2,256,359 1,866,088 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 
1955-65. (Uganda Argus Ltd. Kampala, Uganda) 
See Trading Account. 
It is particularly interesting.to study these 
figures in the light of the price figures given in 
Table 2.6. Low prices in 1957-58 and 1961-62 caused 
trading profits on cottonseed to fall below £1 m, 
while the 1964-65 price of Shs. 499 raised profits 
on cottonseed to more than £2 m. As the price which 
the Government can offer to growers for their seed 
cotton depends partially on cottonseed prices, 
strong competition amongst millers has helped to 
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maintain these prices. 
The price margin between 'AR' and 'BR' seed in 
the period 1959-60 to 1964-5 varied between Shs. 43 
and Shs. 159 excluding 1961-2. The difference in 
the amount of oil produced from one ton of 'AR' and 
'BR' cottonseed is around 67 lbs of oil, which, val-
ued at 90 cents per lb, gives a margin of around 
Shs, 60 in favour of 'AR' seed. However, the cake 
may be of inferior quality in the case of !BR S seed. 
It is doubtful whether there is a cost advantage in 
the crushing of 'BR' seed, otherwise presumably 
competition for 'BR' seed would narrow the margin 
between !AR ! and 'BR' prices. What is probably hap-
pening is that millers are mainly concerned with 
obtaining 'AR! cottonseed, and that the competitive 
force is not so great in the 'BR' market, as 'BR' 
seed forms only 10 per cent of the total cottonseed 
available. The exception to this was in 1961-2, 
when as the millers realised the shortness of the 
crop, intense competition developed for 'BR' seed, 
and 'BR' prices actually exceeded 'AR' prices. 
In Table 2.8 changes in the prices of cotton-
seed paid by the millers are compared with changes 
in the prices of cottonseed cake and of oil. 
Table 2.8 
Season 
Prices of 'AR' 
Cottonseed 
Expressed as $ 
of previous yr 
Prices of cc^t-
tonseed cake 
as % of prev-
ious year 
Prices of oil 
as $ of 
Previous year 
1954-5 176 • 9 109 • 5 _ 
1955-6 74 1 92 1 -
1956-7 114 .8 89 • 7 -
1957-8 72 .7 69 • 5 -
1958-9 113 • 9 138 .4 -
1959-60 1 2 9 8 103 0 -
1960-1 100 2 90 .4 -
1961-2 75 .6 112 .8 -
1962-3 128 • 5 109 .4 80. 6 
1963-4 88 .6 95 .7 110. 1 
1964-5 123 .8 105 .4 l4o. 7 
1965-6 102 8 - 84. 9 
Sources: a. Table 2.6. Average of BP52 and S47pric.es 
used for 1954-8. 
b. Calculated from quantity and value data 
given in E.A. Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya, 1955-65-(Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise East Africa) 
c. Calculated from figures given by millers. 
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The figures of Table 2.8 indicate that millers 
appear to be aware of the ruling price for cotton-
seed cake in the world market, and are to some ext-
ent influenced in their bidding at the auctions by 
these prices. For the eleven years considered, cot-
tonseed prices and cake prices only moved in oppos-
ite directions in the seasons 1956-7, 1960-1 and 
1961-2. The 1961-2 perverse movement was undoubted-
ly caused by the pooling agreement in that year. 
Unfortunately only a limited amount of data is 
available on oil prices, but the four years given do 
not indicate a direct relationship between cotton-
seed prices and oil prices. This is probably to be 
expected, as oil prices are very flexible and may 
change overnight, and therefore the miller is unlik-
ely to consider current oil prices when deciding the 
price he is willing to bid for cottonseed. However, 
the miller may consider the previous season's oil 
price, but there is insufficient data available to 
put this to the test. 
Table 2.9 shows the share of the total amount 
of cottonseed taken by 'the big four' and the remai-
ning purchasers. 
Table 2.9 
% of 'AR' Seed ^ of 'AR' Seed 
Taken by Taken by Other No. of Other 
Season 'The Big Four' Purchasers Purchasers 
1957-8 95 5 7 
1958-9 87 13 8 
1959-60 71 29 20 
1960-1 74 26 16 
1961-2 63 37 31 
1962-3 74 26 18 
1963-^ 80 20 13 
1964-5 75 25 16 
1 9 6 5 - 6 78 22 14 
Source: Private communication with the Lint Market-
ing Board. 
a. Kenyan millers are included in this total, but 
only account for very small percentages in the 
seasons 1961-2 to 1965-6 inclusive. 
These figures indicate the extent to which 'the 
big four' dominate the seed purchasing market, acco-
unting for 77 per cent on average of the purchases 
of all millers from the Lint Marketing Board over 
the period 1957-8 to 1 9 6 5 - 6 . It is almost certainly 
these four firms who dictate the prices in the mar-
ket, and whose lead other millers must follow if 
they are to purchase any seed. If the smaller mill-
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ers were to offer lower prices at the auctions, they 
would be outbidden by 'the big four'. However, the 
smaller firms usually have higher operating costs 
and less opportunity to offset their losses in oil 
milling against profits from another enterprise and 
so are unable to outbid 'the big four' at the aucti-
ons. In this situation, the smaller millers must 
become followers of 'the big four' if they are to 
make any purchases of cottonseed at all. 
'The big four' can hold a monopsony position in 
the seed buying market, while prices continue at a 
high level. Tanzanian millers are not permitted to 
import supplies of cottonseed, and while prices in 
the Lakie Area continue to be lower than those in 
Uganda, the Lake Area seed will obviously be more 
attractive to the few Kenyan millers who purchase 
cottonseed than the Ugandan seed. Further, high 
prices prohibit competition for seed from the expor-
ters. Thus 'the big four's1 hold on the market is 
virtually assured while they are willing to pay high 
prices for their seed, but a fall in prices could 
well lead to not only increased competition from 
other millers in Uganda, but also to increased comp-
etition from Kenyan millers and exporters. 
2. Groundnuts• Groundnuts are of only compara-
tively minor importance to the Uganda oil milling 
industry, because of the difficulty of obtaining 
supplies at a price which enables them to be crushed 
profitably. They are purchased by the millers on 
the free market. 
In 1965, 600,000 acres of groundnuts were plan-
ted in^^Uganda yielding around 178,600 tons of groun-
dnuts. A large proportion of these groundnuts were 
consumed directly in the producing areas. The grou-
ndnuts which came on to the market were either sold 
for consumption shelled or unshelled in the towns, 
sold for export shelled and graded or were crushed 
by the oil millers. 
No figures are available for the quantity of 
groundnuts purchased for consumption, but this is 
believed to account for a large percentage of the 
marketed groundnuts. Indeed, it appears more profi-
table for the millers to purchase groundnuts, shell 
the nuts and then re-sell, than for the millers to 
crush the groundnuts. 
If we consider the product of one ton of 
groundnuts -
2240 lbs of groundnuts gives: .-
806.4 lbs oil (36 per cent rate)^ 
and 1232.0 lbs cake(55 per cent rate). 
Valuing the oil at Shs.1 per lb and the cake at Shs. 
620 per ton (these are the highest prices likely to 
be obtained) the revenue would be: 
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from oil 806.40 
from cake 3*4-1. 00 
Total Shs. 1,147 r^O 
Allowing for crushing costs at Shs. 60 per ton 
this gives a total revenue of Shs. 1087. 
The average prices for shelled groundnuts are 
shown in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10 
Season Price in cts/lb Price in shs/ton 
1 9 6 1 - 6 2 48 1075. . 20 
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 44 985. .60 
1 9 6 3-64 48 1 0 7 5 . . 20 
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 69 1545. .60 
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 60 1344. , 00 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Entebbe, 
Monthly Price Bulletins for I 9 6 I - 6 ) 
(Unpublished) Prices taken for 
Kampala. 
Note: The season applies to the groundnut season 
operating from the middle of the year. 
Even allowing a margin of Shs. 25 per ton for 
shelling costs, it would have been barely profitable 
for millers to crush groundnuts in most years, and 
would certainly have been far less profitable than 
shelling and re-selling from mid-1964 onwards. 
The prices received for exported groundnuts to-
gether with the quantities exported are shown in 
Table 2.11. (Sal es of groundnuts to Kenya and Tanza-
nia have only amounted to a few hundred tons) 
Table 2.11 
Export Price 
Export Price less Transport Quantity 
f.o.r. Mombasa Cost to Coast Exported in 
Shs/Ton a Shs/Ton Tons a 
1960 1 1 5 6 1084 9507 
1 9 6 1 1 1 8 2 1110 9179 
1 9 6 2 952 880 7247 
1 9 6 3 1 0 5 2 980 3500 
1964 1174 1 1 0 2 3804 
1 9 6 5 1556 1484 3 1 6 
Source:aEast African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya 1960/5 
k (Commissioner of Customs & Excise, E. Africa) 
East African Railways and Harbours Tariff Book No.4 
Part II (Aread Lithographic Printers, East Africa) 
Cost from Jinja to Mombasa. 
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These figures show that export prices are in 
most years insufficiently high as compared with 
local prices to make large scale export of ground-
nuts attractive. A comparison of the returns from 
crushing and those from exports indicates that in 
some years exports have been more worthwhile. How-
ever, it would seem that it is local prices rather 
than export prices, which are having the major 
influence on the quantity of groundnuts crushed by 
the millers. A further factor limiting the quantity 
of groundnuts crushed in the 1960's may be fear on 
the part of the millers over selling their groundnut 
cake if it contained aflatoxin. The millers would 
therefore tend to shell and re-sell groundnuts 
rather than crush them. 
In 1963, a total of 6,200 tons of unshelled 
groundnuts was purchased by the oil millers, and 
probably around 5,500 tons were actually used during 
that year. The amount of groundnut cake sold 
through the. Jtampala Produce Exchange in 1963 w a s 
1,483 tons. Using a 55 per cent extraction rate 
for cake from groundnuts, this would imply that 
around 2,700 tons of groundnuts were crushed by the 
millers in 1963, leaving a total of 2,800 tons which 
the millers shelled and then re-sold. 
In 1964 the m i l l e ^ used around 5,300 tons of 
unshelled groundnuts. (A price of 29 cts per lb 
was assumed A total of 1,577 tons of groundnut 
cake was sold,Qthrough the Kampala Produce Exchange 
in that year, and only 590 tons eu^ e recorded for 
total sales in the trade figures. Again using a 
55 per cent extraction rate, these figures indicate 
that in 1964 around 2,900 tons of groundnuts were 
crushed, and around 2,400 tons shelled and re-sold 
by the millers. 
In 1 9 6 5 , the oil millers claimed to have 
crushed nearly 5,000 tons of groundnuts, but only 
1,050 tons of groundnut cake were sold^'through the 
Kampala Produce Exchange in that year, and the 
trade figure^nnly show total sales by Uganda of 800 
tons of cake. Thus it seems unlikely that more 
than 2,000 tons of groundnuts were crushed in 1965, 
and the 5,000 tons probably refers to purchases for 
crushing and shelling and re-sale. 
Thus in recent years, the millers appear to 
have been purchasing around 5,000 tons of groundnuts 
each year, 2-3,000 tons of which are crushed, and 
the remainder of which are shelled and then re-sold. 
3. Other Oilseeds. These include sesame seed, 
sunflower seed, shea butter nuts and castor seed, 
all of which are only crushed by a small number of 
miller's in very small quantities. The seeds are 
purchased by the millers on the free market. 
The most important of these lesser oilseeds in 
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Uganda is sesame seed, which as far as the millers 
are concerned is very similar to groundnuts. In the 
early days of the oil milling industry in Uganda, 
sesame seed appears to have been more important than 
it is now, but no exact figures are known. In 1965 , 
the millers claimed to have crushed only around 400 
tons of sesame seed. The reason given by the mill-
ers for not crushing larger quantities of this seed, 
was that they could not obtain supplies of the seed. 
What is probably meant is that supplies cannot be 
obtained at such a price as to make crushing profit-
able . 
The average prices received for sesame seed in 
Kampala are shown in Table 2.12. 
Table 2.12 
Season Price in cts/lb Price in Shs/Ton 
1 9 6 1 - 2 49 1 0 9 7 . ,60 
1 9 6 2 - 3 56 1 2 5 4 . .40 
1 9 6 3 - 4 52 1164. ,80 
1964-5 51 1142. ,40 
1 9 6 5 - 6 61 1366, ,40 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Entebbe, 
Monthly Price Bulletins, 1961-6, 
(Unpublished) 
Note: Season operates from July to June. 
Assuming that the same revenue would be recei-
ved as from crushing groundnuts i.e. 1087 Shs. per 
ton, from mid-196l onwards the revenue would be ins-
ufficient to offset the cost of purchasing the sesame 
seed. 
Some clue as to the amount of sesame seed crus-
hed may be obtained from considering the sales of 
sesame oil for export and to Tanzania and Kenya. 
Unfortunately no estimates of the amount of sesame 
oil produced and consumed in Uganda are available. 
The figures for sales to other countries are shown 
in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13 
Total Sales of Sesame Amount of Sesame Seed 
Oil to Other Countries Required to Produce This 
Year in Tons Oil (36$ rate) in Tons 
1960 10, ,8 30 
1 9 6 1 60. . 2 167 
1962 - -
1963 0 , .k 1 
196k Ik. .6 kx 
1965 10. . 0 28 
Source: East African Customs and Excise Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika , Uganda and Kenya, 
1960-5" (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, 
East Africa) 
These figures only put a minimum, though, on 
the amount of sesame seed crushed. It is thought 
that probably 500 tons is the maximum amount likely 
to have been crushed in any year. While prices for 
sesame seed remain above 50 cts per lb, it is 
unlikely that crushing of this seed will increase. 
Only two millers in Uganda claimed to have 
crushed sunflower seed at some time, and in 1965 
only one firm was crushing this seed. This firm was 
experimenting with the seed, and had crushed 15 tons. 
Only small amounts of sunflower seed have been sold 
to other countries by Uganda. 
Shea butter nuts are obtained from a tree often 
growing wild in parts of Northern Uganda. The crop 
appears to be very spasmodic, and it appears that 
millers may crush a few hundred tons of this seed to 
provide oil as a base for soap manufacture. (The 
oil produced is not an edible oil.) The cake is 
used for manure. 
A total of four firms in Uganda had at some 
time crushed this seed, and in 1965 the millers 
claimed to have crushed 250 tons. 
Only one firm in Uganda has crushed castor seed, 
this firm crushing around. 100 tons each year. The 
oil is used for industrial and medicinal purposes, 
and the cake for manure. Crushing of castor seed is 
rather specialized and expellers used for this 
purpose must be very thoroughly cleaned before being 
used for crushing of other seeds. Possibly one of 
the major reasons for the limited scale of castor 
seed crushing is the established export market for 
the seed. (Only small amounts are sold to Kenya and 
none to Tanzania). Quantities exported together with 
prices are shown in Table 2.1b. 
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Table 2.14 
Exports of Castor Seed Price in Shs/Ton 
in Tons f.o.b. Mombasa 
1 9 6 0 1684 1 0 7 6 
1 9 6 1 1 7 2 0 1090 
1 9 6 2 2 5 8 1 876 
1 9 6 3 2505 828 
1964 1 9 6 7 900 
1 9 6 5 1 6 1 8 858 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya, 1960-5-(Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise, East Africa). 
These prices are favourable when compared with 
the average price for castor seed in Uganda. See 
Table 2.15. 
Table 2.15 
Price in cts/lb Price in Shs/Ton 
1961 39 8 7 3 , 6 0 
1 9 6 2 29 649-60 
1963 33 739-20 
1964 34 7 6 1 . 6 0 
1 9 6 5 29 649-60 
1 9 6 6 33 739-20 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Entebbe, 
Monthly Price Bulletins, 1961-6. 
(Unpublished)Average prices for 
Kampala. 
Even allowing for t l ^ cost of transport of Shs. 
75 per ton to the coast, export of castor seed 
would have been profitable throughout the period 
1961-5. If, though, prices continue to fall on the 
export market, crushing may become more worthwhile. 
Even so the skill and care required to crush this 
seed may limit its crushing to a small number of 
firms. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE OPERATION OF UGANDAN MILLS 
A. Techniques of Production 
There are three stages in the production of an 
edible oil from an oilseed, the first consisting of 
the pretreatment of the seed, the second of the 
extraction of the oil from the seed and the third of 
the refining of the oil to produce an acceptable 
product for edible purposes. 
1. Pretreatment• Under the heading of pre-
treatment are included the processes of cleaning, 
delinting, decortication, and storage of the seed. 
Seed delivered to the oil mill will often con-
tain quantities of dirt, stones and tramp iron, 
which may contaminate the oil and do physical damage 
to the extraction machinery. One method of prevent-
ing damage from tramp iron is to have a magnet fixed 
to the decorticator. For removing dirt and stones 
cleaning machinery is required. Most of the decort-
icators in use in Uganda make use of this magnet 
device, but not many firms appeared to make use of 
cleaning equipment. 
The delinting process only applies to cotton-
seed and involves the removal of the lint which rem-
ains on the seed after ginning. If this lint is not 
removed, the cake will have a higher fibre content, 
and thus be of poorer quality. Although delinting 
is highly desirable, it does not generally prove to 
be economic in Uganda with the high costs in terms 
of power required to operate the delinting machinery 
and the rather uncertain market for the product (the 
linters). In 1965 twelve of the eighteen operative 
mills in Uganda owned delinting equipment, but only 
eight were actually making use of the equipment. 
The inability to use the equipment was the result, 
not only of the high cost of delinting in terms of 
power requirements, but also of the fact that many 
firms had insufficient delinting equipment to delint 
all the seed which they were crushing. 
Decortication involves the removal of the outer 
shell of the seed. First the husk of the^seed is 
cracked and then the loose husk removed. Although 
Ugandan cottonseed can be crushed without prior dec-
ortication, this usually leads to a lower output of 
oil from the seed and a poorer quality of cake being 
produced. Some millers in Uganda do, though, from 
time to time crush undecorticated seed. Most of the 
decorticators in use in Uganda consist of rotating 
knives and with such decorticators the correct sett-
ing of the knives is important. If the settings are 
too close some of the inner part of the seed will be 
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chopped up, while if too wide whole undecorticat^pd 
seeds will slip through. It has been suggested 
that an improved method of decortication is to set 
the knives so that around 70 per cent of the seed is 
cracked the first time through the decorticator, and 
then the remaining 30 per cent unhulled should be 
fed to another decorticator with knives set to crack 
the smaller seeds. In fact, only three of the larg-
er firms in Uganda possess more than one decortica-
tor and two of these firms claimed to use this dual 
method of decortication. These two firms do, though, 
account together for around 50 per cent of the seed 
crushed in Uganda. 
One test of the efficiency of the decortication 
process is to measure the amount of oil in the husk. 
Technologists have suggested that the oil content of 
the husk should be less than 1 per cent. Unfortuna-
tely, only one firm could give information on the 
amount of oil in the hulls, this firm being one of 
the two using the dual method mentioned above. They 
gave a figure of 0.36 per cent, but there is no rea-
son to believe that this figure, satisfactory as it 
is, reflects in any way the position throughout 'the 
Ugandan industry. In fact, as none of the other 
firms make any such tests, it is probable that they 
have little idea as to the amount of oil in their 
husk, and thus of whether the settings of their 
decorticators are correct. In 1965 > fourteen of the 
eighteen firms possessed decorticators, the remain-
ing four firms making use of grinding mills for rem-
oving the outer shell, a rather less efficient meth-
od. One of the firms with a decorticator was crush-
ing whole seed. 
Although not strictly a process, proper storage 
of the seed to prevent deterioration is an important 
prerequisite for efficient milling. As the Ugandan 
millers do not hold stocks of seed from one season 
to another, it is short term storage which is relev-
ant. All the millers claimed to have adequate stor-
age to hold stocks of seed comparable with their 
expelling capacity in the short run. As most of the 
mills only crush small quantities of seed, this was 
not surprising, and it is not thought that inadequ-
ate storage was leading to any large scale loss of 
efficiency in the industry. 
2. Extraction. The second stage, the actual 
extraction of the oil from the oilseed, may make use 
of hydraulic presses, screw presses (expellers) or 
solvent extractors. The hydraulic press process is 
comparatively efficient, but is a batch process and 
labour intensive. The screw press process has in 
general superseded the hydraulic press, and reduces 
the amount of oil left in the cake to around 2 per 
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cent for the most modern expellers and around 6 per 
cent for older expellers. (As the oil is the most 
valuable product of the oilseed, and as cake with 
too high a fat content is often less acceptable, the 
level of profits and thus the efficiency of the 
industry depends on the amount of oil which can be 
extracted). Solvent extraction plant will reduce 
the amount of oil left in the cake to 1 per cent, 
and is thus the most efficient process of the three. 
However, while the capacity of a firm using expel-
lers can be easily increased by adding to the number 
of expellers or decreased by putting some expellers 
temporarily out of action, the solvent extraction 
plant requires a fairly constant supply of seed, and 
a minimiun throughput of at least 9,000-15,000 tons 
of seed per 300-day year in order for operations to 
be economic. 
The older-type of expellers are used by the 
smaller firms in Uganda, but some modern expellers 
are operated by 'the big four'. One firm is consid-
ering the possibility of installing a modern solvent 
extraction plant. With a large number of firms 
operating often for only a few months of the year, 
and crushing only small amounts of seed, the use of 
expellers i.i the Ugandan industry seems rational. 
Only 'the L: g four' crush sufficient seed to poss-
ibly justify the use of continuous solvent extract-
i on plant. 
A total of 127 expellers were owned by the 
eighteen millers in 1965, the total for individual 
firms varying from twenty-five at the one extreme to 
two at the other. 
The average number of tons of seed which can be 
crushed per expeller per year in the industry, was 
found by considering the number of expellers owned 
by each firm and relating them to the claimed crush-
ing capacity of the firm. This gave an average fig-
ure of 1 , 6 3 0 tons per expeller per year for all the 
firms in the industry, and of 1 , 6 9 0 tons for 'the 
big four'. 
Given that the expeller capacity of the older-
type expellers is 10 tons per 24 hours for first 
crush^ngs, and 8 tons per 24 hours for second crush-
ings, this indicates a potential output of 1,333 
tons per expeller per year. Thus the figures above 
are not unreasonable in the light of the fact that 
'the big four' own some of the more modern expellers. 
Of the expellers owned by the eighteen millers 
in 1965* 73 per cent were the Rose-Down expellers 
from Great Britain, 14 per cent were the Krupp expe-
llers from West Germany, 10 per cent were of Indian 
manufacture and 2 per cent from South Africa. Opin-
ions given by the millers as to the advantages and 
29 
disadvantages of the different makes of expellers 
varied. The popularity of the Rose-Down expeller 
may be explained, particularly in the early years 
of the industry, by its availability, but is probab-
ly also explained by its price. The average prices 
of vegetable oil crushing machinery imported into 
Uganda over the period 1951-65 from the four major 
countries concerned are shown in Table 3*1. 
Table 3.1 
Average Price per cental 
Country of Origin 1951-1965 
Great Britain £19.9 
India £17.8a 
South Africa £26.7 
West Germany £26.8 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya, 1951-65. (Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise, East Africa.) 
Note: a - includes purchases of second-hand machinery. 
Although the Indian machinery appears to be the 
cheapest, some may be second-hand, and further, Ind-
ian machinery, in many cases a copy of the Rose-Down 
model, is reputed to be less efficient in terms of 
oil extracted. 
Despite its higher price, the German Krupp exp-
eller has become increasingly popular. Some millers 
claim that it is more efficient than the Rose-Down 
model, but no test has been made of this statement. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the effi-
ciency of the extraction process is measured by the 
amount of oil left in the cake. Most millers clai-
med to leave only 6-7 per cent of oil in cottonseed 
cake, and 7-9 per cent in groundnut cake, although 
three firms did give a figure of 7-9 per cent oil in 
their cottonseed cake. No tests were done to subst-
antiate these claims, but most millers claimed to 
receive at least 13 per cent oil from their 'AR' 
cottonseed in 1965- Assuming an oil content of 19-
20 per cent for Ugandan cottonseed, the claims of 
the millers seem to be correct. These figures ind-
icate that given the existing extraction machinery 
in the industry, the industry was operating fairly 
efficiently. 
3. Refining and Hydrogenation. The purpose of 
the third stage, refining, is to remove any substan-
ces which may be injurious to the consumer from the 
crude oil. These substances include the free fatty 
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acids, and colour", smell-, and taste-giving substa-
nces. The amount of these substances in the partic-
ular oil depends on the type of oilseed being crush-
ed and on the method of extraction. 
The term semi-refined oil (as used in Uganda), 
refers to oil that has only been neutralized, while 
that of double-refined oil refers to oil that has 
been neutralized, bleached and deodorised. Both 
semi- and double-refined oil are produced in Uganda. 
In the process of neutralization, caustic soda 
is added to the oil under certain conditions so as 
to remove some of the free fatty acids from the oil 
and the oil is repeatedly washed to remove all 
traces of soap. The residue containing the free 
fatty acids is generally used as soap-stock. 
In order to improve the quality of the oil, the 
oil may be bleached after neutralization by adding 
quantities of Fullers Earth and active carbon, and 
finally deodorised by blowing steam through the oil 
at high temperatures. These latter two processes 
give an oil which is neutral in both taste and flav-
our, usually referred to as double-refined or fully-
refined oil. 
In some cases the miller may take the product-
ion process one stage further and hydrogenate his 
oil. The purpose of hydrogenation is to raise the 
melting point of the oil, and so make it possible to 
market a solid fat. The oil should be pre-refined 
before hydrogenation, and post-refined afterwards. 
Two Ugandan firms hydrogenate their oil to produce 
vegetable ghee and solid fats using some cottonseed 
oil, which unhydrogenated is in a liquid state at 
normal temperatures. 
Normally there will be some losses when the 
crude oil is refined, the extent of the losses depe-
nding on theglength of time for which the seed has 
been stored. Storage over time increases the free 
fatty acids in the cottonseed, and thus increases 
the losses in the neutralization process. Overall 
losses for producing double-refined oil may rise 
from 5 per cent for fresh seed to 7 per cent for 
seed held in store, andQfor semi-refined oil from k 
per cent to 6 per cent. Total losses in hydrogena-
tion including the pre- and pos^refining stages 
amount to around 6.k per cent. 
Information obtained on the industry was not 
sufficiently accurate to make any estimates of refi-
ning losses by millers. Nor was it possible to test 
the quality of the oils and fats produced, and thus 
it is not possible to make any conclusions as to the 
efficiency of the refining process in the industry. 
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B. Activities of Firms 
1. Refining and Hydrogenation. There were eig-
hteen firms crushing oilseeds in Uganda in 1965 , of 
whom only six had plant for producing double-refined 
oil, and two of these also had hydrogenation plant. 
One further mill was installing double—refining cap-
acity to be operative in 1966. 
This means that in 1965 the operation of twelve 
of the mills was confined to the production of semi-
refined oil, i.e. oil which has been neutralized but 
not deodorized or bleached. This oil is inferior to 
double-refined oil, but finds a market for local 
consumption amongst lower paid groups. As will be 
shown later some of this oil is re-sold to millers 
with double-refining plant. 
The four firms with double-refining plant conc-
entrated their production almost completely on doub-
le-refined oil, while the two firms with double-ref-
ining and hydrogenation plant produced both double-
refir.ed oil and vegetable ghee. This ghee is a 
cheap substitute for animal ghee, and finds a ready 
market with those who cannot afford the animal ghee. 
One of the firms with hydrogenafcion plant was also 
producing solid fats in the form of shortening and 
margarine. 
2. Soap Manufacture. Six of the firms operat-
ing in 1965 made use of the soap-stock, produced as 
a by-product in the oil milling process, as a basis 
for the manufacture of soap. Three of these firms 
supplemented their supplies of soap-stock with supp-
lies of copra and palm oil purchased from outside 
Uganda. Five of the firms were producing ordinary 
laundry soap, but one firm was producing high quali-
ty toilet soap in addition. A seventh firm was pla-
nning to install plant for producing both laundry 
and toilet soap. 
3. Grain Milling. Seven of the eighteen firms 
were also grain milling, maize being the most impor-
tant crop milled. The link between grain milling 
and oil crushing results from the relationship bet-
ween millers and local produce dealers often arising 
from some other subsidiary activity of the firm. 
The maize meal is usually sold locally. 
4. Groundnut Shelling. This activity practised 
by six firms in 1965, all except one of which was 
located in the Eastern Region, was mentioned in 
Chapter II, Section C.2. Here it was pointed out 
that the millers shell and re-sell, either for local 
consumption or for export, around 2,500 tons of 
groundnuts each year. 
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5- Tin Manufacture. Two of 'the big four' 
firms own their own factories for the manufacture of 
tins for oil and ghee. The tins are constructed 
from tin-plate imported into Uganda, and not only 
supply the needs of the firms producing them but 
also are sold to a number of other millers in Uganda. 
Prices paid for the tins vary between Shs. 3-10 and 
Shs. 3-50 for a four gallon tin, which prices appear 
to be in line with the cost of purchasing similar 
tins from the Metal Box Co., Ltd. at Thika. One of 
the two firms was producing 60,000-70,000 tins each 
year. 
6. Other Activities. Eleven of the eighteen 
firms also operated ginneries, three had interests 
in sugar plantations, while others had interests in 
produce dealing, coffee, sisal and tea. Two of the 
Jinja millers also owned oil mills in Tanzania. All 
'the big four' had one of the above activities as a 
major activity. 
7. Past Activities of Redundant Mills. In evi-
dence from ten redundant mills, it was found that 
none of these firms had owned double-refining plant. 
Seven of the firms had milled grain, four had produ-
ced laundry soap, and two had shelled groundnuts. 
Only one firm had links with any other major enter-
prise, this firm being engaged in large-scale sisal 
production in Tanzania. 
C. Size and Structure of Firms 
In 1961 the Oil Millers Association listed 
their member firms into small* medium and large. Of 
the thirty mills listed as operative at that time, 
fifteen were ^lassified as small, five as medium and 
ten as large. However, the criterion used for this 
classification of firms is unknown. 
In Table 3.2 the eighteen firms operative in 
1965 are classified according to their total capaci-
ties and utilized capacities in that year. 
Table 3-2 
Capacity in Tons Total Capacity Utilized Capacity 
of Seed Crushed No. of Firms No. of Firms 
Under 5,000 1 1 1 
5 ,000-10,000 9 3 
1 0 , 0 0 0-15 , 0 0 0 k 1 
1 5 , 0 0 0 - 2 0 , 0 0 0 2 1 
2 0 , 0 0 0 - 2 5 , 0 0 0 - -
2 5 ,000 - 3 0 , 0 0 0 1 1 
3 0 , 0 0 0-and over 1 1 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
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These figures lead to the conclusion that four-
teen of the firms may be classified as small in the 
sense that they had capacities of less than 15,000 
tons, and utilized capacities of less than 10,000 
tons, the majority falling in the less than 5,000 
tons grouping. The four firms with total capacities 
in excess of 15,000 tons and utilized capacities of 
more than 10,000 tons are the firms generally refer-
red to in the industry as 'the big four'. 
The total capacity of the industry in 1965 was 
given as 209,500 tons of seed. (This excludes the 
capacity of redundant firms which amounted to at 
least another 35,000 tons.) For 19^0 the capacity 
was given as 196,500 tons for the seventeen firms 
operative in that year, but obviously this figure is 
subject to a greater degree of inaccuracy due to 
error of momory. 
The utilized crushing capacity claimed by the 
millers was 1 3 9 , 9 5 0 tons in 1965 and 1 2 0 , 5 0 0 tons in 
1960, of which around 5,000 tons in both years was 
accounted for by orushi.ngs of oilseeds other than 
cottonseed. The Lint Marketing Board quotes total 
sales of 118,512 tons in the 1959-60 season and of 
1 3 1 , 8 3 0 tons in the 1964-5 season (see Table 2.4). 
It is also interesting to note that it is believed 
that only 2,000 tons of groundnuts and a few hundred 
tons of other oilseeds were crushed in 1965 (see 
Chapter II, sections C.2 and C.3). This indicates 
that the overall 1965 figure for all oilseeds is 
either exaggerated by about 5,000 tons or that the 
millers had an alternative source of cottonseed 
apart from the Lint Marketing Board. 
Total,utilized and excess capacity for all 
firrms operative in the industry in 1960 and 1965 and 
for 'the big four' are shown in Table 3-3, and are 
based on figures given by the millers. 
Table 3-3 
All Firms 'The Big Four' 
1 9 6 0 1965 1960 1 9 6 5 
Total Capacity 1 9 6 , 5 0 0 
Utilized Capacity 120,500 
Excess Capacity 76,000 
209,500 100,500 107,500 
139,950 8 2 , 0 0 0 9 9 , 0 0 0 
69,550 18,500 8,500 
Utilized Capacity 
as % of total 
Capacity 61 67 72 92 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
The figures show that 'the big four' were oper-
ating at a much higher level of utilized capacity 
than the industry as a whole. In fact in 1 9 6 5, 'the 
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big four" only accounted for 51 per cent of total 
capacity of all firms but for 71 per cent of util-
ized capacity of all firms, and in 1960 they accoun-
ted for 51 per cent of total capacity of all firms 
but for 68 per cent of utilized capacity of all 
firms. The situation in 1965 is particularly strik-
ing when 'the big four' were working with 92 per 
cent utilized capacity while the other fourteen 
firms were working with utilized capacities of only 
40 per cent on average, and it should be remembered 
that capacities of firms non-operative in 1965 have 
not been included in the total capacity for that 
year. There was considerable variation in the util-
ized capacities of individual small firms in 1965, 
utilized capacities ranging from 5-88 per cent. 
It should not be concluded from the figures of 
Table 3.3 that there has been an improvement in the 
industry with respect to utilized capacity between 
1960 and 1965. It should be noted that 1965 was an 
exceptionally good year for cottonseed, and also 
that non-operative firms have been excluded. If all 
firms operative in 1960 were included in the 1965 
total capacity, this would reduce the utilized capa-
city for all firms in 1965 to 64 per cent. 
Earlier it was shown (see Chapter II, section 
C.1) that 'the big four' have purchased over 75 per 
cent on average of the cottonseed sold by the Lint 
Marketing Board to the millers over the period 
1957-8 to 1 9 6 5 - 6 . This figure is in line with the 
percentage of total utilized capacity of all firms 
accounted for by 'the big four' as shown above, and 
obtained in evidence from the millers. 
The total capacity of the six firms with double-
refining plant for producing double-refined oil was 
around 16,000 tons of oil in 1965, and was expected 
to increase to 30,000 tons in 1966 with the opening 
of a new- plant and the expansion of existing plant 
by one of 'the big four'. 75 per cent of the capa-
city in 1965 was accounted for by 'the big four' all 
of whom owned double-refining plant, and this will 
increase to 80 per cent in 1 9 6 6 . Production of 
double-refined oils in 1965 was around 11,300 tons, 
indicating that all plant was working at 71 per cent 
of capacity on average. 'The big four' were opera-
ting at 90 per cent of capacity in 1965. Again the 
dominance of 'the big four' is evident. 
The capacity of the hydrogenation plant owned 
by two of 'the big four' was in the region of 5»000 
tons in 1 9 6 5 , but was expected to increase to 7 , 0 0 0 
tons in 1 9 6 7 . Around 4,000 tons of hydrogenated 
oils and fats were produced in 1965, indicating that 
the plant was operating at around 80 per cent of 
capacity. 
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Perhaps the overall state of the industry is 
best reflected by the aspirations in 19^5 of the 
different firms for the future. Three of 'the big 
four' were planning to increase their capacity if 
the cottonseed crop increased, one hoped to install 
a hydrogenation plaint, and one was considering repl-
acing their expellers by a modern solvent extraction 
plant. 
Of the other fourteen firms, seven had no plans 
at all, and two were awaiting a good customer so as 
to take the opportunity of selling out. One firm 
planned to increase its capacity if the cotton crop 
increased, two more firms hoped to install double-
refining plant, and the two already possessing doub-
le-refining plant hoped to purchase hydrogenation 
plant. 
The dominance of 'the big four' in terms of 
purchases of seed, utilized capacity and output is 
evident. Accounting for at least 75 per cent of the 
activity in the industry, they appear to be the ack-
nowledged leaders of the industry, whose pricing 
policy with respect to output many of the smaller 
firms said they followed. The dependence of the 
smaller firms on 'the big four' is further increased 
by the need to follow the bids of 'the big four' at 
the cottonseed auctions, and in some cases by the 
need to sell their semi-refined oil to be re-refined 
by firms with double-refining plant. (Sales for re-
refining were thought to amount to 580 tons of semi-
refined oil in 1965, representing about 4 per cent 
of the total output of semi-refined oil in that 
year.) 
D. Labour Employed in the Industry 
It appears useful to differentiate between 
three different groups of firms in describing tiie 
use of labour in the industry. The first group con-
sists of the leading eight firms with respect to 
utilized capacity in 1965 , the second group of the 
next six firms, and the third group of the remaining 
four firms. 
The first group, who in 19^5 had utilized capa-
cities of from 4,000 - 44,000 tons of seed, employed 
mainly permanent labour with the exception of one 
firm which employed only casual labour. This firm 
appeared to have bought much more seed in 1965 than 
in any former years. The mills of these firms were 
operated on a three shift basis, each shift being of 
eight hours for 10, 11, or 12 months of the year. 
These firms crushed a total of 122,000 tons of seed 
of all types in 1965 , and employed a total of around 
1,500 people. Six of the firms employed over 100 
employees each. This indicates an average through-
put of 81 tons of seed per year per unit of labour 
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employed. 
The second group of firms, who had utilized 
capacities from 600-3,000 tons of seed in 1965, emp-
loyed mainly casual labour. The firms were run on 
a two shift basis for a period of time depending on 
the quantity of seed available for crushing and the 
capacity of the firm's machinery. Altogether, this 
group crushed a total of 10,000 tons of seed of all 
types in 1965, and employed a total of around 280 
people. This indicates a throughput of 36 tons of 
seed per unit of labour employed. However this fig-
ure is not directly comparable with that given for 
the first group, as these firms have a shorter work-
ing year, and also the labour in these firms is of-
ten employed in other activities. 
The third group of firms, who had utilized cap-
acities from 200 - 600 tons in 1965 » employed only 
casual labour on a one or two shift basis for a per-
iod of 1-3 months, depending on the available seed 
and capacity of machinery. This group crushed a 
total of around 1,700 tons of seed of all types, and 
employed a total of 133 people. This gives an aver-
age throughput of 13 tons per unit of labour employ-
ed, a low figure for much the same reasons as for 
group two. 
Only five firms out of the eighteen in 1963 
said that they paid a wage above the minimum wage as 
set by the Government, and this most generally took 
the form of a bonus for seniority, although one firm 
provided housing, schooling and a whole range of 
other services for its employees. Four of the firms 
paying wages above the minimum wage were in the 
first group of firms as classified above. 
The minimum wage rates applicable in Uganda are 
set out in Table 3.4. 
Table 3-4 
1959a 1962a 1965b 
shs shs shs 
Kampala 75 .40 120, , 00 1 5 0 . 00 
Jinja 67 .60 110. .00 1 5 0 . . 00 
Mbale and Tororo 65 .00 104. , 00 140. ,00 
Masaka 57 .00 104. , 00 i4o. ,00 
Masindi and Soroti 84. ,50 i4o, ,00 
Other Towns 84, ,50 130, , 00 
Sources: a. Report of the Minimum Wages Advis-
ory Board, appointed under General Notice no. 927 of 
1964. (Government Printer, Entebbe) 
b. Laws of Uganda, 1965, Minimum 
Wages Legislation. (Government Printer, Entebbe) 
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In addition to rates for the towns, the 1965 Minimum 
Wages Legislation set out a minimum rate for certain 
categorieS| 2°f employment outside the towns of Shs 75 
per month. Oil milling was one of the categories 
of employment named. A number of oil mills are sit— 
uated outside the towns and therefore come under 
this legislation. 
The figures of Table 3.h show that although in 
the past the Eastern Region millers have been requi-
red to pay lower wages than the millers in Kampala, 
the 1965 legislation requires both Kampala and Jinja 
millers to pay equal wage rates. However, the mill™ 
ers in Mbale, Tororo, and Soroti still have a relat-
ive advantage in terms of wage-rates, and millers 
situated outside the towns have a considerable advar. 
ntage in terms of wage-rates compared with town mil-
lers. It is also interesting to note that any Nort-
hern miller would only be required to pay Shs 130 
per month, if the mill were situated in a town, giv-
ing that miller a 20 shilling wage advantage over 
the millers in Jinja and Kampala. 
The total amount of labour employed in the ind-
ustry was around 1,900 employees in 1965 of whom 
1,400. (74 per cent) were permanent employees and 500 
(26 per cent) casual employees. This indicates that 
the level of employment probably fluctuated in 1965 
between 1, 400 and 1,900 persons during the year, 
being at its maximum at the beginning of the year 
when the cottonseed becomes available, and decreas-
ing to a minimum probably in September at the end of 
the milling season. 
The 19b3 Survey of Industrial Production, 
showed an annual average labour force for sixteen 
oil milling firms of 1,108 employees, which fluctua-
ted from 1,453 employees on March 31st to 808 emplo-
yees on September 30th. ^ 
The 1964 Survey of Industrial Production, 
showed an annual average labour force again for six-
teen firms of 1,179 employees, and of 1,121 employ-
ees on December 31st. 
Although the two excluded firms from the two 
surveys account for some of the difference between 
the figures given by the millers in 1965, and those 
quoted by the surveys, it seems probable that the 
former figures have been slightly exaggerated, and 
that the industry probably does not employ more than 
1,000 permanent employees altogether. The 
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classification of firms according to number of 
employees for 1963 and 1965 is shown in Table 3-5. 
Table 3.5 
No. of Employees No. of Firms 
1963a 1965 
Under 20 5 -
20-49 3 7 
50-99 3 4 
100 and over 5 6 
Total 16 18 
Sources: a. Statistics Division, Ministry of Plan-
ning ana Community Development, Survey of Industrial 
Production, 1 9 6 3 . (Government Printer, Entebbe, 
October, 1965.) 
b. Evidence from the millers. 
It seems probable from these figures that exag-
geration as to the number of employees in 1965 main-
ly came from the smaller firms, presumably because 
these firms often find it difficult to differentiate 
between labour used for oil milling, and that used 
for other activities. 
The total wage tjj.ll for the industry was Shs , 
3.0 million in 1963 5 and Shs 3.2 million in 1964. 
The average animal payments per employee were Shs 
2,740 in 1963 <Znd Shs 2,810 in 1964, indicating 
payments of Shs 228 and Shs 234 per month respect-
ively. This indicates that on average wages and 
salaries were considerably above the minimum wage, 
but it should be remembered that salaries of manage-
rial staff and skilled technicians are included in 
this average. 
The number of proprietors in any firm varied 
widely from two to seventeen in 1 9 6 5 . Most of the 
firms were Asian family businesses, and thus the 
number was probably guided by family considerations 
as well as by the size of the non-milling activities 
of the firm. There certainly seemed to be no corre-
lation between the size of the oil milling enter-
prise of the firm, and the number of proprietors. 
E. Costs of Production and Profitability 
Difficulty was experienced in obtaining rel-
iable data on the costs of production in the indus-
try due to the reluctance of the millers to give 
such information. The costs given in Table 3-6 are 
taken from the Survey of Industrial Production for 
1964. 
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Table 3.6 
Consumpt ion 
1963 1964 
Fuels 
Electricity 942 921 
Mineral Fuels and lubricants 320 158 
Other fuels 124 289 
Total 1,386 1 ,368 
Materials 
Cotton Seeds 48,515 46,605 
Groundnuts 3,973 3,442 
Chemicals 581 385 
Packing materials 3,465 3 ,130 
Other materials 11,362 1 0 , 7 6 1 
Total 67,896 64,323 
Other Costs 
Consumable tools and parts 
of machinery 825 1,442 
Other current costs 2 , 0 7 0 5,647 
Total 2,895 7,089 
Grand Total 72,177 7 2 , 7 8 0 
Source: Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning 
and Community Development, Survey of Industrial 
Production, 1964. (Government Printer, Entebbe, 1966) 
Total payments to labour in cash and in kind 
amounted to aJD39,000 Shs in 1963 and to 3,493,000 
Shs in 1964. V 
The millers claimed in 1965 that the costs of 
crushing seed amounted to Shs 50 - 60 per ton of 
seed crushed, including the costs from when the seed 
is delivered to the mill to the point at which the 
crude oil is produced. Other authorities on the 
industry suggested crushing costs of Shs 40 per ton, 
although if all overhead costs were included, they 
suggested crushing costs would be higher than this. 
A rough check can be made on the costs of 
crushing each ton of seed in 1963 and 1964 by com-
paring total fuel, total labour, and consumable 
tools and parts of machinery (mainly spares for 
expellers) costs, with the amount of seed crushed in 
these years. This gives a figure of Shs 46 per ton 
of seed crushed for 1963, and of Shs 51 per ton of 
seed crushed for 1964. Obviously these figures are 
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only approximations, as some part of the fuel costs 
should be allocated to refining and other activities, 
while none of the overhead costs have been allocated 
to the extraction process, but these figures do seem 
to bear out the evidence given above. 
The evidence given by the millers in 1965, 
together with the information in Table 3>6, give 
some idea of the nature of oil milling costs. 
The figures of Table 3.6 show that electricity 
is the dominant source of fuel in the industry, 
accounting for over two-thirds of the total fuel 
bill. In 1965, total expenditure on electricity, 
excluding that generated by two firms from their own 
generators, was Shs 889,000. All the Ugandan 
millers were using the husk from their cottonseed to 
burn in their boilers, only buying wood for this 
purpose when the husk was finished. Thus the value 
of the husk to the industry as a source of fuel is 
considerable . 
Costs for materials are obviously dominated by 
purchases of oilseeds, which accounted for over 77 
per cent of these costs in 1963 and 1964. The total 
amount spent on cottonseed in 1965 was estimated as 
Shs 62,746,872 (based on production of seed and seed 
prices in 1 9 6 5 ) , this increase over the 1963 and 
1964 levels being in part due to the increase in the 
amount of seed crushed, but mainly due to the higher 
prices in that year. The total amount spent on 
groundnuts for crushing in 1965 (based on amounts 
crushed and average prices in Jinja ) was probably 
around Shs 1,792,000, but this is not comparable 
with the figures given in Table 3-6 as groundnuts 
for shelling and re-sale are not included. 
The consumption of chemicals by the industry in 
1963 and 1964, most of which would have been used 
for refining the oil, indicates a consumption of 36 
Shs of chemicals per ton of crude oil refined in 
1963, and of Shs 22 of chemicals in 1964. Data 
given by the millers in 1965 was highly erratic, 
varying from 3 - 349 shs per ton of crude oil 
refined. One factor affecting these figures is the 
consumption of chemicals by the soap factories often 
attached to the oil mills. Two of the mills in 
Uganda producing double-refined oil quoted the cost 
in terms of chemicals used for double-refining as 
Shs 45 and Shs 48.75 per ton of crude oil double-
refined. Obviously, the costs for producing semi-
refined oil, which only requires caustic soda, would 
be very much less. 
The cost of tins for the oil constitutes much 
the greater part of the packing materials costs 
listed, although sacks for the cake and packing mat— 
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erials for some of the other products produced will 
also be required. The 1963 and 1964 figures for 
packing materials in Table 3-6 yield figures of shs 
3'65 and shs 3-10 per tin of refined oil produced. 
With the average price of a tin being shs 3-25, 
these figures are not unreasonable, In 1965, the 
millers claimed to have spent a total of 3,896,000 
shs on packing materials, which represents a total 
of shs 3'60 per tin of refined oil produced. 
The costs of other materials include the costs 
of other oilseeds apart from cottonseed and ground-
nuts, and the costs of materials for other activiti-
es of the firms such as maize milling. No estimates 
of such costs are available for 19^5• 
The cost of consumable tools and parts of machi-
nery is thought to mainly consist of spares for the 
expellers. The 1963 and 1964 figures in Table 3.6 
indicate an outlay of shs 7-25 per ton of seed crus-
hed in 1963 and of shs 11.80 in 1964. The totals 
given by the millers in 1965 varied from shs 1.60 to 
shs 20 per ton of seed crushed. These costs are 
likely to vary considerably from year to year, and 
an average over a period of years would probably 
yield a more realistic figure, but unfortunately 
such an average is not available. 
When the grand totals of consumption costs given 
in Table 3-6, together with labour costs, are compa-
red with the gross outputs (gross outputs of shs 
78,880,000 and shs 79,417,000 are given for 1963 and 
1964 respectively in the survey of Industrial Produ-
ction, 1964 " ) this gives a positive balance of shs 
3,664,000 in 1963 and shs 3,144,000 in 1964. Unfor-
tunately this includes the returns from all the act-
ivities of the firms, and therefore does not enable 
the returns from oil milling itself to be assessed. 
There have been allegations that in the past the 
prices paid for cottonseed have been so high, and 
the prices received for oil so low that it was impo-
ssible for any miller to make a profit on oil milling 
alone. This, it is claimed, was a deliberate design 
on the part of 'the big four' who effectively cont-
rol both the prices paid for cottonseed and the 
price at which the oil is sold in Uganda, to force 
the smaller firms, who could not continue to operate 
at a loss, out of business. 
If we consider the product of one ton of 'AR' 
cottonseed; this yields a total of 291.2 lbs of 
crude oil (a 13 per cent extraction rate is used as 
it is the plight of the smaller firms which is being 
considered, and not that of the larger firms who may 
receive 14 per cent oil from their cottonseed) and 
of 1120 lbs of cottonseed cake (50 per cent extrac-
tion rate). 
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The total value of the oil, assuming a price of 
75 cts per lb for crude oil would be shs 218,and as-
suming a price of 90 cts per lb for crude oil, shs 
262. The total value of the cake is shown in Table 
3-7. 
Table 3-7 
Average Price of 
Cottonseed Cake 
Received by Mil-
lers in shs/ton 
Total Value 
of 1 1 2 0 lbs 
Cottonseed 
cake in shs 
1960 401 2 0 0 . 5 0 
1961 356 1 7 8 . 0 0 
1962 410 2 0 5 . 0 0 
1 9 6 3 455 2 2 7 . 5 0 
1964 432 216 . 0 0 
1965 464 2 3 2 . 0 0 
Source: East African Customs and Excise 
Annual Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya 
1960—5" (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa) 
Note: shs 65 per ton has been deducted from the ave-
rage price for transport to the coast. See East 
African Railways and Harbours, Tariff Book No.4 Part 
II (Aread Lithographic Printers'^ East Africa) 
On the basis of these figures, the maximum and 
minimum returns to the miller in any year can be 
calculated, see Table 3.8. 
Table 3-8 
Minimum Value of Oil Maximum Value of Oil 
and Cake from One Ton and Cake from One Ton 
of Cottonseed (shs) of Cottonseed (shs) 
1 960 418.50 462.50 
1 961 396.00 440.00 
1962 423-00 467.00 
1963 445.50 489.50 
1964 434.00 478.00 
1 9 6 5 450.00 494.00 
Some idea of the profitability of oil milling 
in individual years can now be assessed by comparing 
these figures with the price of cottonseed and crus-
hing costs shown in Table 3*9• 
43 
Table 3.9 
Prices of 'AR' Prices plus Prices plus 
Cottonseed Crushing Costs Crushing Costs 
Season in shs/ton of 50 shs of 60 shs 
1959-60 
1960-1 
1 9 6 1 - 2 
1962-3 
1963-4 
1964-5 
467 
468 
354 
455 
403 
499 
517 
518 
4o4 
505 
453 
549 
527 
528 
414 
515 
463 
559 
Source: See Table 2.6 in Chapter II. 
With the costs of production of semi-refined 
oil from one ton of cottonseed being around shs 50, 
and the price of semi-refined oil having been in al-
most all years less than 90 cts per lb., the smaller 
millers who only have semi—refining plant would have 
operated at a large loss in 1960 and 1961 when the 
maximum returns from the oil and cake were insuffic-
ient even to cover the cost of the seed. In 1963 
maximum returns would have been sufficient to cover 
seed costs, but only a very small margin would have 
been left for covering crushing costs. Further, 
prices for oil were extremely low in 1963, being 
only 90 cts per lb for double—refined oil and it is 
possible that total returns were in fact below cott-
onseed prices in that year. In 1964 prices for dou-
ble—refined oil were still only 1 sh per lb, and 
thus returns were likely to be near the minimum 
level of shs 434, which would cover the cost of pur-
chasing the cottonseed, but provide little margin 
for covering other costs. In 1965, double-refined 
oil prices rose to shs 1.40 per lb and semi-refined 
oil prices were possibly as high as 1 sh per lb, in 
which case maximum returns from one ton of seed 
would have been 523 shs. As in 1964, while this 
would cover the cost of purchasing the seed, only a 
very small margin would remain for other costs. The 
only year in which returns would appear to have been 
sufficient to cover all costs, for millers with only 
semi—refining plant in the 1960's, appears to be 
1962 when cottonseed prices fell to the abnormally 
low level of shs 354 per ton. It should be noted, 
though, that due to the peculiar circumstances of 
that year, 'BR' seed prices were on average shs 396 
per ton, and it is therefore unlikely that returns 
from 'BR' seed would have been sufficient to cover 
costs in that year. 
A glance at the figures for the maximum value 
44 
of the oil and cake in Table 3.8 shows that a price 
of around shs 400 per ton for cottonseed over the 
period considered would have given returns suffici-
ent to cover costs. It is interesting to note here 
that in the opinion of an official of the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board of Tanzania, shs 400 per ton is 
a fair price to ask the miller to pay for cottonseed 
given the state of oil and cake prices in 19 6 6 . 
However, for the millers with double-refining 
and hydrogenation plant, the position may not have 
been so critical in the 1960's. The total cost of 
producing double—refined oil and cake from one ton 
of cottonseed is about shs 6 7 . This indicates total 
costs including the seed of the order of magnitude 
of column 3 of Table 3.9, plus shs 7 . The total 
cost of producing hydrogenated oils and fats from 
one ton of cot.tonseed is about Shs 82. 
The prices, together with calculations for the 
amount of revenue obtained from double-refined and 
hydrogenated oils are shown in Table 3.10. The cal-
culations are based on a 14 per cent extraction rate 
for oil from the seed (only large millers double-
refine and hydrogenate) allowing 6 per cent refining 
losses for double-refined oil and 7 per cent refining 
losses for hydrogenated oils and fats. 
Table 3.10 _ „ _ Revenue from One 
Price of Minimum Ton of Seed 
Double-Refined Price of From Oil From Ghee 
Oil in cts/lb Ghee cts/lb (shs) (shs) 
1962 1 1 2 114 331.35 334 . 1 1 
1963 91 96 269.22 281.36 
1964 100 111 295.85 325.32 
1965 140 1 2 7 4 1 4 . 1 9 3 7 2 . 2 1 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
The figures of Table 3.10, together with the 
value of cake given in Table 3>7« give the following 
figures in Table 3.11. 
Table 3-11 
Returns from Oil and Returns from Ghee and 
Cake from One Ton of Cake from One Ton of 
Seed (shs) Seed (shs) 
1 9 6 2 536 539 
1 9 6 3 497 509 
1964 512 541 
1965 646 504 
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A comparison of the figures of Tables 3-9 and 
3.11, with the appropriate additions to crushing 
costs, indicates that the production of double-refi-
ned oil would have been highly profitable in every 
year except 1963* The production of ghee may not 
have been profitable in 1963 and 1965, although it 
should be remembered that the price given for ghee 
was the minimum realised for lowest quality ghee. 
Thus there does seem to be some truth in the 
contention that in Uganda in the 1960's, while the 
production of semi-refined oil was not profitable, 
the production of double-refined oil did yield good 
returns. Thus the millers with double-refining 
plant could have deliberately bidden cottonseed 
prices up, so as to make the production of semi—ref-
ined oil unprofitable while still being able them-
selves to obtain a good return from their double-
refined oil. 
F. Possj.bilities of Technological Development 
The question of technological development in 
the industry is a difficult one. The life of an 
expeller is approximately fifty years, and so the 
problem of the replacement of existing machinery is 
not likely to arise until the 1990's. With excess 
capacity as it stands in the industry in 1965, any 
additional expelling capacity would seem to be 
redundant. 
The problem is to decide whether it is .in the 
interests of the efficiency of the industry for more 
millers to invest in modern expellers or for some to 
invest in solvent extraction plant. The problem 
also must be considered of whether investment in 
additional double—refining and hydrogenation plant 
is justified. 
1. Extraction Plant. An increase of 1 per cent 
in the output of oil from the cottonseed increases 
the revenue from crushing by around shs 20 per ton 
of seed crushed assuming a price of 90 cts per lb 
for oil. The cost of a modern expeller crushing 
around 3,000 tons of seed per year, and leaving 4^ — 
7 per cent^oil in the cake is quoted as £6,500 f.o.b. 
U.K. Port. Even if this expeller were to increase 
the output of oil by only 1 per cent this would lead 
to an increased potential revenue of £3,000 per year 
at no greater cost to the miller. Even allowing for 
high transport costs on such machinery, it would not 
take many years of operation to cover the initial 
investment, and with a life-time of over 50 years, 
such a machine if utilized to capacity would yield a 
high return on capital. 
However, the minimum size of utilized plant for 
which such an investment would be worthwhile is pro-
bably around 9,000 tons, as at least three expellers 
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are needed to cope with first and second crushings 
of seed. This means that reinvestment in modern 
expellers is to be recommended only up to the extent 
of a firm's utilized capacity, and only for those 
firms with a utilized capacity in excess of 9,000 
tons. A few of the larger "smaller" firms may find 
it profitable, though, to invest in one such expel-
ler if their utilized capacity exceeds 5,000 tons. 
Therefore it is recommended that 'the big four' 
and the other three millers with utilized capacities 
of over 5,000 tons should, to the extent that they 
have not done so already, replace their older expel-
lers by the more modern type. However, care should 
be taken only to install such machinery to the 
extent of the firm's utilized capacity. 
Only the 'big four' have sufficient utilized 
capacity for the efficient operation of a solvent 
extraction plant. However, it is claimed that the 
market for solvent extracted cake is uncertain, and 
the price low. Further, the last 1-2 per cent of 
oil obtained from cottonseed is often of poor 
quality and can only be used for soap-stock. Under 
these circumstances the solvent extraction plant may 
not lead to an increase in revenue. Obviously any 
firm considering such an investment would need to 
study these factors carefully. It is believed that 
groundnuts show greater returns when solvent extrac-
ted, but as the quantity of groundnuts crushed in 
Uganda is so small, this is not relevant in the 
Ugandan context. It seems unlikely that investment 
in solvent extraction plant would be worthwhile. 
2. Double-refining Plant. In 1965, some of the 
mills without double-refining plant were showing an 
interest in investing in such plant. As from 1966, 
the total capacity of double-refining plant was 
around 30,000 tons of oil, which is capable of dou-
ble-refining the oil from over 200,000 tons of cott-
onseed, assuming an extraction rate of 14 per cent 
oil from the seed. Thus in 1966 there is sufficient 
capacity to double-refine all the oil in Uganda. 
With an estimate of 180,000 tons of cottonseed being 
available for crushing by 1971 (see Chapter IV sect-
ion C) no further expansion in double-refining plant 
is required. Further, most of the smaller firms 
only have crushing capacities of less than 5,000 
tons per year. If a small firm were to own double-
refining plant with a capacity of 3>000 tons of oil 
per year, either the firm would need to buy large 
quantities of semi- and unrefined oils from other 
firms, or the plant would operate at very low util-
ized capacity. Given further that some of the crude 
oil is utilized by hydrogenation plants, there cert-
ainly seems to be no case for any new investment in 
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double-refining plant. 
3. Hydrogenation Plant. Yet other firms, who 
already own double-refining plant, are interested in 
installing hydrogenation plant. It is thought that 
in 1965, the existing hydrogenation plant in Uganda 
was operating at 80 per cent of capacity. Obviously 
in part the question of new investment in hydrogen-
ation plant depends on market prospects for ghee and 
solid fats. In 1964 ard 1965 over 400 tons of ghee 
was imported (see Chapter IV Section A) but it is 
believed that this is mainly the superior groundnut 
ghee, and therefore could not be replaced by home-
produced ghee. The most important markets for both 
ghee and solid fats are the Kenyan and home markets, 
and these markets may be expected to grow with 
increases in population and the gross domestic prod-
uct. However, by 1 9 6 7 , a total of around ",000 tons 
of hydrogenated oils and fats can be produced by the 
industry, which is around 3,000 tons above the 1965 
level of production. Decisions concerning new 
investment in such plant should wait for market 
trends to become more obvious. 
In considering these proposals for future 
investment in the industry, no account has been 
taken of the opportunity cost of the capital invol-
ved. Foreign currency, which would be required for 
all these investments, is a scarce resource in 
Uganda, and investment in new plant for the oil 
milling industry must be considered carefully along-
side alternative projects. 
A changeover to more modern expellers would 
give a high return on the capital invested, provided 
they were fully utilized, and such reinvestment 
would only at most affect the leading seven firms in 
the industry. Demands for both refining and hydrog-
enation plant stem from the desire of certain firms 
to strengthen their positions in the industry. Al-
though returns would be high if such plant could be 
fully utilized, it is doubtful if in the 1960 1s such 
plants could be fully utilized, and thus the capital 
involved would in 1967 probably be better spent 
elsewhere. The question of such investment may be 
considered again 5-10 years hence when the size of 
market and the amount cf seed available for crushing 
are known factors. 
In conclusion, it is to be recommended that all 
oil milling firms pay particular attention to the 
pretreatment of their seed in order to increase 
their efficiencies. The cost of cleaning equipment 
is comparatively low (Rose, Downs and Thompson Ltd., 
of Hull, England, quote the price of cleaning equip-
ment with a capacity of 50 tons per 24 hours, as 
around £3,000 f.o.b. U.K.) and its use would increase 
8 
the efficiency of the industry. Further, adequate, 
clean storage, and carefully controlled decortication 
would also increase the yield of oil obtained. 
The only reinvestment in the industry that can 
be justified is the replacement of old expellers 
with more modern ones by some of the leading firms 
to the extent only of their utilized capacity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
FOR THE PRODUCTS OF THE UGANDAN INDUSTRY 
A. The Supply and Demand for By-Products 
1. Linters. The linters are a by-product of 
the delinting process, and may form as much as 5 per 
cent by weight of the original cottonseed. As ment-
ioned earlier (see Chapter III Section A) only a 
small number of firms crushing cottonseed actually 
delint their seed, and these firms produced a total 
of around 1.4 million lbs of linters in 1965- Prod-
uction in other years is unknown. 
There is a demand for linters from upholstery 
manufacturers, but this demand is often fairly loca-
lized and limited in size. One firm did report 
selling its linters to a mattress company in Nairobi 
but this firm appeared to be the exception rather 
than the rule. The price received for the linters 
in 1965 varied from 45 cts per lb in Kampala to 
50 - 75 cts per lb in the Eastern Region towns. 
Almost cei'tainly the limited scope of the market for 
linters is another factor affecting the millers' 
decision as to whether or not to delint their cotton-
seed . 
2. Hulls. The husks (or hulls) are a by-prod-
uct of the decortication process, forming in the 
case of cottonseed up to 40 per cent by weight of 
the original seed. Although the husk may be used as 
a fertilizer, a packing material, or a poor quality 
cattle-food, these markets are limited and nearly 
all the Ugandan millers burn their husk in the boil-
ers of their mills. Thus the husk becomes a major 
source of fuel in the industry, obviating the need 
for wood or some other fuel to use in the boilers. 
In a few cases, the husk is also added to the cotton-
seed cake so as to increase its bulk. 
3. Soap-Stock. Soap-stock is a by-product of 
the refining process, and may account for around 
4 - 6 per cent by weight of the crude oil. This 
residue forms the base for the production of laundry 
soap, although some millers producing soap also 
purchase palm and copra oil to improve the quality 
of the soap. In 1965, a total of five milling firms 
were producing soap, all except one firm producing 
only laundry soap. A total of 13,570 tons of soap 
was produced in 1965 by the millers, the laundry 
soap being sold at Shs 1,000 - 1,200 per ton, almost 
all locally. The one firm producing toilet soap, 
though, did supply a much wider market. 
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B. The Supply and Demand for Oil Products 
The production of oil products by the industry 
is the most important aspect of.the industry, oil 
being the most valuable product from the crushing of 
the oilseeds. Various different forms of oil prod-
ucts may be produced, of which in Uganda, liquid 
oils are the most important. However, hydrogenated 
oils in the form of vegetable ghee and solid fats 
are also produced. 
Figures for the production, distribution and 
consumption of these oil products are shown in 
Tables A.1 to A.5 of Appendix 1 for the period 
1963-5, and figures for sales to and purchases from 
other countries for liquid oils are shown in Table 
A.6 of Appendix 1 for the period 1955-65. 
Overall production of all oil products increa-
sed by 14 per cent over the period 1963-5, most of 
the increase being accounted for by increased produ-
ction of ghee and solid fats. Over the period 
1963-5 the average production of liquid oils was 
around 13,440 tons, of ghee around 2,640 tons, and 
of solid fats around 460 tons. Sales of all oil 
products to Kenya increased over the period, while 
sales to Tanzania showed a slight decline. Sales of 
liquid oils on the home market declined, but sales 
of ghee and solid fats increased, most of this inc-
rease accounting for the increased production of 
these products. The low level of exports for oil 
products remained unchanged. 
Liquid oil was the most important oil product 
consumed in Uganda over the period 1963-5, amounting 
to 5,288 tons on average, of which 90 per cent was 
home produced. There appeared to be a slight decl-
ine in its consumption over the period 1963-5- In 
contrast, the consumption of both ghee and solid 
fats showed a large increase between 1964-5, mainly 
supplied from the increased production in the 
Ugandan industry. 
The Liquid Oils Market. The most important 
markets for liquid oils over the period 1963-5 were 
Kenya and Uganda,for on average 51 per cent of the 
liquid oils produced were sold to Kenya and 35 per 
cent on the home market. 
In the past, the Ugandan oil milling industry 
appears to have dominated in both these markets, but 
in the 1960's there is reason to believe that the 
industry in the Lake Area of Tanzania is providing 
strong competition. There is no fear of strong com-
petition in this field from Kenyan millers, as only 
around 5,000 tons of cottonseed per year are availa-
ble for crushing in Kenya, this being augmented by a 
few thousand tons more purchased from Uganda and 
Tanzania. 
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But there were in 1965 a total of seventeen 
operative oil mills in the Lake Area, three of whom 
owned double-refining plant. In 1965 these firms 
produced a total of around 13,000 tons of liquid 
oils, according to the evidence of the millers, 
almost the same quantity as that produced by the 
Ugandan millers, but most of the production was in 
the form of semi-refined oil, only around 2,800 tons 
of double-refined oil being produced. However, Lake 
Area millers only sold in 1965 a total of 2,868 tons 
of liquid oils to Kenya, compared with^Ugandan 
millers' sales of 7,305 tons to Kenya, and thus it 
appeax^s that Ugandan millers were in the stronger 
position in the Kenyan market. Further, Lake Area 
millers' sales to Uganda were les?5 than Ugandan mil-
lers' sales to Tanzania in 1965- But over the per-
iod 1960-5, sales by Lake Area millers_to Kenya and 
Uganda have been steadily increasing, and undoubt-
edly competition in these markets is increasing. 
There is verbal evidence from the millers to 
the effect that the Ugandan millers are influenced 
in their pricing policy by the prices of liquid oils 
in Mwanza and vice versa. Prices for liquid oils in 
Uganda and Mwanza are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
1965 Uganda 1966 Uganda 1966 Mwanza 
Prices in a Prices in ^ Prices in ^ 
shs/tin shs/tin shs/tin 
Semi-refined 
oil 38-39 34.10 29.42 
Double-refined oil 48-48.50 41.30 34.10 
Sources: a. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Inquiry on the Prices of Edible Oils, June 1965• 
(Unpublished) 
b. Private Communication. 
In 1965 it is believed (based on the evidence 
of millers) that prices of liquid oils were roughly 
the same in both Mwanza and Uganda. However, in 
1966 prices in Mwanza fell considerably below those 
in Uganda, and it is interesting to note that it was 
in this year that the Ugandan millers began to comp-
lain that the Mwanzan millers were flooding the 
Ugandan market with cheap oil. 
What are the price differentials which must 
exist between Mwanza and Uganda in order that Lake 
Area millers may compete on the Ugandan and Kenyan 
markets ? 
The costs of sending liquid oils from Mwanza to 
54 
Jinja and Kampala are set out in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Transport Costs from Mwanza per Tin of Oil 
To Jinja (shs) To Kampala (shs) 
Large loads 1.15 1 .28 
Small loads 1 .64 1 .91 
Source: East African Railways and Harbours, Tariff 
Book No.4 Part II (Aread Lithographic 
Printers, East Africa) 
Therefore if prices for either semi- or double-
refined oil in Mwanza should be more than 2 shs 
below those in Uganda, the Mwanzan millers could 
effectively compete with the Ugandan millers on the 
Ugandan market. 
The costs of sending liquid oils from Mwanza to 
Nairobi are compared in Table 4.3 with the costs of 
sending oil from Jinja and Kampala to Nairobi. 
Table 4.3 
Tin of Oil 
From Kampala(shs From Jin j£ \shs Prom M wdfir 
Large 
Small 
loads 1.42 
loads 2.36 
1 
2 
33 
20 
1 
3 
.83 
.28 
Source: East African Railways and Harbours, Tariff 
Book No.4 Part II (Aread Lithographic 
Printers, East Africa) 
The figures show that for large loads, there is 
only a 50 ct difference between the cost of trans-
port for oils from Jinja and Mwanza to Nairobi, and 
for small loads a 1.08 sh difference. This means 
that if Mwanzan prices are more than 1 sh below 
Ugandan prices, Mwanzan oil can compete favourably 
with Ugandan oil on the Kenyan market. 
One of the most important factors in determin-
ing the competitive power of the two groups of mill-
ers is the overall cost of production in the two 
areas. There does not appear to be a wide differen-
ce in the crushing costs in the two industries, see 
Chapter VI, but the price differential for cotton-
seed purchased in Uganda and Tanzania has in almost 
all years been in favour of the Mwanzan millers, see 
Chapter VI, and this gives the Mwanzan millers a 
considerable cost advantage over their counterparts 
in Uganda. This cost advantage may enable Lake Area 
millers to produce lower cost oil, thus increasing 
their competitive strength in the oil markets. 
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The interaction of these two competitors in the 
market is also to some extent affected by the differ-
ence of season between the two areas. The Ugandan 
oil milling season operates from January to Septem-
ber, while that in the Lake Area operates from June 
to March. This means that either group of millers 
may find themselves entering the market with the new 
season's supplies of oil when the market is already 
flooded with supplies from the other source. Thus 
prices at the beginning of the season in both the 
Ugandan and the Mwanzan industries are likely to be 
determined by prices already ruling in the markets. 
Further, as both industries may dump surplus supp-
lies of oil towards the end of their season, in order 
to sell the old season's oil before the new season's 
oil enters the market, prices may be depressed 
around March and September. 
The fact that the Lake Area millers only prod-
uced 2,800 tons of double-refined oil in 1965, comp-
ared to Uganda's production of around 11,000 tons, 
obviously means that at that time the Ugandan 
millers were in the stronger position in the double-
refined oil market. However, with the expansion of 
double-refining capacity in Mwanza, the strength of 
the Lake Area millers will increase, and supplies of 
double-refined oil from Mwanza may take a larger 
share of the Kenyan and Ugandan markets. 
Thus the evidence suggests that the Ugandan 
millers are not monopolists in the liquid oils mar-
ket in East Africa, strong competition being provi-
ded by the Lake Area millers. 
Some millers in Uganda have claimed that the 
cutting-off of sales of oils to Somalia was the 
cause of falling prices in 1 9 6 6 . However, from 
1963-5, exports only accounted for 8 per cent on 
average of total sales. Sales to Somalia, though, 
did on average account^for 88 per cent of exports 
between 1963 and 1 9 6 5 , most of the rest of the oil 
being exported to other African countries. While the 
suspension of sales to Somalia may seriously reduce 
the level of exports of oil, the amount of oil invo-
lved is small compared with total sales, and the 
effect on prices should npt be particularly great. 
The scope for exporting oil is probably limited 
to neighbouring African countries because of its 
price. U.K. prices for oils, quoted c.i.f. U.K. 
ports,.were in 1963 and 1964 only 31 shs per tin of 
36 lbs which is at about the same level as semi-
refined oil in 1 9 6 6 . Thus there is little hope of 
selling oil on the European market. 
There is evidence to suggest that the pricing 
policy of the Ugandan industry is determined by 'the 
big four', presumably after due regard has been paid 
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to the prices ruling in Mwanza. A number of the 
smaller millers, when asked as to how they determin-
ed the prices of their oil answered that they foll-
owed the lead of 'the big four'. Others said that 
they followed the ruling market price, which amounts 
to much the same thing. The rationale of this is 
obvious. If the smaller miller were to try to sell 
at a higher price than "the big four', who produce 
over 70 per cent of the liquid oils, they will find 
themselves unable to sell. On the other hand, if 
they offer their oil at a lower price, they may find 
themselves in financial difficulties, due to the 
very low margins on oil sales, see Chapter III, 
section E, and anyway they could not hope by their 
action either way to have any effect on the future 
pricing policy of 'the big four'. The position of 
these small millers is further weakened by the fact 
that they must often offer their oil for re-refining 
to the millers with double-refining plant. 
Thus it would appear that although 'the big 
four' dictate pricing policy in the Ugandan industry, 
they do not hold a monopoly position in the East 
African liquid oils market. They do, though, appear 
in 1966 to be in a stronger position than the Lake 
Area millers, who only produce comparatively small 
amounts of double-refined oil. 
The Ghee and Solid Fats Markets. For vegetable 
ghee, 72 per cent of production on average over the 
period 1963-5 was sold to Kenya, nearly all the rem-
ainder being sold on the home market. For solid 
fats, 52 per cent was sold to Kenya on average, 
again nearly all the remainder being sold on the 
home market. Thus, as for liquid oils, the Kenyan 
and Ugandan markets are of supreme importance. 
However, production of ghee and solid fats in 
East Africa was limited to three firms in 1965, two 
being Ugandan millers and one being a Kenyan miller 
situated in Nairobi. Unfortunately, as the Kenyan 
miller was not willing to disclose production figur® 
it is not easy to assess the competitive forces in 
these markets. 
The trade figures show that in 1964 and 1965 
Uganda sold around 2,000 tons mcgre of vegetable ghee 
to Kenya than Kenya to Uganda, but that„Kenya 
exceeded Uganda in its sales to Tanzania, although 
these latter sales were very small. The Ugandan 
millers thus appear to be strongly established in 
the vegetable ghee market, although their position 
may be challenged when production of ghee begins in 
Mwanza. 
It is difficult to estimate future potential 
demand for vegetable ghee, as this is strongly infl-
uenced by the price of alternative products, such as 
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the superior quality groundnut ghee imported from 
Europe (over 2,500 tons of this was imported into 
East Africa in 1964 and 1965 J, and animal ghee. 
In the field of solid fats, sales by Kenya to 
Uganda exceeded those by Uganda to Kenya by a few 
hundred tons in 1964 and 1965. Kenya was also very^ 
much the larger supplier of solid fats to Tanzania. 
This seems to indicate that the Kenyan firm is pro-
bably the larger producer, and tends to dominate the 
market. 
To a certain extent, the three firms with hydro-
genation plant in Uganda and Kenya do ocaupy a mono-
poly position in the market for ghee and solid fats 
in EastAfrica, although imports do to some extent 
regulate the level of prices. However, there is no 
evidence of collusion between the Ugandan and Kenyan 
firms, and as such it is doubtful whether the poten-
tial monopoly position is being exploited to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
C. The Supply and Demand for Oil-Cake 
The second most important product of the indus-
try is vegetable oil-cake, which is the residue rem-
aining after as much oil as possible has been remo-
ved from the oilseed. 
In the case of cottonseed, two types of cake 
may be produced depending on whether the cottonseed 
has been decorticated before crushing. Decorticated 
cottonseed gives the type of cake known as 46 per 
cent cake, and undecorticated cottonseed gives the 
31 per cent cake. It is usual for other oilseeds to 
be decorticated before crushing. 
Total production of cake for the period 1963-5 
is estimated in Appendix 2. These figures show that 
production of all cake increased steadily over the 
period considered and ranged from 60,000-70,000 tons. 
Table A.10 in Appendix 2 shows the sales of cake as 
given in the trade figures. These figures show that 
on average over the period 1955-65 around 98 per cert 
of the cottonseed cake has been exported to count-
ries outside of East Africa, nearly all the remain-
der being sold in Kenya. The exported cake is main-
ly sold as a cattle-food to European countries. It 
is believed that only very small quantities of the 
cake are retained in Uganda, although no data is 
available on this. 
A high percentage of the cake sold for export 
is registered for sale through the Kampala Produce 
Exchange. The cake is usually sold forward for 
delivery 1-3 months hence, with a high and low price 
being quoted. The maximum of the highs and the min-
imum of the lows for transactions in any one year 
for the period 1963-6 are shown in Table A.11 of 
Appendix 2. The average prices for 31 per cent and 
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46 per cent cottonseed cake together exported in any 
one year are also shown in Table A.11. These fig-
ures indicate that in 1965 millers were receiving 
between shs 430 and shs 590 per ton for their 46 per 
cent cottonseed cake, which is backed up by evidence 
from the millers that they received from shs 450 -
560 per ton in 1965. 
The prices for groundnut cake are shown in 
Table A.12 of Appendix 2. The prices given by the 
millers for sales of groundnut cake in 1965 ranged 
from shs 600 to shs 670 f.o.r. Uganda, which again 
agree with the figures given in Table A.12. 
The price figures of Tables A.11 and A.12 show 
that there are small yearly variations in prices of 
cake, probably determined by the situation in the 
world market and the quality of the cake offered. 
The highest value is placed on groundnut cake by the 
cattle-food buyers, and this sells at a premium of 
more than shs 120 per ton over 46 per cent cotton-
seed caka However, in the 1960's the problem of 
aflatoxin, a mould which grows on damp groundnuts 
and is contained in groundnut cake extracted from 
contaminated nuts, has introduced a new difficulty 
into the groundnut cake market, as this mould is 
harmful to animals and human beings. A few countr-
ies have already introduced legislation banning the 
import of groundnut cake containing aflatoxin, while 
it is known that other countries are refusing consi-
gnments of cake affected with aflatoxin. If the 
legislation becomes more severe, this may mean that 
Ugandan millers will find it difficult to sell any 
groundnut cake at all on the world market. There 
may, though, to counteract this difficulty, be an 
increased demand from livestock owners in Kenya and 
Uganda for the relatively small amount of groundnut 
cake produced. 
The majority of the cake produced in Uganda, 
takes the form of 46 per cent cottonseed cake. Some 
of the 31 per cent cottonseed cake is produced by 
the industry, but the millers said that they only 
crushed undecorticated seed when there was a ready 
customer for the 31 per cent cake. There does not 
seem to be an established world market for 31 per 
cent cake. 
Little information is available on the world 
market situation for cottonseed cake, but the trade 
figures indicate that most of the Ugandan cake is 
sold to European cattle-food manufacturers. The 
figures for sales, Table A.10, and prices, Table 
A.11, do not indicate any deterioration in this mar-
ket over the period 1955-65* 
Although there are prospects of an increase in 
sales of cake within East Africa, these are only 
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likely to accoyint for a very small percentage of 
total sales of cake in the future. The new Ugandan 
manufacturer of animal foods only expected to use a 
total of 75 tons of oilseed cake in 1966, and a 
large Kenyan manufacturer of animal food utilizes 
less than 1,000 tons of oilseed cake each year. 
Obviously the millers must therefore continue to 
depend on outside markets for selling their cake, 
but oilseed cake is such a valuable protein food 
that the market is likely to continue to be favour-
able . 
D. The Value of Sales of Oilseed Products Outside 
Uganda 
The value of Uganda's sales of vegetable oils 
and fats and oilseed cake is considerable. Table 
4.4 shows the value of such sales to Kenya, to 
Tanzania and to countries outside East Africa for 
the period 1963-5. 
Table 4.4 
Oils and fats Cake 
(£) U) 
Total 
U ) 
1963 
To Kenya 
To Tanzania 
b 
Exports 
Total 
1964 
To Kenya 
To Tanzania 
b 
Exports 
Total 1965 
To Kenya 
To Tanzania 
Exports13 
Total 
Source: 
670,637 
95,963 
84.587 
851,187 
1,024,144 
115,787 
158,899 
1,298,830 
1,411,106 
8 8 , 9 8 0 
116,065 
1,616,151 
38,170 
1,369,332 
41,355 
1,351,338 
18,558 
21 
1,595,684 
7 0 8 , 8 0 7 
95,963 
1,453,919 
1,407,502 2,258,689 
1,065,499 
115,787 
l,510,237 
1,392,693 2,691,523 
1,429,664 
8 9 , 0 0 1 
1,711,749 
1,614,263 3,230,416 
East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya 
1 9 6 3 - 5 (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, 
East Africa) 
Notes: see overleaf. 
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Table 4.4 
Notes:aThis includes ghee for 1964 and 1965, but ex-
cludes^other hydrogenated fats in all years. 
From the value of exports has been deducted 
the cost of transport from Jinja to Mombasa. This 
amounts to shs 4.10 per cental for oil and ghee, and 
shs 2.90 per cental for cake. See East African Rai-
lways and Harbours, Tariff Book No .Tf Part II (Aread 
Lithographic Printers, East Africa) 
The figures of Table 4.4 show that the earnings 
of the industry from sales outside Uganda reached 
£2.3 million in 1963, £2.7 million in 1964 and £3.2 
million in 1965, a n increase of 39 per cent over the 
period. Of these sales, 62 per cent in 1963> 52 per 
cent in 1964 and 50 per cent in 1965 were accounted 
for by the cake. (One reason for the greater relat-
ive importance of cake in 1963 a s compared with 1964 
and 1965 may be the exclusion of ghee from the fig-
ures in 1963). In addition, the cake accounted for 
92 per cent on average of the exports for the period. 
It will be noted that while the cake accounted for a 
high percentage of exports, oil and fat products 
accounted for 97 per cent of the sales to Kenya and 
Tanzania, sales to Kenya being particularly import-
ant . 
The value of sales of the industry outside 
Uganda is compared with the total value of all exp-
orts for the period 1963-5 in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 
Value of Sales Value of All of Total 
by Oil Milling Sales by Formed by Oil 
1963 2,258,689 51,475,000 4.4 
1964 2,691,523 64,430,000 4.2 
1965 3,230,416 62,709,000 5.2 
Source: Work for Progr ess, Uganda's Second Five-Year 
Note: These percentages are slightly under-estima-
ted due to the value of all exports being 
f.o.b. Mombasa or Dar es Salaam. 
These figures show that although oil milling 
products were not a major component of the total 
domestic export revenue of Uganda, they comprised 
over 4 per cent of that total over the period 1963-5 
and are thus a valuable minor component. Obviously 
therefore the maintenance and expansion of the pres-
ent markets for oil and cake are of importance to 
the economy of the country. 
61 
The value of oil sales to Kenya are especially impo-
rtant as total Kenyan sales to Uganda have exceeded 
total Ugandan sales to Kenya by over £3 million over 
the period 1963-5 and had reached £8 million by 1965. 
E. Future Trends in Supply and Demand 
Unless there were to be a change in the legisl-
ation governing the import of cottonseed into Uganda, 
all the cottonseed crushed by the Ugandan industry 
in the future must be supplied from within Uganda. 
Even if seed could be imported, it is unlikely with 
the growing oil milling industry in Tanzania and 
with insufficient cottonseed available for existing 
millers in Kenya, that much seed would find its way 
on to the Ugandan market. 
The aim of Uganda's Second Five Year Plan is 
that production of cotton lint should increase to 
575,000 bales by 1970-1. Such a figure for cotton 
lint indicates a production of cottonseed in 1970-1 
of around 180,000 tons, see Appendix 3 Table A.13, 
when planting requirements have been met. ^„ 
There are also plans in the Five Year Plan 
for an expansion in the production of groundnuts by 
around 7.8 per cent per year over the five year per-
iod 1966-71. However, these plans are mainly geared 
towards the expansion of the production of high 
grade groundnuts for export. With the expansion of 
this market and that for local consumption as the 
population increases, it seems unlikely that large 
supplies of groundnuts will be available for crush-
ing in the future unless prices for groundnuts both 
locally and on the world majrket were to fall 
considerably. 
The availability of other oilseeds for crush-
ing by the industry is also uncertain, but it seems 
unlikely that over the period 1966-71 these will be 
of any great importance to the industry. 
Assuming, therefore, that the millers will 
crush around 180,000 tons of seed in 1971, this ind-
icates a production of approximately 24,500 tons of 
crude oil (assuming that 10 per cent of the seed is 
'BR', 90 per cent 'AR' and that extraction rates are 
14 per cent from 'AR' seed and 10 per cent from 'BR' 
seed.) Allowing for a 5 per cent refining loss, pro-
duction of refined oils would be around 23,300 tons. 
In Appendix 3, projections have been made of 
the demand for oils and fats in 1971 and 1981. 
These projections are based on the projected levels 
of monetary gross domestic product per ^ apita and of 
population given in the Five Year Plan. They are 
made using an assumed model as described in the 
Appendix, and are only approximations which give an 
idea of the order of magnitude of total demand at 
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some future point in time. No estimate of the ext-
ent of the error of projections is given. 
Projections for 1971 with 1965 as base, show 
that the total demand for oils and fats will be exp-
ected to rise to between 11,000 and 12,500 tons by 
1971. As noted above, if the production of 575,000 
bales of cotton lint is achieved by 1970-1, product-
ion of oils and fats by Uganda in 1971 is likely to 
amount to over 23,000 tons. This leaves a gap of 
between 10,800 and 12,300 tons of oils and fats to 
be traded with other countries. In the 1960's, 
total sales to other countries have ranged between 
5,174 and 9,345 tons, sales to Kenya forming much 
the most important part of these sales, see Table 
A.6 in Appendix 1. It seems feasible, provided that 
Uganda's position in the Kenyan market is maintained 
and increased as total demand in Kenya rises, that 
Uganda can sell all the oil that she produces up 
until 1971• However, the Ugandan industry may find 
itself in a surplus position if the rise in total 
demand in Kenya is insufficient to take the surplus-, 
es from both Uganda and Tanzania, and other markets 
cannot be developed for the oils and fats outside 
East Africa. In fact, projections for Tanzania, see 
Chapter VI, suggest that Tanzania will not have a 
surplus of oil in 1971, and thus Uganda should be 
able to sell most of her surplus oil to Kenya. 
Projections for 1981 with 1965 as base, show 
that total demand for oils and fats will be expected 
to rise to between 17,500 and 22,000 tons. Unfortun-
ately no estimates are available for cottonseed pro-
duction in 1981, but production is expected to be 
higher than that in 1971• This will again give 
Uganda a surplus of oils and fats. Uganda's ability 
to sell these oils and fats will depend on develop-
ments in both Tanzania and Kenya. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE LOCATION OF THE OIL MILLING INDUSTRY IN UGANDA 
The location of the eighteen firms operative in 
the industry in 1965 is shown in Table 5-1. The 
place (town) given, refers to the postal address of 
the mill and not its actual location. Some mills 
are known to be situated in rural areas. 
Table 5-1 
Place No. of Mills 
Jinja 8 
Tororo 1 
Mbale 3 
Soroti 1 
Kampala 5 
Source: Evidence from 
the millers. 
These figux'es show that in 1965 the industry 
was located in only two regions, the Eastern Region 
and Buganda, the majority of the mills being in the 
Eastern Region. At one time there had been other 
operative mills in other places, including one in 
Gulu, one in Hoima and two in Masaka, but these all 
ceased to operate prior to 1960. 
Not only are a high percentage of the oil mills 
located in the Eastern Region, but an even higher 
percentage of total capacity is in that region, see 
Table 5.2. 
No.of Mills 
Table 5.2 
of 
All Mills 1965 
Capacity > of Total 
Buganda 5 27.8 30,500 ^k.6 
Western - - - -
Eastern 13 72.2 179,000 85.4 
Northern _ _ - _ 
Total 18 100.0 209,500 100.0 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
Sales of 'AR1 cottonseed by the Lint Marketing 
Board to the millers, Table 5*3, indicate an even 
stronger orientation of the industry to the Eastern 
Region. 
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Table 5.3 
to Eastern 'fo to Bugandan % to Millers 
Season Region Millers Millers Outside Uganda 
1957-8 
1958-9 
1959-60 
1 9 6 0 - 1 
1 9 6 1 - 2 
1 9 6 2 - 3 
1963-4 
1964-5 
1965-6 
99.7 
1 0 0 . 0 
8 2 . 1 
87.7 
94.4 
94.4 
91 .6 
93.0 
81 .6 
17.9 
12.3 
17.7 
5.2 
4.4 
6.3 
5.0 
0.3 
0.7 
0.4 
1 .2 
2. 1 
2.0 
Source: Private communication with the Lint 
Marketing Board. 
These figures show that over the nine seasons 
1957-8 to 1965-6 over 90 per ce'" on average of the 
1AR1 cottonseed was sold to Eae nrn Region millers, 
the residual being mainly sold to the Bugandan 
millers. 
The figures of Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5 . 3 show 
that, although the industry is centred on both Jinja 
and Kampala, the Kampala millers only account for a 
small percentage of the seed crushed. 
The development of the industry in the two 
areas of Buganda and the Eastern Region was undoubt-
edly the result of the zoning arrangements which 
were not relaxed until 1959, see Chapter II, 
section A. 
Kampala and Jinja were the obvious centres for 
a market orientated oil milling industry in Uganda, 
as they provided easy access to the coast by rail 
for the cake, nearly all of which was exported, and 
for the oil, possibly around 50 per cent of which 
was sold in Kenya. Further, Jinja and Kampala had 
the largest urban populations and thus provided a 
good market for oil locally. However, the location 
of the industry in the past need not necessarily be 
the correct location for the industry in the 1960's. 
Table 5*4 shows the amount of cottonseed avail-
able for allocation to millers by Region for the 
seasons 1960-1, 1962-3 and 1963-4. The 1961-2 seas-
on has been excluded, as flooding in that season 
caused an abnormally small cotton crop in certain 
zones. 
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Table 5.4 
1960-
Amount of 
-1 1 9 6 2 - 3 
Amount of 
Cottonseed «jo by Cottonseed io by 
Region (tons) Region (tons) Region 
Buganda 16,803 14.2 19,617 17.4 
Western 4,098 3-5 4,543 4.0 
Eastern 62,571 53.0 54,805 48.6 
Northern 34,520 29.3 33,694 29.9 
Total 117,992 100.0 112,659 99-9 
Buganda 
1963 
9,342 
-4 
7.9 
Western 5,164 4.4 
Eastern 64,539 5 4 . 6 
Northern 39,220 3 3 . 2 
Total 118,265 100.1 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 1961, 
1 9 6 3 and 1964. (Uganda Argus, Ltd. Kampala) 
If we take the mean of the percentage figures 
given in Table 5.4. by Region, this would give the 
following results. 
Percentage on Average of 
Region Total Cottons-eei 
Buganda 13 . 1 
Western 4 .0 
Eastern 52 • 3 
Northern 30 .6 
Total 100 .0 
In attempting to draw conclusions from these results, 
it is interesting to look at the trends in the acre-
age of cotton planted in the different Regions. 
These are shown in Table 5.5* 
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Table 5.5 
<?o of Total Acreage Planted 
Region 1961 - 2 1 9 6 2 - 3 1963-4 
Buganda 22. 1 15-4 1 3 . 0 
Western 4. 2 3.9 4.0 
Eastern 50. 7 57.6 58.9 
Northern 23. 0 2 3 .1 24.2 
Total 100. 0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 
1962, 1 9 6 3 and 1964. (Uganda Argus Ltd., Kampala) 
The figures show that the percentage of the 
total acreage planted in Buganda declined over the 
period 1961-2 to 1963-4, while that in the Eastern 
and Northern Regions increased. This trend is asso-
ciated with the movement away from cotton in Buganda 
with the expansion of other attractive cash enter-
prises, and the steady increase in cotton acreage in 
the East and North as a result of the development of 
group farming. With the continued growth in grojup 
farms anticipated in the Second Five Year Plan, 
this trend may be expected to continue. 
We would therefore expect that in future less 
than 13 per cent of the cottonseed available to 
millers will come from Buganda, around 4 per cent 
will come from the Western Region and more than 50 
per cent and 30 per cent respectively will come from 
the Eastern and Northern Regions. 
It therefore appears that in the 1960's over 90 
per cent of the cottonseed is crushed in the Eastern 
Region, the source of only 50 per cent of the seed 
available, while none is crushed in the Northern 
Region, the source of 30 per cent of the seed. Do 
we conclude that the location of the industry is 
optimum, or that in the light of these circumstances 
some re-organization is called for? 
Probably the strongest argument for a source 
rather than market orientated milling industry rests 
on the cost advantage to be obtained from crushing 
seed at source rather than at some market centre. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the Lint Marketing 
Board has the sole responsibility for the allocation 
of seed to the millers, according to the amounts 
bought by the millers at the auctions. 
The particular allocation of seed from ginner-
ies to millers for the 1963-4 season cost the Lint 
Marketing Board £251,212 in transport costs. The 
pattern of the allocation is set out in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.3 
Amount of 
Seed Percentage Sold to: 
Region Available Soroti Mbale Tororo Jinja Kampala 
Buganda 9,008 - - - 41 . 7 58.3 
Western 5,164 - 1 -9 4.8 59.2 3k. 1 
Eastern 62,786 0.3 18.0 6.8 73.3 1 .6 
Northern 39,687 0.5 4.9 3.3 89.9 1 .3 
Source: Private communication with the Lint Market-
ing Board. 
This data suggests that, given the 1965 locat-
ion of the mills, the allocations were fairly ratio-
nal. For the Bugandan cottonseed 58 per cent was 
crushed in Kampala and 42 per cent in Jinja. For 
the Eastern Region seed over 98 per cent was crushed 
in the Eastern Region, while for the Northern Region 
seed over 98 per cent also was crushed in the East-
ern Region, which represents the nearest oil milling 
area. It would seem unnecessary for Western Region 
seed to have been transported to the Eastern Region 
for crushing, although as such a high percentage of 
the seed had been purchased by Eastern Region 
millers, this was probably inevitable. Given the 
location of the mills and the high percentage of 
purchases by Eastern Region millers, it is doubtful 
whether the transport costs could have been reduced 
below £250,000. 
Transport costs incurred by the Lint Marketing 
Board have been of much the same order of magnitude 
in other years, Table 5*7« 
Table 5.7 
Season 
Transport Cost 
U ) 
Amount of Cottonseed 
(tons) 
Cost/Ton 
(£) 
1954-5 130,933 87,651 1.49 
1955-6 2 1 7 , 1 1 6 110,500 1 , 9 6 
1956-7 2 2 5 , 5 2 6 114,595 1 .97 
1957-8 2 4 7 , 6 0 9 1 0 7 , 3 8 1 2.31 
1958-9 285,780 125,410 2.28 
1959-60 209,723 1 1 8 , 5 1 2 1 .77 
19 6 0 - 1 2 7 1,440 117,992 2.30 
1 9 6 1 - 2 99,861 44,301 2.25 
1 9 6 2 - 3 302,119 112,659 2.68 
1963-4 251,212 1 1 8 , 2 6 5 2 . 1 2 
1964-5 267,848 130,625 2.05 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 1955-65 
Note: 'BR' cottonseed is not included prior to 1959-
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Assuming that transport costs remain unchanged, 
with the steady increase in the amount of cottonseed 
available to millers, the costs of transport for 
seed from the ginneries to the oil mills cannot be 
expected in the future to fall below £250,000 per 
year. Further, as the Northern Region crop increa-
ses, we would expect the cost per ton to increase. 
Considering the Northern Region crop, the 
total amounts of cottonseed available in that Region 
are set out in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 
Amount of Cottonseed 
Season to Nearest '000 Tons 
1960-1 35,000 
1 9 6 1 - 2 1 0 , 0 0 0 
1962-3 34,000 
1963-4 39,000 
Source: Lint Marketing Board, Annual 
Reports, 1961-4. (Uganda Argus Ltd., Kampala.) 
Taking the figure of 90 per cent as that perce-
ntage of the Northern crop crushed in Jinja, and 
considering Gulu as the central collecting point for 
seed in the Northern Region, we would expect at 
least 35,000 tons of cottonseed for 1963-4 and foll-
owing seasons to be transported from Gulu to Jinja. 
The cost of transporting cottonseed from Gulu 
to Jinja^by rail is shs 2.50 per cental, or shs 56 
per ton. 
Now, in order to obtain a figure for the cost 
advantage of crushing cottonseed in Gulu rather 
than Jinja, we must offset against the transport 
charges the extra costs of transport of the final 
products of oil milling. 
The main products are oil and cake, oil forming 
approximately 13 per cent by weight of the seed, and 
cake forming approximately 46 per cent by weight. 
A large part of the remaining weight consists of 
hulls which are generally burnt in the boilers at 
the mill. 1-2 per cent by weight consists of soap-
stock, which is generally used for the manufacture 
of laundry soap. 
If we consider the output from one ton of cott-
onseed, this would give: 
291.2 lbs of oil 
and 1,030.4 lbs of cake. 
Firstly, consider the case of all the oil and 
cake being exported. Now, if the seed is crushed in 
Gulu as opposed to Jinja, the extra cost of railage 
of the oil and cake to the coast would be 75 cts per 
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3 cental of oil and 50 cts per cental of cake. This 
would imply an extra cost to the Gulu miller of shs 
7-35 per ton crushed. On the other hand, the cost 
of transporting the raw seed from Gulu to Jinja was 
shs 56 per ton, and thus, if the miller had to meet 
the cost of transporting his own seed, the Gulu 
miller would have a cost advantage of shs 48.65 per 
ton crushed over the Jinja miller for cottonseed 
from the Northern Region. 
Secondly, consider the case of all the cake 
being exported, but 50 per cent of the oil being 
sent to Nairobi, the remaining 50 per cent to 
Kampala. The extra railage would be 50 cts per cen-
tal of cake, 1.10 shs per cental of oil sent to 
Nairobi ^pd 2.90 shs per cental of oil sent to 
Kampala. This would imply an extra cost to the 
Gulu miller of shs 11 per ton of seed crushed. This 
gives a cost advantage of shs 45 per ton to the Gulu 
miller for cottonseed from the Northern Region. 
The worst possible situation for the Gulu 
miller with respect to his cost advantage over the 
Jinja miller, is one in which all the oil is sold in 
Jinja. The cost of transport,,for oil from Gulu to 
Jinja is shs 3-70 per cental. Assuming that all 
the cake is exported, the extra cost to the Gulu 
miller would be shs 15-90 per ton of seed crushed. 
This still gives a cost advantage to the Gulu miller 
of shs 40.10 for seed from the Northern Region. 
Of the three cases considered above, the second 
is the most realistic, although we would not necess-
arily expect all the oil to be sold in Kampala and 
Nairobi. Further, as a Northern based mill would be 
able to serve a local demand for oil, the cost 
advantage to the Gulu miller would probably be even 
greater. 
Table 5.9 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Extra Cost for Cake per 
cental in shs .50 .50 .50 
Extra Cost for Oil per 1 • 1 0 
.90 a n d cental in shs • 75 2 3 . 70 
Extra Cost to Gulu Miller 
shs/ton Crushed 7 • 35 1 1 .00 15 .90 
Cost of Transport to Jinja 
Miller shs/ton 56 .00 56 .00 56 .00 
Net Gain from Crushing 
Northern Seed in North 
shs/ton 
48 .65 45 .00 4o .10 
Table 5-9 sets out the three cases mentioned 
above. Now, if we assume that around 35,000 tons of 
seed will be sent from the Northern Region to Jinja 
for crushing each year, the total extra costs of 
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crushing in Jinja rather than the North are as 
follows:-
Extra Cost for 35,000 tons 
Case 1 shs 1,702,750 or £85,138 
Case 2 shs 1,575,000 or £78,750 
Case 3 shs 1,403,500 or £70,175 
Thus, in terms of costs alone, the system of 
sending most of the Northern cottonseed for crushing 
to Jinja leads to a yearly loss of around £80,000. 
The reason for the continued existence of this 
system despite the apparent gains from a relocation 
of the industry lies with the willingness of the 
Lint Marketing Board to continue meeting the costs 
of transport from the ginneries to the oil mills. 
It is difficult to forecast exactly what would 
be the effect of the Lint Marketing Board handing 
over the responsibility for transport costs to the 
millers. If the cottonseed were to be sold ex-ginn-
ery, a complicated price and auction system would 
undoubtedly result. Further, if the millers could 
agree not to outbid one another, it is possible that 
as a group they could force the price of cottonseed 
down to a level at which they are compensated for 
the transport costs, and nothing would be gained. 
However, if at least one miller could be attra-
cted to open a mill in the Northern Region, and some 
limit were placed on the amount of cottonseed from 
the North which could be transported elsewhere for 
crushing, then some gain could be expected to arise 
in that prices for Northern seed going to Northern 
mills would not fall as much as those for Northern 
seed going elsewhere if millers were asked to pay 
for transport costs. In fact, the Northern miller 
might find himself at a cost advantage compared with 
other millers, the extent of the advantage depending 
on the price he was required to pay for his seed. 
The most important factors are whether the 
millers can command a monopsonist position in the 
market for seed and whether a miller is prepared to 
operate in the Northern Region. It is unlikely that 
with 18 operative mills in the industry, the millers 
can come to a complete agreement. Further, it is 
likely that, provided some incentive were given, a 
miller would begin to operate in the Northern Region. 
In the past the successful millers in the indu-
stry have been characterized by having other large 
scale interests, the profits from which have been 
used to offset any losses in oil milling, and all 
millers have some other activity outside oil milling, 
such as maize milling, soap manufacture, etc. . 
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Further, if cottonseed prices were to continue at 
the same high levels as in the early 1960's, undoub-
tedly profit margins would be small, even though the 
Northern mill might have some cost advantage. 
This suggests that the establishment of a new 
mill in the North, operated by a firm completely new 
to the oil milling industry could prove disastrous. 
Such a firm would need a large and continual subsidy 
payment in terms of relatively cheaper seed in order 
to remain in business. 
We need not assume, though, that this precludes 
the establishment of a Northern mill. With prosp-
ects of a crop of over 40,000 tons being available 
for crushing in future years, there is certainly 
sufficient seed available to support at least one 
Northern mill of an economic size. In order to sup-
port a double-refining plant of 3,000 tons of oil 
per year, the mill would need a throughput of 25,000 
tons of seed, and as a double-refining plant is 
necessary in order to make satisfactory returns from 
oil milling. This represents the minimum recommen-
ded size of a Northern mill. Some Co-operative 
Unions have suggested that they should be allowed to 
crush their own cottonseed. However, as the maximum 
amount of cottonseed produced by any Co-operative g 
ginnery in the 1964-5 season was around 4,000 tons, 
this idea is rejected on the grounds that insuffic-
ient seed is available at any ginnery to support a 
plant for producing double-refined oil efficiently. 
Two non-cost benefits of a Northern mill would 
also result. Firstly, milling of the Northern seed 
in the North would lead to an easing of the conges-
tion on the railway. Despite the fact that the East 
African Railways and Harbours would lose a revenue 
of approximately £80,000 per year, this loss is more 
apparent than real. For the cottonseed must travel 
southwards at the same time as the cotton lint, lea-
ding to congestion on the railway. If, though, the 
seed were to be crushed in the North, movements of 
oil and cake southwards would tend to follow rather 
than be concurrent with movements of cotton lint. 
Secondly, there would be some benefit in the North-
ern Region from the increase in employment in the 
new mill, although only 100-200 people would be 
employed. 
Thus there are considerable direct and indirect 
benefits from the establishment of an oil mill in 
the North, a part of the cost benefits probably 
going as an incentive to the miller and a part to 
the Lint Marketing Board. Such a benefit to the 
Lint Marketing Board is particularly important in 
the light of the losses incurred by the Board, see 
Table 2.7. Obviously, some of these gains can only 
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be made at the expense of someone else. The chief 
losers will be the Jinja millers who at present 
crush 98 per cent of the Northern crop. 
The most satisfactory relocation of the indus-
try would result from providing an incentive to an 
existing miller to open up operations in the North. 
This would give all the benefits mentioned above, 
while removing the problems of the establishment of 
a completely new firm in the industry. If an exis-
ting miller were to operate in the North, probably 
some of the existing redundant plant in the indus-
try could be transferred to this mill, thus reducing 
the costs of the investment. A completely new mill 
would cost at least £500,000, but costs would be 
much lower if second-hand equipment were used. The 
smaller the investment required, the smaller need be 
the incentive given, and the larger the gains to the 
Lint Marketing Board. 
In view of the high opportunity cost of capital 
and the problems of competing in the industry, a 
Northern mill operated by an existing miller would 
seem to be the better investment. If a new firm 
were to try to enter the industry, the difficulties 
of such entry should not be forgotten. Such a firm 
is likely to meet with antagonism from the existing 
milling group who, although probably not able to 
deprive the miller of his seed, could flood the mar-
ket with cheap oil, causing the new firm to operate 
at a loss. 
The problem of whether a mill should be establ-
ished in the Western Region is more easy to deal 
with. The quantity of cottonseed produced in that 
area only amounts to around 5,000 tons, see Table 
5.4, which is insufficient to support a mill of an 
economic size. There is therefore, in 1966, no case 
for an oil mill in the Western Region. 
Evidence on the location of the oil milling 
industry was given by the writer to the Committee of 
Inquiry into the Cotton Industry, 1966. On the 
basis of this and other evidence, the Committee 
recommended that "the Government should pursue the 
possibility of establishing a mill in the North 
either by a para-statal organization or through pri-
vate or Co-operative enterprise". The Committee 
also recommendedgthat cottonseed should in future be 
sold ex-ginnery. In reply to the demands of Co-op-
erative Unions "that they should be allowed to 
retain their seed and mill it themselves", it was 
stated — "If a Co—operative Union or a combination 
of Unions can provide the necessary capital and man-
agement then naturally no bar must be put in their 
way. 'But we are firmly of the opinion that no conc-
essions or ease of entry should be given to the 
7^ 
Co-operatives as to do so would lower theQprice of 
seed and hence the price to the growers." 
It is known that in 19^7 at least one of the 
larger oil mills in Uganda is considering operating 
in the North. One Co-operative Union, advised by 
another large miller, is also investigating the pos-
sibility of erecting a new mill in the North. In 
the opinion of the writer the movement of the exist-
ing miller to operate in the North is to be particu-
larly encouraged in the light of the evidence above, 
but care should be taken on the part of the Co-oper-
ative Union lest it should severely burn its fingers 
in this highly competitive industry. 
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CHAPTER VI 
OIL MILLING IN THE LAKE AREA OF TANZANIA 
A. Background Information to Lake Area Milling 
1. History. The Tanzanian oil milling industry 
centred on Mwanza represents the only other large 
producing area of liquid edible oils in East Africa. 
Although there are other mills situated in Tanga and 
Dar es Salaam, these mills are mainly concerned with 
the crushing of copra and with grain milling, and 
only crush very small quantities of sesame, ground-
nuts and cottonseed. 
The continued increase in the amount of cotton-
seed available for crushing in the 1950's and 1960's 
in the Lake Area of Tanzania has led to the continu-
ous expansion of the oil milling industry in and 
around Mwanza, where most of the Tanzanian cotton 
crop is grown. As in Uganda, small amounts of 
groundnuts and sesame are being crushed by the 
millers, but these oilseeds are of minor importance 
compared with cottonseed. 
The earliest recorded mill in the Lake Area was 
founded in Mwanza in 1912 and at that time was 
mainly crushing groundnuts. This mill was an excep-
tion, though, and most of the oil mills were built 
in 1950-60 period. Evidence from six millers in 
1965 showed that 77 per cent of their expellers had 
been purchased in the 1960's. 
Seven of the seventeen oil mills in the Lake 
Area in 1966 were owned by the Victoria Federation 
of Co-operative Unions. The policy of the Federa-
tion has been, since 1953, to purchase all the 
cotton ginneries in the Lake Area, and also leading 
rice mills and sisal factories. Where oil mills 
were on the same site as any of these enterprises, 
they also have been bought. One further mill, in 
which the Federation had an ownership share, was 
being constructed in Mwanza in 1966. This mill was 
to concentrate on the production of hydrogenated 
oils and fats. 
It is interesting to compare the development of 
this industry with that in Uganda. Plentiful supp-
lies of cottonseed for crushing were available in 
Uganda at a much earlier period and the Ugandan 
industry most rapidly expanded in the early 1950's 
when the Lake Area industry was still in its infancy. 
When the greatest expansion was under way in the 
Lake Area industry in the early 1960's, the Ugandan 
industry was under severe excess capacity, and firms 
were going into voluntary and forced liquidation. 
2. Location. In Tanzania in contrast to the 
position in Uganda, the oil mills are situated 
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within the area in which the cottonseed is grown. 
About half the oil mills in the Lake Area are attach-
ed directly to ginneries,and the seed for crushing 
is provided in many cases, by an arrangement amongst 
the millers and the Lint and Seed Marketing Board, 
from the ginnery attached to the mill. The mills 
which are not attached to ginneries are all situated" 
in the towns of Mwanza and Shinyanga. The industry 
is therefore almost completely supply orientated. 
Further, in contrast to Uganda, cottonseed is sold 
ex-ginnery by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board of 
Tanzania, rather than sales at mill or nearest mill 
station as in Uganda. The Tanzanian system is 
likely to lead to a much more optimum location of 
the industry than the Ugandan one, as it encourages 
supply orientation, which for an oilseed with such 
high losses in crushing as cottonseed, is almost 
certainly advantageous. 
3. Supplies of Seed. (a) Cottonseed. As in 
Uganda, all the cottonseed is by law the property of 
the Lint and Seed Marketing Board of Tanzania, and 
is sold to the millers either by auction or private 
treaty. 
The total amount of cottonseed available for 
crushing in the Lake Area is shown in Table 6.1, 
together with figures for cottonseed produced in the 
Coast Area of Tanzania. 
Table 6.1 
•AR' Cottonseed •BR' Cottonseed 
Lake Coast Lake Coast Total 
Area Area Area Area Cottonseed 
1955 -6 30,802 1 ,746 1 ,532 1 ,013 35,093 
1956 -7 32,257 2,502 2,792 513 38,064 
1957 -8 42,343 3,375 3,972 1 , 108 50,798 
1958 -9 40,771 4,657 4,537 1 , 166 51,131 
61,357 * 1959 -60 50,365 4,212 5,331 1 ,449 
1960 -1 40,384 5,182 5,701 1 ,821 53,088 n 
1961 -2 41,184 - 4,207 656 46,047 s 
1962 -3 46,393 1 ,824 8,167 292 56,676 ; 
1963 -4 55,853 4,326 10,720 1 ,069 71,968 
1964 -5 66,169 5,027 10,094 8 96 82,196 
1965 -6 85,019 8,653 94,019 
Source: Private communication with the Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board. 
Note: a - rough estimate only. 
These figures show that, apart from a minor 
recession in the early 1960's, the Tanzanian cotton-
seed crop has been steadily increasing. Supplies of 
cottonseed have more than doubled over the ten-year 
period 1955-6 to 1964-5, but still fall considerably 
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short of cottonseed sold through the Lint Marketing 
Board in Uganda, where in 1964-5 a total of over 
131,000 tons of cottonseed was sold to the millers, 
compared with only 76,000 tons in the Lake Area of 
Tanzania. In the 1966-7 season the Lake Area cotton-
seed crop is expected to increase to 110,000 tons, 
and it now appears that the gap between production 
in Tanzania and Uganda is closing. 
Some of the cottonseed sold through the Lint 
and Seed Marketing Board is sold to Kenya, while 
some is also exported, most of the exported cotton-
seed coming from the Coast Area of Tanzania. Fig-
ures for these sales, and estimates for the balance 
of cottonseed available to the oil millers for 
crushing are shown in Table 6.2. Although small 
purchases of cottonseed from outside Tanzania are 
shown in Table 6.2 for the 1960-1 and 1962-3 seasons, 
it is known that imports of cottonseed are effect-
ively banned, so as to prevent the spread of disease 
and the mixing of varieties, and can only take place 
on the authority of the Agricultural Department of 
Tanzania. The small purchases shown may have been 
experimental seed for planting. 
Table 6.2 
Total 'AR' Total (tons) 
and 'BR' Total .Sales .Total , „ . ,a , b, b„ , b_ , 
1955-6 3 5 i , 0 9 3 3,82 6 6 1 6 - 3 0 , 6 5 1 
1956-7 3 8 . , 0 6 4 4 , 0 2 0 756 - 3 3 , 2 8 9 
1957-8 5 0 . , 7 9 8 8,386 3 , 5 0 9 - 3 8 , 9 0 3 
1 9 5 8 - 9 51 • , 131 7 , 5 2 0 3 , 4 3 4 - 4 0 , 1 7 7 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 61 . , 3 5 7 5 , 0 1 1 7 , 0 2 4 - 49,322 
1960-1 5 3 , ,088 5 , 4 6 0 3 , 8 5 7 59 43,830 
1961-2 4 6 , , 0 4 7 2 , 1 8 8 2 , 4 3 4 - 4 1 , 4 2 5 
1962-3 5 6 , ,676 3 1 , 6 2 6 1 5 5 , 0 4 8 
1 9 6 3 - 4 71 : ,968 10 5 , 4 9 8 - 6 6 , 4 6 0 
1 9 6 4 - 5 8 2 , , 1 9 6 1 , 3 7 5 3,871 - 7 6 , 9 5 0 
1965-6 , 0 1 9 * 2 1,829 - 9 2 , 1 8 8 * 
Sources: : a - See Table 6.1 
b - East ; African Customs and Excise , Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Ugand a and Keny; a, 
1955-65. (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
Notes: For the 1955-6 season, exports for 1955 have 
been taken, as it is believed that most of the seas-
on's crop would be sold in that year, and so on for 
all the other seasons. * Excluding 'BR' seed. 
The figures of Table 6.2 show that over 90 per 
cent of the cottonseed produced in Tanzania since 
1961, excluding that set aside for planting, has 
been crushed by the millers. 
Exports of cottonseed have been worthwhile from 
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Tanzania because of the lower prices fetched for 
cottonseed in Tanzania, as compared with prices in 
Uganda. Prices received are shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 
Price of 'AR' 
Cottonseed in 
shs/ton 
Lake Coast 
Price of 'BR' 
Cottonseed in 
shs/ton 
Lake Coast 
Average Price 
of exported 
Cottonseed^ 
in shs/ton 
1955-6 335 358 1 18 166 402 
1956-7 378 342 308 280 459 
1957-8 327 231 142 1 45 483 
1958-9 235 274 190 144 370 
1959-60 3 69 430 297 206 411 
1960-1 380 440 161 194 476 
1961-2 422 - 224 200 456 
1962-3 383 396 190 170 280e 
1963-4 329 320 212 179 336e 
1964-5 375 344 205 231 410 
1965-6 547 317 300e 
1966-7 400f 500f — 
Sources: c - Private communication with the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board, 
d - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-65.(Commissioner of CustomsandExcise, East 
Africa). Prices f.o.b. Dar es Salaam. 
Notes: e - Less than 10 tons exported in these years, 
f - Rough estimates. 
A comparison of 'AR' cottonseed prices between 
Uganda and the Lake Area of Tanzania shows that in 
the period 1959-60 to 1965-6, prices in the Lake 
Area of Tanzania only exceeded those in Uganda in 
the 1961-2 and 1965-6 seasons. In all other seasons 
Ugandan cottonseed prices were more than Shs 70 in 
excess of those in the Lake Area. The explanation 
for the 1961-2 season is that prices were abnormally 
low in Uganda in that season because of the pooling 
agreement, see Chapter II, while prices were slight-
ly higher in the Lake Area for that season as a res-
ult of a short crop. The high Lake Area prices in 
the 1965-6 season (the price of Shs 547 received for 
'AR' cottonseed in that season was an all-time high) 
resulted from heavy competition for cottonseed 
80 
amongst the millers in the Lake Area. These high 
prices led to large losses being incurred by the 
millers, as a result of which the millers came to a 
gentleman's agreement not to outbid each other at 
the auctions in the following season. This agree-
ment was effective, and in the 1966-7 season prices 
in the Lake Area fell to around shs 400, which price 
the Lint and Seed Marketing Board felt to be fair in 
relation to current cottonseed oil and cake prices. 
It therefore seems likely that Lake Area prices will 
continue to be lower than Ugandan prices. 
It should be noted here that the prices given 
by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board are prices ex-
ginnery, compared with prices in Uganda, which refer 
to cottonseed delivered at mill or nearest mill 
station. However, as about half the mills crush the 
seed from their own ginneries, and as distances from 
the ginneries to the mills are in most cases fairly 
short, most of the oil mills in the Lake Area were 
receiving seed at a considerably lower cost than 
their counterparts in Uganda. 
Although given the structure of prices in the 
two areas, and transport costs o^ f shs 6k per ton of 
cottonseed from Mwanza to Jinja, the Ugandan millers 
could have obtained lower cost seed from Tanzania 
than from lhe Ugandan Lint Marketing Board, such 
purchases were prohibited by the ban on imports of 
cottonseed into Uganda. However, Kenyan millers 
could obtain this lower cost seed, and purchases by 
Kenyan millers from Tanzania have greatly exceeded 
their purchases from Uganda in the 1960's. 
A comparison of the prices received for cotton-
seed in the Lake and Coast Regions of Tanzania shows 
that the difference in prices between the two 
regions fluctuates widely from year to year. This, 
as we would have expected from the distance between 
the two sources of seed, reflects the separate dem-
and situations for seed from the two regions. Dem-
and for Coast seed is almost completely for seed 
for export, while that for Lake Area seed predomina-
ntly comes from the oil millers and to a much lesser 
extent from the exporters. In this respect there is 
a close similarity between sales of Lake Area cotton-
seed and sales of Ugandan cottonseed. Naturally, 
Coast Area cottonseed is in a more advantageous pos-
ition than either Lake Area or Ugandan cottonseed 
for export, as the charge^of transport to the coast 
(of around shs 75 per ton ) does not have to be met 
for Coast Area seed. A comparison of Coast Area and 
exported seed prices, indicates that in almost all 
years exports would have been fairly profitable. 
In the Mwanza area the Victoria Federation of 
Co-operative Unions (which operated a total of five 
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mills in 1965) dominated the purchases of seed from 
the Lint and Seed Marketing Board, purchasing a 
total of 28 per cent of the cottonseed in the 1965-6 
season. In that same season, there were two other 
firms who bought between 1 0 - 1 4 per cent of the seed, 
five who bought between 5-9 per cent of the seed and 
six who bought less than 5 per cent of the seed. In 
the 1966-7 season , with the addition of two further 
oil mills, the Federation is expected to account for 
an even greater percentage of purchases of cotton-
seed, although it is interesting to note that they 
are still not crushing all the cottonseed which is 
produced in the Federation ginneries. 
However, the Federation does not dominate the 
purchases of seed in the Lake Area to nearly the 
same extent as 'the big four' in Uganda, and is cer-
tainly not in a monopsony position. 
(b) Other Oilseeds. The crushing of other oil-
seeds in the Lake Area seemed to be rather less com-
mon than in Uganda. In 1965 none of the millers 
interviewed in Mwanza were crushing other oilseeds, 
although some had done so in the past. Apparently 
supplies of other oilseeds are not readily available 
for crushing in the Mwanza region, and this probably 
explains the lack of interest of Lake Area millers 
in these seeds. 
It is believed that at one time there were sep-
arate mills for the crushing of groundnuts in Tanza-
nia, but that most of these have now closed because 
of the relative attractiveness of selling groundnuts 
for export and for direct consumption. This belief 
is backed up by evidence from the Census of Industr-
ial Production, 1961, which states that while copra 
and cottonseed are crushed for oil and cake, other 
oil bearing seeds are exported in their raw state. 
Figures given by the Ministry of Industries, 
Mineral Resources and Power show that around 700 
tons of groundnut oil was produced in Tanzania over 
the period 1961-3* This indicates, assuming a 36 
per cent extraction rate for oil from groundnuts, 
crushings of around 2,000 tons of groundnuts. Total 
sales of groundnut oil by Tanzania to other ccrnnt-
ries have not exceeded 50 tons in the 1960's, and 
sales of groundnut cake only^amounted to 442 tons 
and 88 tons in 1964 and 1965 respectively, indicat-
ing crushings of around 800 tons of groundnuts in 
1964 and 160 tons in 1965-
Certainly, in 1961 some groundnuts were being 
crushed by the indi+stry. The Census of Industrial 
Production in 1961 shows that some of the thirty-
two establishments classified in the 'oil milling 
and soap' section were crushing groundnuts, produc-
ing oil and cake to a value of £154,000. In 
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addition, seven of the firms listed under the 'Grain 
Mill Products' section in the Census were said to be 
producing groundnut and sim sim oil. it is thought, 
though, that the crushing of groundnuts has gradual-
ly decreased in the 1960's. 
Little information is available on the crushing 
of sesame seed, but it is known, as mentioned above, 
that some firms listed under 'Grain Mill Products' 
were crushing sesame seed in 1961. Total sales of 
sesame oil by Tanzania to othergCountries have not 
exceeded 10 tons in the 1960's, and have in most 
years been negligible. It is thought that in the 
mid-1960's total crushings of sesame seed have been 
very small. 
The only other oil produced in Tanzania is 
copra oil, which is produced at the Coast. This oil 
is used mainly for the production of soap, and as 
there are no crushings of copra in Uganda, this oil 
has been excluded from the study. 
B. The Operation oi' Lake Area Mills 
1. Techniques if Production. The techniques of 
production used in Tanzania are similar in almost 
all respects to those in use in Uganda. 
(a) Pretreatment. As far as the delinting is 
concerned, about half the firms appeared to be remo-
ving the fluff making use of gins in their ginneries 
but only one firm actually owned a delinting machine. 
This differs considerably from the practice in 
Uganda where a number of delinters are owned, but 
very few are in use. The difference possibly arises 
from the different variety of seed in the two areas, 
the Tanzanian seed having more fluff on it, thus 
increasing the need for delinting prior to crushing. 
The position with regard to decor Iication app-
eared to be roughly similar to that in IJgandu - Most 
millers had one decorticator, a few were still using 
grinding mills, but only one mill owned two decorti-
cators. Most of the decorticators contained a mag-
net for removing tramp iron, but as in Uganda, there 
seemed to be an absence of proper cleaning equipment 
for removing dirt and stones. 
There is no information available on the amount 
of oil left in the hulls after decortication, and 
thus there is no measure of the efficiency of the 
decortication process. 
Although the millers gave evidence in 1965 vo 
the effect that they owned adequate storage accommo-
dation for the seed, other" evidence shows that this 
is often not true. Many of the millers only have a 
total storage capacity of 400-500 tons, which is 
hardly adequate for the seed and the cake (which may 
have to be stored for 1-2 months due to the difficu-
lties of railage to the Coast). 
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(b) Extraction. The method of extraction, as 
in Uganda, is by means of expellers, a total of 98 
expellers being owned by the industry in 1965 and 
105 in 1966. Many of these expellers have been pur-
chased during the I960's and it was found that for 
seven firms, who owned a total of forty-three expel-
lers, thirteen of their expellers had been purchased 
second-hand from Uganda and Kenya. The majority of 
expellers owned by the seven firms mentioned above 
were of the British Rose-Down model. 
This is backed up by the evidence from the East 
African Customs and Excise Annual Trade Reports for 
1951-65, where 5^ per cent of the purchases of vege-
table oil crushing machinery were found to be from 
the United Kingdom. A further 37 per cent were from 
India, and 6 per cent from Germany. Again, as in 
Uganda, the Indian machinery was the cheapest and 
the German the most expensive machinery from these 
three countries. 
All except one of the millers asked claimed to 
leave, after extraction, only 6-7 per cent of oil in 
the cake. Some firms even claimed to only leave 
6-6.5 per cent oil in the cake. The weighted aver-
age of the extraction rates for oil from cottonseed 
of the Lake Area millers came to nearly 14 per cent 
in 1965 and is therefore almost exactly identical 
with that received on average by the Ugandan millers. 
Thus in terms of efficiency of extraction of 
cottonseed oil, there seems to be little to choose 
between the Lake Area and Ugandan industries. Both 
would gain in efficiency if more of the modern-type 
expellers were used. 
(c) Refining. A total of three firms, with a 
total capacity of 9,000 tons of oil, were producing 
double-refined oil in 1965, and a plant to produce 
7-8,000 tons of double-refined and hydrogenated oils 
and fats was planned. All the other fourteen firms 
were only producing semi-refined oil. No data is 
available on the efficiency of the refining process 
in Tanzania. 
2. Activities of Lake Area Millers. (a) Refin-
ing. There were seventeen mills operating in the 
1965-6 season, fourteen of whom were producing semi-
refined oil, and three of whom were producing double-
refined oil. None of these mills had hydrogenation 
plant, but a new mill for producing double-refined 
and hydrogenated oils and fats was being constructed 
in 1966 and was expected to be operational in 1967-
(b) Grain Milling. A total of eight mills in 
1965 were found to be rice milling, and this appea-
red to be an important alternative activity of the 
town millers. Two of these mills were also produc-
ing maize flour and two cassava flour. 
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(c) Other Activities. The most important other 
activity of the millers was cotton ginning, a total 
of nine out of the seventeen mills having an associ-
ated ginnery, usually on the same site as the oil 
mill. Four of the mills with associated ginneries 
now belong to the Victoria Federation of Co-opera-
tive Unions. 
It is particularly interesting to note that 
soap manufacture is not closely associated with oil 
milling in the Lake Area of Tanzania. Only one of 
the millers in the Lake Area was producing soap and 
the millers claimed that soap manufacture was not a 
profitable enterprise on a small scale. In fact, 
most of the soap-stock is apparently thrown away, as 
according to the millers it is not worthwhile in 
terms of the returns to barrel the soap-stock and 
sell it to the soap factories. 
The reason for this difference of attitude tow-
ards soap-stock as between the Ugandan and the Lake 
Area millers probably arises from two factors. 
Firstly, the Ugandan millers have found it much more 
difficult to make profits on their oil milling enter-
prises than the Mwanzan millers due to the very high 
prices for cottonseed in Uganda and therefore wish 
to utilize all the by-products. Secondly, large 
amounts of copra oil are produced in Tanzania, and 
this provides a better base for soap manufacture 
than the soap-stock from cottonseed oil. This will 
reduce the value of the soap-stock in Mwanza consid-
erably, and probably explains why it was not worth 
barrelling and selling. 
The fact that only one of the Lake Area millers 
was found to be manufacturing soap in 1965 is inter-
esting in the light of the following evidence from 
the Qpnsus of Industrial Production in Tanganyika in 
1961 - "The classification problem posed by multi-
purpose mills which produced both vegetable oils and 
soap proved insoluble as the mills were unable to 
distinguish between their separate cost of produc-
tion so that oil milling and soap manufacturing are 
considered to constitute one industry." Under the 
classification 'Oil Milling and Soap' in the Census, 
were included thirty-two establishments, almost 
double the number of oil mills found in the Lake 
Area in 1 9 6 5 . It seems probable that around fifteen 
of these establishments were at the Coast, and that 
it is there that copra extraction and soap manufac-
ture are inseparable activities, and not in the Lake 
Area. 
3. Size and Structure of Firms. The general 
impression of the oil milling industry in the Lake 
Area is that it consists of a number of mills of 
more or less equal size. However, the slow amalgam-
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ation of mills by the federation has led to the 
emergence of one large milling group, which in 1966 
owned a total of seven out of the seventeen exist-
ing oil mills. Further, the new mill being constru-
cted in 1966, with a total of fifteen expellers, 
should also be somewhat larger in terms of its crus-
hing capacity than the existing mills. 
In Table 6.4, the eleven separate firms are 
classified according to the number of expellers 
owned in 1966. Crushing capacity is not used as 
this could not be obtained sufficiently accurately. 
Table 6.4 
No. of Expellers No. of Mills in That Class 
2 1 
3 2 
6 1 
7 2 
8 2 
10 2 
45 1 
1 1 
number of expellers - 109 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
The two mills with ten expellers, and one of 
the mills with seven expellers have double-refining 
plant, and in a sense may be considered as the larg-
er firms in the industry. The firm with 45 expell-
ers is of course the Federation, which really con-
sists of a number of firms working under the same 
management, and not of a large integrated mill as is 
found amongst 'the big four' in Uganda. 
The total capacity of the industry was estima-
ted as 147,000 tons of seed in 1965 and as 156,000 
tons in 1966. When the new firm is fully operational 
in 1967, total capacity may be expected to rise to 
183,000 tons. In 1965, the millers crushed.^ total 
of 86,000 tons of 'AR' and 'BR' cottonseed, and in 
1966 they were expected to crush around 110,000 tons. 
This indicates utilized capacities of 59 per cent in 
1965 and 71 per cent in 1966. With the operation of 
the new mill in 1967, utilized capacity will undoub-
tedly fall again in 1967. 
It is interesting to note, that despite claims 
by the millers that they had a high utilized capac-
ity, the Mwanzan industry is operating overall at no 
greater utilized capacity than the Ugandan industry. 
However, the plight of the individual firms in the 
Mwanza Area is definitely better than in Uganda, 
where a high percentage of utilized capacity is acc-
ounted for by 'the big four'. 
The capacity of the three firms with double-
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refining plant was around 9,000 tons of oil in 1965* 
but only 2,800 tons of double-refined oil was actua-
lly produced in 1965, indicating a utilized capacity 
of 31 per cent. The capacity of this plant was in 
1965 considerably less than that of the Ugandan 
millers (16,000 tons increasing to 30,000 tons in 
1967) and was operating at a much lower capacity. 
The new mill in Mwanza will have capacity for prod-
ucing 7-8,000 tons of hydrogenated and double-refin-
ed oils, bringing the total capacity for producing 
double-refined and hydrogenated oils in Mwanza to 
16-17,000 tons in 1967. (For Uganda this will 
amount to 35,000 tons in 1967). 
Unlike the Ugandan industry, there does not 
seem to be a sharp division in the industry amongst 
the firms as to future plans. Most firms in the 
Lake Area did not appear to have clearly defined 
plans, and the plans of the Federation were geared 
to the acquisition of ginneries rather than oil 
mills. However, the Federation plans do affect the 
other millers, in that existing millers owning ginn-
eries are uncertain as to their future, and will not 
invest money lest they should be bought out. 
Only three firms hoped to expand their expell-
ing capacity, and one of the larger millers with 
double-refining plant mentioned the possibility of 
investing in hydrogenation pl;nt. 
Certainly, the Mwanzan industry was not in 1965 
dominated by the Federation in the same way as the 
Ugandan industry is dominated by 'the big four'. 
'The big four' have major interests in oil milling, 
and considerable ability to affect cottonseed and 
oil prices. The Federation was in 1965 only just 
emerging as a large oil milling group, its major 
interest being in cotton ginning. There is no indi-
cation that it has ever outbid other millers at cot-
tonseed auctions, although a few Mwanzan millers did 
complain that on occasions the Federation had flood-
ed the local market with oil. Again, unlike 'the 
big four', none of the mills owned by the Federation 
in 1965 had double-refining plant, although the Fed-
eration was to have a share in the new mill being 
constructed. 
In 1966, the Lake and Western Regions Oilmill-
ers' Association was formed in Mwanza to provide a 
bargaining power for the millers with the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board over the price of cottonseed, 
and with East African Railways and Harbours to deal 
with the problem of railage of cake to the Coast. 
The formation of this Association, which includes 
nearly all the millers in the Lake Area, indicates a 
measure of co-operation amongst the millers in the 
Lake Area, which does not exist in Uganda. 
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4. Labour Employed. Most of the mills were 
employing both permanent and casual labour, unlike 
the position in Uganda, where the bigger firms empl-
oyed only permanent labour. Only around 45 per cent 
of the total labour force was permanent, compared 
with 7^ per cent in Uganda. The large casual labour 
element will cause considerable variation in the 
total amount of labour employed at different times 
of the year. 
Of the eight firms who gave information on lab-
our employed, the four firms crushing more than 
5,000 tons of seed per year had average throughputs 
of 152 tons per unit of labour employed, while the 
remaining four, with utilized capacities of less 
than 5,000 tons per year, only had average through-
puts of 72 tons per unit of labour employed. These 
figures are well above those found to apply in 
Uganda and give support to the claim by the millers 
that the handling of the seed is more highly mechan-
ized in the Lake Area than in Uganda. 
All except one of the millers were operating 
three shifts of eight hours each day, and most of 
the millers claimed to operate for an 8-month year, 
coinciding with the ginning season beginning in June 
-July and ending in February-March. This is in con-
trast to the situation in Uganda where the larger 
mills operate for about 10 months of the year, while 
the smaller mills only operate for a few months dep-
ending on seed supplies. The difference undoubtedly 
results from the close relationship between milling 
and ginning in the Lake Area, and the more equitable 
distribution of seed amongst millers in the Lake 
Area. 
Payments to labour were roughly similar in form 
to those in Uganda, most millers paying the minimum 
wage of shs 125 per month in 1965. It should be 
noted that this wage-level is shs 25 below the mini-
mum wage applicable in Jinja and Kampala in 1965. 
Some firms in the Lake Area were paying bonuses for 
seniority, while the Federation was paying a basic 
wage of shs 130 per month. A few firms were provid-
ing housing and other facilities for their employees. 
The data which is available on labour indicates 
that total labour costs per ton of seed crushed 
should be less in the Lake Area than in town mills 
in Uganda. 
5. Costs of Production and Profitability. Some 
evidence on costs of production was given by seven 
of the millers in the Lake Area, but there is no 
evidence from other sources, as the Census of Indus-
trial Production in Tanganyika in 1961 classifies 
oil milling and soap manufacture together. 
Figures given by the seven millers for fuel 
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costs varied from 5 - 2 2 Shs per ton of seed crushed 
One reason for this variation is probably that only 
four out of the seven mills were linked to the main 
electricity supplies. The other three mills, all 
situated outside the towns, either had their own 
generators or used some alternative fuel and the 
costs of such fuels were difficult to estimate. 
Many millers were also using their husk as fuel for 
the boilers. 
As is the case in Uganda, the main cost of mat-
erials takes the form of cottonseed, for which the 
millers paid over Shs 500 per ton in 1965, but this 
price was abnormally high. 
Other purchases of materials included chemicals 
and packaging costs. Expenditure on chemicals 
varied from 5 - 38 Shs per ton of crude oil refined, 
and that on packaging materials (tins for the oil 
and sacks for the cake) amounted to Shs 47 per ton 
of seed crushed or Shs 5*70 per ton of refined oil 
produced. 
The cost of spare parts mainly for the expel-
lers, was given as 3 - 9 Shs per ton of seed crushed, 
While costs of chemicals and expenditure on 
spare parts appears to be rather lower in the Lake 
Area than in Uganda, expenditure on packing mater-
ials appears to be higher in the Lake Area, although 
from the data available it is difficult to make 
precise judgements. 
When estimates were made as to the overall 
crushing costs (including fuels, chemicals, spare 
parts and labour costs) per ton of seed crushed, the 
resulting figures per ton crushed varied consider-
ably, but for those firms whose costs appeared to be 
consistent, a figure of between 45 - 55 Shs for cru-
shing costs per ton of seed crushed was obtained. 
However, as overhead costs have not been included, 
these costs per ton are likely to be under-estimated, 
These estimates coincide roughly with similar esti-
mates made for Uganda in Chapter III, section E. 
Actual figures for total costs of crushing one 
ton of seed as quoted by the millers are shown in 
Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
Overall Crushing Costs in Shs/ton No. of Firms 
45 - 50 
50 - 55 
55 - 6o 
6 0 - 65 
65 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Source: Evidence from the millers. 
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These figures show that overall crushing costs 
per ton of seed crushed in the Lake Area lie bet-
ween 45 - 65 shs. As in some cases the firms have 
not adequately accounted for overhead costs, the 
true cost probably lies towards the upper end of 
this range. 
The question of the profitability of the indus-
try in the Lake Area is a difficult one. In the 
1965-6 season when cottonseed prices were abnormally 
high in the Lake Area, many millers complained of 
making heavy losses. The Lint and Seed Marketing 
Board of Tanzania considered carefully the question 
of what constituted a reasonable price for cotton-
seed for the following season and concluded that a 
price of shs 400 per ton for cottonseed was fair, 
taking into account ruling prices for oil and cake 
and allowing for cri^hing costs of shs 40 per ton of 
cottonseed crushed. 
If the product of one ton of cottonseed is con-
sidered, this would yield 299 lbs of oil (14 per 
cent extraction rate and allowing 5 per cent for 
refining losses) and 1120 lbs of cake (50 per cent 
extraction rate). Valuing the oil at 75 cts per lb, 
and the cake at ruling export prices^ ^ Less shs 68 for 
the cost of transport to the Coast, this gives the 
following figures shown in Table 6.6, 
Table 6.6 
Value of Cake Value of Oil 
From One Ton From One Ton Total 
of Cottonseed of Cottonseed Value 
1960 201 224 425 
1961 188 224 412 
1962 214 224 438 
1963 259 224 483 
1964 232 224 456 
1965 241 224 465 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, 
Annual Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1960-5. c Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
The figures for prices of 'AR' cottonseed, ar.d 
estimates of overall crushing costs are shown in 
Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7 
Price of 'AR' 
Cottonseed(shs)Price + 50 shs Price + 60 shs 
Season in Lake Area Crushing Costs Crushing Costs 
1960-1 380 430 440 
1961-2 422 472 482 
1962-3 383 433 443 
1963-4 329 379 389 
1964-5 375 425 435 
1965-6 547 597 607 
Source: Private communication with the Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board. 
A comparison of the figures of Tables 6.6 and 
6.7 shows that in the two seasons 1961-2 and 1965-6, 
in which prices for 1AR' seed in the Lake Area exce-
eded shs 400 per ton, the millers may well have 
found it difficult to cover their costs, although it 
should be remembered that the value shown for oil in 
Table 6.6 is undoubtedly a very low value which 
would be exceeded in most years. However, if a 
price of 90 cts per lb is assumed for oil, an extra 
revenue of shs 45 would be received by the millers, 
which would still give a negative balance in 1961 and 
1965. In other years there would appear to have 
been a comfortable return from the production of 
semi-refined oil in the Lake Area. One factor which 
should be remembered is that the prices given for 
cottonseed in the Lake Area are ex-ginnery prices, 
and therefore that a few millers in the Lake Area, 
who have to buy seed from a considerable distance, 
may not have been in such a favourable position. 
The position in the Lake Area contrasts sharply 
with that in Uganda, where it was found, see Chapter 
III, section E, that the production of seini-refined 
oil alone was not a profitable enterprise, due to 
the high prices of cottonseed. As for Uganda, the 
production of double-refined oil would certainly 
have provided a good return for the miller. 
6. Possibilities of Technological Development. 
Much the same arguments apply to the Tanzanian situ-
ation as applied to that in Uganda. 
As in Uganda, a 1 per cent or more rise in the 
amount of oil extracted from the cottonseed would 
lead to a considerable increase in revenue, and this 
could be achieved by the use of more modern extrac-
tion plant, and in particular more modern expellers. 
However, as in Uganda, such a recommendation is 
only applicable to firms with sufficient crushing 
capacity to fully utilize these expellers. Only two 
mills had utilized capacities of over 9,000 tons in 
1965, and thus could with advantage, to the extent 
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which they have not done so already, replace their 
expellers with more modern ones. At least another 
five firms had utilized capacities of more thar 
5,000 tons in 1965, and could benefit from the pur-
chase of one such machine. 
Again as in Uganda, the installation of sol-
vent extraction plant is not to be recommended. 
In 1967, the total capacity of the double-refi-
ning and hydrogenation plants in the Lake Area is 
expected to be 16 - 17,000 tons. This capacity is 
sufficient to double-refine or hydrogenate the oil 
from around 120,000 tons of cottonseed. The total 
amount of cottonseed available for crushing is only 
expected to reach around 140,000 tons by 1970 (see 
page 97 ) and thus in the near future, assuming that 
a small market for semi-refined oil will continue, 
there would seem to be no need for further plant of 
this form. 
However, looking ahead to 1980, when the amount 
of cottonseed available for crushing is estimated as 
around 300,000 tons, considerable expansion will 
probably be required in double-refining and hydroge-
nation plant in order to produce a saleable commod-
ity, as demand for semi-refined oil is likely to 
diminish over time, while that for other oil produ-
cts increases. 
As in Uganda, little investment in the industry 
is justified in the mid-1960's, particularly when 
such investment is seen in the light of the opportu-
nity cost of the foreign exchange which could be 
used on other projects. Some increased efficiency 
can be achieved in the industry at very low cost by 
the millers taking more care over the pretreatment 
of their seed. A high capital outlay in the indus-
try is neither required or justified, although some 
replacement of old expellers by modern ones, where 
these can be fully utilized, may be advantageous. 
C. Supply and Demand for the Products of the Lake 
Area Industry 
1. The Supply and Demand for By-Products. As 
in Uganda, the husk (or hulls)from the decortica-
tors are used as a fuel in the boilers, and are not 
generally sold. They may also be added in a few 
cases to the cake, in order to increase the bulk of 
the cake before it is sold. 
The actual amount of linters produced in 1965 
in the Lake Area is unknown, but it is believed to 
amount to over 90,000 lbs. Prices quoted by millers 
as being received for their linters varied between 
80 cts and 1 sh, which is considerably higher than 
the price received by Ugandan millers. As in Uganda, 
the linters were sold to upholstery manufacturers. 
The soap-stock produced by the Lake Area 
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millers was almost all thrown away as was mentioned 
earlier. 
2. The Supply and Demand for Oil Products. 
Cottonseed oil is the most important oil available 
in Tanzania, and is mainly converted into liquid oil 
products. Figures for the production, distribution 
and consumption of liquid oils from cottonseed are 
shown in Appendix 4 for the period 1963-5* 
The exact production of groundnut and sesame 
oils in Tanzania is unknown, and Tanzania's pur-
chases and sales of these oils as shown in the trade 
figures indicate an almost negligible amount of 
trade in the oils. It is assumed in what follows 
that these other oils are of only minor importance. 
No hydrogenated oils and fats were being prod-
uced by the Lake Area millers in 1965, although 
small sales of both vegetable ghee and solid fats 
are shown in the trade figures, see Appendix 4, 
Table A.16. These sales are probably resales of 
purchases from elsewhere. Total consumption of ghee 
and solid fats for 1964-5 is shown in Table A.17. 
Total production of liquid oils increased by 45 
per cent over the period 1963-5 from 8,250 to 11,944 
tons, in contrast to the situation in Uganda where 
production of liquid oils remained almost static at 
around 13,000 tons and where the increase in crude 
oil production was used to produce ghee and solid 
fats. Sales of liquid oils to Kenya increased four-
fold over the period 1963-5, but sales of 2,868 tons 
by Tanzania in 1965 are small when compared with 
Uganda's sales to Kenya of 7,305 tons. Sales to 
Uganda and for export declined over the period. 
Over 67 per cent of production was consumed within 
Tanzania itself. 
As in Uganda, liquid oil was the most important 
oil product consumed in Tanzania over the period 
1963-5, amounting to 8,183 tons on average, of which 
82. per cent was home produced. However, in Tanzania 
consumption of liquid oils was still increasing 
while that in Uganda was declining. Consumption of 
liquid oils was also at a higher level in Tanzania. 
This is possibly due to the greater preference for 
ghee and solid fats in Uganda where per capita inc-
omes are higher. 
For the Tanzanian millers, the most important 
markets for their liquid oils are the home market 
which absorbs 67 per cent on average of their sales, 
and the Kenyan market absorbing 18 per cent on aver-
age of their sales. It is obvious from these fig-
ures that the Kenyan market is not nearly as import-
ant to the Tanzanian as to the Ugandan millers. The 
greatest threat to the Lake Area millers would be 
from any stiff competition in their home market. 
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As discussed in Chapter IV, it seems far more 
likely that the Tanzanian millers will begin to take 
an increasing share of the Kenyan and Ugandan mar-
kets, than that they should lose their competitive 
power in these or their home markets. For the indu-
stry in the Lake Area is a rapidly expanding one, 
and one which should be able to produce lower cost 
oil due to the lower price of cottonseed. In these 
circumstances, it is likely, that, while prices i.n 
Uganda for cottonseed continue to be high, the Lake 
Area millers can control the liquid oils market. 
There is no evidence that one or a group of 
firms in the Lake Area have the power to affect oil 
prices in the same way as 'the big four1 in Uganda, 
although some millers did complain that the Federa-
tion had at one stage flooded the market with cheap 
oil. In fact, the Federation only accounted for 25 
per cent of the liquid oils produced in 1965, comp-
ared with 'the big four's' 70 per cent. 
The scope for exporting liquid oils is limited 
for the same reasons as for Uganda. Exports accoun-
ted for 11 per cent on average of total sales, a 
slightly higher percentage than for Uganda, and as 
for Uganda, a high proportion of these sales were to 
Somalia. 
However, Tanzania would seem to be in a more 
advantageous position in the 1960's for marketing 
her liquid oils than either Uganda or Kenya. Uganda 
suffers from high cost seed, while Kenya suffers 
from limited supplies, and thus Tanzania should be 
able to maintain her share of the market, and poss-
ibly increase it at the expense of Uganda. 
The Lake Area millers said that prices for oil 
depended on the price which they had to pay for cot-
tonseed in any particular season. They pointed out 
that the high prices for oil in 1965 resulted from 
the very high prices for cottonseed in the 1965-6 
season, and that the fall in prices in 1966 resulted 
from the large fall in cottonseed prices in that 
year. Unfortunately, there is no price data for 
other years to put this claim to the test. It was 
also said that the prospects of a large increase in 
the amount of cottonseed available for crushing in 
the Lake Area in the 1966-7 season, and therefore of 
more plentiful supplies of oil being put on the mar-
ket, had caused the fall in price in 1966. 
It is interesting to note that if the former 
claims are true, the Lake Area millers are able to 
raise their prices and still market their produce, 
indicating that Ugandan millers are not providing 
strong competition on the East African market. Fur-
ther, the fact that oil prices fall as cottonseed 
prices fall, indicates a fair degree of competition 
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amongst the Lake Area millers themselves. 
The total consumption of ghee and solid fats in 
1965 was 2,468 and 1,241 tons respectively, all of 
this being purchased from outside Tanzania. When 
the new mill becomes operative in '1967, there seems 
no reason why its ghee and solid fats should not 
find a. ready market in Tanzania. As is the case for 
liquid oils, the Lake Area millers should be able to 
produce these products at lower cost due to the 
lower cost of cottonseed, and thus the new products 
should be able to compete on the home market effect-
ively with those from Uganda and Kenya. The firm 
might also, when it has established a brand name, be 
able to take a share of the Kenyan and Ugandan 
markets. 
3. The Supply and Demand for Oil-Cake• Total 
production of cottonseed cake, almost all of which 
was the 46 per cent type cake, increased from 29,000 
to 42,500 tons between 1963 and 1965, see Appendix 5-
Around 99-7 per cent of the cottonseed cake 
produced, see Table A.18 of Appendix 5> was sold for 
export, all the remainder being sold to Kenya. 
There were no sales of cottonseed cake to Uganda 
over the period 1955-65. As in Uganda, it is 
thought that only a very small fraction of the cott-
onseed cake produced is used in Tanzania itself. 
The average prices received for the exported 
cake are shown also in Table A.18. In 1965, the 
millers claimed to be receiving from 520 to 570 shs 
for their cottonseed cake free on wharf at Dar es 
Salaam, which is supported by the figure given for 
1965 in Table A,18. A comparison of Table A.18 with 
Table A.11 in Appendix 2, shows that prices f.o.b. 
Dar es Salaam were rather higher than those f.o.b. 
Mombasa over the period 1958-65. However, the cost 
of transport from Jinja to Mombasa of shs 65 per ton 
for cake is slightly lower than tjtjpt from Mwanza to 
Dar es Salaam of shs 68 per ton. Even so, it does 
appear that over the period 1958-65, the Mwanzan 
millers have been receiving rather more for their 
cake than their Ugandan counterparts. 
As for Uganda,Tanzanian millers must accept the 
ruling market prices for their cake, but again there 
appears at present to be no deterioration in these 
marke t s. 
Within Tanzania itself, though, difficulties 
have arisen with respect to the transporting of the 
cake to Dar es Salaam. These difficulties which 
began in 1965 have arisen because of the congestion 
on the Tanzanian railway, and congestion at Dar es 
Salaam Port. An agreement was made by the millers 
with the East African Railways and Harbours, that 
E.A.R. & H. would rail 4.000-5.000 tons of cottonseed 
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cake to the Coast each month. However, in the 
1966-7 season, production of cake per month was in 
excess of this figure, and the cake was piling up in 
Mwanza. Often the cake, when it was cransported, 
was taken in open trucks with consequent losses and 
deterioration en route. Further, with the railage 
difficulties the old system of payment has broken 
down. Under the old system, the banks forwarded the 
money to the millers when it was railed, collecting 
the money from the exporters wnen the cake reached 
Dar es Salaam. Now this system has broken down, the 
miller does not receive payment until his cake 
reaches Dar es Salaam, and if the cake is unduly 
delayed because of the congestion, the miller may 
not have the necessary finance to purchase further 
supplies of cottonseed. Most of the contracts made 
between the millers and exporters for cake have been 
for cake delivered free on wharf at Dares Salaam. 
This again has created yet more difficulties, in 
that responsibility for off-loading from the railway 
and storage at the port becomes the responsibility 
of the miller. With the congestion in the port this 
has proved a major responsibility, and makes the 
millers responsible for any losses. 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising 
that the millers have complained bitterly. It has 
been suggested that Kilindini Port should be used as 
an alternative outlet for the Lake Area cake, but 
the Lake Area millers are anxious that any extra 
cost of sending their cake to Mombasa should be met 
by E.A.R. & H. and not by themselves. Even if the 
Lake Area millers did have to meet the extra costs 
themselves of sending their cake to Mombasa (the 
cost of transport from>Jwanza to Mombasa would be 
around shs 7^ per ton ^ they would still pz'obably 
be in a more favourable cost position than the 
Ugandan millers due to their loiver price of cotton-
seed . 
k. The Value of Sales of Oilseed Products Out-
side Tanzania. The value of Tanzania's 
sales of cottonseed oil and cake to countries outside 
Tanzania is shown in Table 6.8 for the period 1963-5* 
Sales of other oils and cake are excluded as these 
were very small in amount over that period. 
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Table 6.8 
Oils Cake Total 
l£l 
1963 
To Kenya 56,809 435 57,244 
To Uganda 44,174 - 44,174 
Exports a 89,270 741,838 831,108 
Total 190,253 742,273 932,526 
1964 
To Kenya 184,547 - 184,547 
To Uganda 13,800 ~ 13,800 
Exports a 144,441 773,295 917,736 
Total 342,788 773,295 1,116,083 
1965 
To Kenya 361,751 2,000 363,751 
To Uganda 45,999 - 45,999 
Exports a 75,715 1 ,008,397 1,084,112 
Total 483,465 1,010,397 1,493,862 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1963-5(Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa) 
Note: a - The cost of transport from Mwanza to Dar 
es Salaam has been subtracted from export values at 
the rate of shs 3.05 per cental for cake and shs 
4.30 per cental for oil. 
The figures of Table 6.8 show that the earnings 
of the Lake Area milling industry amounted to around 
£0.9 .million in 1963, £1.1 million in 1964 and £1.5 
million in 1965, showing an increase of 67 per cent 
over the period. These figures are considerably 
less than the earnings of the Ugandan industry which 
increased from £2.3 million to £3.2 million over the 
same period. 
Exports accounted for 79 per cent on average of 
these sales over the period, and 89 per cent of 
exports were accounted for by the cake. Sales of 
oils to Uganda and Kenya accounted for most of the 
sales to these countries. Thus, sales of cake were 
of great importance in the case of Tanzania. 
In Table 6.9, the value of the sales of the 
Lake Area millers is compared with the total value 
of all sales for Tanzania for the period 1963-5. 
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Table 6.9 
Value of Value of Percentage of 
Lake Area all Tanzanian Total Formed by 
Millers' Sales Sales Millers' Sales (£) U ) 
1963 932,526 63,553,374 1.5 
1964 1 ,116,083 70,111,861 1 .6 
1965 1,493,862 62,777,634 2.4 
Source: East African Customs and. Excise, Annual 
Trade Report of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 1965. 
(Commissionerof CustomsandExcise, East Africa) 
Note: a - The percentages are under-estimated as all 
exports are valued f.o.b. Mombasa or Dar es Salaam. 
Although the sales by the Lake Area millers do 
not account for as gr-eat a percentage of total sales 
as was the case in Uganda, they have been accounting 
for an increasing percentage, and particularly sales 
of cake have a minor but significant part to play in 
the country's earnings from other countries. 
5- Future Trends in Supply and Demand• While 
the ban on imports of cottonseed into Tanzania cont-
inues, the Tanzanian millers must rely on cottonseed 
produced within Tanzania for their crushings of seed. 
In the Tanganyika Five-Year Plan, the output 
target for cotton lint is given, as 81,000 tons by 
1970 and 190,000 tons by 1930. Assuming that the 
cottonseed available for crushing forms 175 per cent 
by weight of the cotton lint, this indicates a prod-
uction of 142,000 tons of cottonseed by 1970, and of 
333,000 tons by 1980. 
Within the Tanganyika Five-Year Plan, details 
for expansion of the groundnut crop are also set 
out, but as in Uganda, it is expected that most of 
the increased production of groundnuts will be 
absorbed by the local population and by exports of 
high quality nuts. 
It is not expected that any large quantities of 
other oilseeds will be available to the millers for 
crushing in the future, and thus total crushings 
will be limited to the amounts of cottonseed given 
above. 
Assuming that the millers crush 142,000 tons of 
cottonseed in 1970, and 333,000 tons in 1980, this 
indicates a production of 19,312 tons of crude oil 
in 1970 and 45,288 tons in 1980. (Assuming that 10 
per cent of the seed is 'BR', 90 per cent 'AR', and 
that extraction rates are 14 per cent from 'AR' seed 
and 10 per cent from 'BR' seed.) Allowing for a 5 
per cent refining loss, production of refined oils 
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would be around 18,400 tons in 1970 and 43,100 tons 
in 1980. 
In Appendix 6. projections have been made of 
the demand for oils and fats in Tanzania in 1971 and 
1981, these projections being based on the same 
model as was used for Uganda. 
The projections show that in 1971, total demand 
for oils and fats in Tanzania should be between 
17,500 and 20,000 tons. A comparison of these 
figures with those for production above, indicates 
that by 1971, Tanzania could be producing just suff-
icient oils and fats to satisfy her home demand, but 
that there will be little or no surplus remaining 
for sales to other countries. 
By 1981, total demand in Tanzania will have 
increased to between 27,000 and 34,000 tons, and 
supply will have increased to over 43,000 tons, giv-
ing a surplus of over 9,000 tons to be sold to other 
countries. 
It will be remembered that Uganda was found to 
have an exportable surplus of oil by 1971 of over 
10,000 tons, but it was considered that this would 
be absorbed by the Kenyan market. 
However, the position would appear to be more 
critical by 1981. Although no supply estimates for 
oils and fats in Uganda by 1981 are available, dem-
and by 1981 in Uganda is only expected to increase 
to between 17,500 and 22,000 tons, and even in 1971, 
supply of oils and fats was expected to amount to 
23,000 tons. Thus we may still expect Uganda to be 
in a surplus position by 1981. Further, it has 
been shown above that Tanzania will also be expected 
to have a large surplus of oils by 1981. 
The question of whether these oils and fats can 
be absorbed within East Africa obviously depends on 
the trends in oils and fats consumption in Kenya. 
Otherwise the continued prosperity of the oil mill-
ing industry in East Africa will depend on the deve-
lopment of exports to other neighbouring African 
countries. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE OIL MILLING INDUSTRY IN KENYA 
A. Background to the Oil Milling Industry in Kenya 
The oil milling industry in Kenya consists of a 
number of small firms, most of whom are not very act-
ive in the production of edible vegetable oils. A 
total of thirty-two firms in 1966 held licences to 
purchase cottonseed from the Cotton Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board of Kenya, but it was found that most 
of these firms were traders, who held licences in 
order to buy up cottonseed for export, should this 
become profitable. 
As in Tanzania, the cotton production areas are 
split, the largest quantity of seed coming from 
Nyanza and Western Provinces, and most of the rest 
coming from the Coast Province, although a few tons 
in the 1960's have been coming from the Eastern 
Province. 
The quantities of seed sold to millers and 
exporters in these three areas over the period 
1955-6 to 1965-6 are shown in Table 7.1. This 
cottonseed, as in Uganda and Tanzania, is all sold 
through the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board. 
Table 7.1 ,. . \ (in tons) 
Nyanza & Western Coast Eastern 
Provinces Province Province Total 
AR BR AR BR AR BR 
1 9 5 5 - 6 3 , 9 5 0 5 5 7 1 , 2 5 4 3 4 7 . 5 — _ 6 , 109 
1 9 5 6 - 7 2 , 7 7 5 2 4 5 102 129 - - 3 , 251 
1 9 5 7 - 8 3 , 1 1 2 4 0 9 716 158 - - b, 3 9 5 
1 9 5 8 - 9 4 , 4 o o 461 1 , 3 9 8 271 - - 6 , 5 3 0 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 4,016 416 2 , 2 9 0 4 6 2 - - 7 , 184 
1 9 6 0 - 1 4 , 3 9 3 309 7 7 0 261 - - 5 , 7 3 3 
1 9 6 1 - 2 2,025 6 2 0 4 7 9 2 4 8 2 3 18 3 , 4 1 3 
1 9 6 2 - 3 3 , 7 0 6 5 5 9 8 3 3 3 3 4 165 177 5 , 774 
1 9 6 3 - 4 3 , 1 8 0 4 7 0 2 , 0 1 3 2 9 7 414 155 6, 529 
1 9 6 4 - 5 5,003 720 1 , 2 7 4 421 456 494 8 , 368 
1965-6 7 7 3 910 6 0 0 262 2, 5 4 5 * 
Source: Private communication with the Cotton Lint 
and Seed Marketing Board , Kenya• 
Note: * Incomplete. 
These figures show how small the cottonseed 
crop has been in Kenya compared with that in Uganda 
and Tanzania. The maximum amount of cottonseed sold 
by the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board was 
8,400 tons in the 1964-5 season, when sales in 
Uganda and Tanzania amounted to around 130,000 and 
80,000 tons respectively. 
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Total sales of cottonseed by Kenya for expoi-t 
or to Uganda and Tanzania have been very small. 
Purchases appeared to have been made by Uganda and 
Tanzania in only two years between 1955-65, and 
these were only of around half a ton. 
As imports of cottonseed into Uganda and 
Tanzania are banned, it is assumed these purchases 
represented small purchases for experimental or 
planting purposes. It has been suggested that seed 
cotton and cottonseed is being smuggled from the 
Western Province of Kenya into Uganda, where a 
higher price can be obtained, but there is 110 firm 
evidence that such illegal transactions are taking 
place. However, if, as was suggested in the Kenya 
Development Plan^, prices for raw cotton in Kenya 
were not to be kept in line with Ugandan prices, and 
further if farmers were to be charged for seed for 
planting, irregularities across the Kenya-Uganda 
border could increase. 
As in Tanzania, almost all the seed exported 
probably comes from the Coast Province, and this is 
shown in Table 7«2, together with the balance sold 
to non-exporting firms in Kenya. 
Table 7.2 
Total Amount (to nearest ton) 
of Seed Sold 
(AR + BR) Exports of seed Balance 
1956 6,109 1,873 4,236 
1957 3,251 - 3,251 
1958 4,395 - 4,395 
19 59 6,530 806 5,724 
1960 7,184 1 ,596 5,588 
1961 5,733 - 5,733 
1962 3,413 - 3,413 
1963 5,774 - 5,774 
1964 6,529 980 5,549 
1965 8,368 1 8,367 
Sources: a - See Table 7-1' 
b - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports for Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1956-65. (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
However, the supplies of seed available in 
Kenya are augmented by purchases from both Uganda 
and Tanzania. These purchases, as recorded in the 
trade figures, are shown in Table 7'3, together with 
figures for purchases from the Lint and Seed Market-
ing Board of Tanzania, and the Lint Marketing Board 
of Uganda. 
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Table 7, 0 — (to nearest ton) 
Sales by Sales by Purchases Purchases 
L.M.B. of L & SMB of in.Trade in Trade 
Uganda to Tanzania Figures Figures 
Kenyan to Kegyan From c From c Firms Firms Uganda Tanzania 
1955 _ 605 
1956 - 756 
1957 - 3,509 1958 - 298 3,434 
1959 - - 7,024 
1960 - - 3,857 
1961 - 1 ,300 - 2,434 
1962 200 5,294 132 1 ,626 
1963 419 2,870 229 5,498 
1964 1 ,241 1 ,982 - 3,870 
1965 1,950 1 ,986 - 1,829 
Sources: a - Private communication with the Lint 
Marketing Board, Uganda (AR seed only). 
b - Private communication with the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board, Tanzania, 
c - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-65 (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
The explanation of the different figures arriv-
ed at from the different sources is explained by two 
factors. Firstly, there may be some lag in cotton-
seed sales and the seed for the 1961-2 season, for 
example, in Tanzania may be recorded in the 1962 
trade figures, when in fact the contract for the 
seed would have actually been made in 1961. Second-
ly, in the case of Ugandan sales, there is one firm 
which has offices in Uganda, but whose mill is situ-
ated at Malakisi, just over the border in Kenya. It 
is likely that purchases by this firm, which account 
for most of the Ugandan seed sold to Kenya, have 
been omitted from the trade figures. A further dis-
crepancy that may have arisen with respect to the 
Tanzanian figures is that seed may have been bought 
by non-milling Kenyan firms whom it was not possible 
to identify from the Lint and Seed Marketing Board 
figures. 
However, the figures of Tables 7*2 and 7*3 ind-
icate that the total amount of cottonseed sold to 
Kenyan firms, mainly millers, over the period 1961-5 
did not exceed 12,000 tons per year. 
It is interesting to note the preference of the 
Kenyan millers for the Tanzanian, as opposed to the 
Ugandan cottonseed. As is noted below, prices for 
cottonseed in Tanzania have, with the exception of 
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two years, been much lower than those in Uganda, 
and with the cost of transport for cottonseed from 
Mwanza to Nakuru being little in excess of that from 
Tororo to Nakuru , while that from Mwanza^ to Kisumu 
was less than that from Tororo to Kisumu, the pref-
erence for Tanzanian cottonseed is obvious. 
The prices for the Kenyan cottonseed itself are 
shown in Table 7 • 4. 
Table 7.4 /. , /. x - (xn shs/ton) 
Western Provinces Coast 
AR BR AR BR 
1958-9 297 223 301 172 
1959-60 388 285 416 221 
1960-1 425 186 388 199 
1961-2 300 205 338 190 
1962-3 423 246 388 223 
1963-4 339 221 340 201 
1964-5 422 292 392 205 
Source: Private Communication with the 
Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing 
Board. 
An interesting feature of these figures is that 
prices for 'AR' cottonseed at the coast were, in 
four years out of seven, higher than prices in the 
Western Provinces. It is possible that in some 
years this is explained by demand for seed for 
export. 
Throughout the period 1958-9 to 1964-5, the 
Kenyan prices have been less than the prices paid by 
millers in Uganda, the price differential being on 
average shs 59 over the period for Western Provinces 
and Ugandan 'AR' cottonseed. However, in every year 
except 1961-2 over the period 1958-9 to 1964-5, 
prices of cottonseed in the Lake Area of Tanzania 
were rather less for 'AR' cottonseed than those in 
the Western Provinces, the price differential being 
shs 37 ° n average over the period excluding 1961-2. 
With costs of transport of shs 64 per ton from 
Mwanza to Nakuru, and of shs 44 per ton from Mwanza 
to Kisumu,-' the cheapest source of seed to the West-
ern Provinces millers would have been Western Prov-
inces seed, although in 1958-9, 1960-1, and 1964-5, 
purchases from Tanzania may have been cheaper. A 
comparison of the prices for cottonseed in the Coast 
areas of Kenya and Tanzania show that on average 
these have been more or less equal over the period. 
A total of fifteen different firms were listed 
as buying Western Provinces cottonseed from the Cot-
ton Lint and Seed Marketing Board over the period 
1958-65' However, it was found that only six of 
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these firms were regular purchasers of seed, the 
other purchasers being either exporters or traders 
who resold their seed, probably to one of the other 
six. Of these six firms, all of which were located 
in the Western Provinces, one had sold his oil mill 
in the early 1960's, and seemed now to be concerned 
with supplying cattle-food. This leaves a total of 
only five oil mills in the Western Provinces. 
In 1965, only three of these mills purchased 
more than 100 tons of cottonseed from Kenya, Uganda 
or Tanzania, the largest purchaser having bought a 
total of 5,520 tons from all three sources, and the 
other two having bought 1 ,566 tons and 7^8 tons from 
all three sources. 
Information was only available for one year on 
the purchasers of coast province cottonseed. In 
1965-6, there were eight different purchasers of 
Coast cottonseed, three of whom were the Western 
Provinces millers mentioned above, the other five 
consisting of a ginnery, a soap factory, a dairy 
farmer, and two associated firms who operated an oil 
mill in Mombasa. This last was found to be the only 
mill producing edible oil products in the Coast Pro-
vince from cottonseed although it is believed that, 
as in Tanzania, there are a number of mills crushing 
copra. 
Thus the oil mills extracting oil from cotton-
seed and other edible oil seeds are mainly located 
in the Western Provinces. Two are located in Nakuru, 
two near Kisumu, and one near the Uganda border at 
Tororo. In addition there is one mill at Mombasa. 
The small number of mills in Kenya and the small 
amount of their activity is undoubtedly due to the 
small size of the cotton crop in Kenya. 
In addition to the six mills mentioned above, 
there is one firm in Nairobi, a subsidiary of a 
large international company, which produces vege-
table ghee and solid fats amongst a range of other 
products. This firm does not buy raw cottonseed or 
other oilseeds, but purchases the supplies of liquid 
oils it requires from oil mills in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. The reason given by the firm for not 
crushing the oilseeds for itself, is that only very 
small amounts of oil-bearing seeds are available in 
the Nairobi area, and the high cost of bringing 
cottonseed from the cotton-growing areas of Kenya 
would put the firm at a disadvantage compared with 
other millers located in the cotton areas. The firm 
only has a small extraction plant in Nairobi which 
has been used for crushing small amounts of sunflow-
er seed. 
Apart from the crushing of cottonseed, no other 
oilseed seems to have been crushed in any quantity 
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by the industry in Kenya. It is thought that the 
high prices for exported groundnuts, and also in the 
local markets, have prevented the crushing of 
groundnuts by the millers, as in Tanzania and Uganda. 
Small amounts of other seeds for specific purposes 
have been crushed, and these will be mentioned later. 
B. The Operation of the Kenyan Oil Mills 
The methods used by the Kenyan millers for the 
extraction of oil from their oilseeds were similar 
to those in use in Uganda and Tanzania. 
All of the four firms asked owned delinting 
equipment, which was being used. All four also had 
decorticators, which contained a magnet for removing 
tramp iron. But three of the firms in the Western 
Provinces were in fact crushing mainly undecorticatr 
ed cottonseed, there being a market for the 31 per 
cent type cake amongst the farmers in Kenya itself. 
The four firms claimed to have adequate storage cap-
acity for the seed which they crushed. 
A total of 20 expellers, mainly of the old type, 
were owned by five of the six millers in 1965* At 
least four of these expellers were second-hand ones 
purchased from millers in Uganda and Tanzania. Most 
were of the British Rose-Down model. Figures given 
for the amount of oil left in the cake after extrac-
tion varied from 7—10 per cent. These figures are 
considerably higher than those given by the millers 
in either Uganda or Tanzania, and probably refelct a 
lower standard of efficiency amongst the Kenyan 
millers. 
None of the six mills had plant for producing 
double-refined or hydrogenated oils and fats, alth-
ough, as mentioned above, there is one firm in 
Nairobi producing hydrogenated oils and fats. 
Thus the six mills were producing only semi-
refined oil, some of which was then sold to the 
Nairobi firm for hydrogenation. 
Another important activity of the millers, 
apart from oil milling, was grain milling, two of 
the mills producing maize meal and two polished rice. 
In the case of one of the rice millers, the rice 
mill appeared to be the major enterprise of the firm, 
the oil mill only being operated when seed could be 
obtained. Two of the mills were also producing 
laundry soap, while another was also engaged in 
cotton ginning. 
The two Nakuru mills were produce dealers in 
all forms of food products, and were also concerned 
with the provision of cattle-food to the local 
farmers, In addition to cottonseed, these two firms 
crushed small amounts of mustard seed, linseed, 
kapok seed, soya beans, and sunflower seed which has 
been rejected for export, but the total of all these 
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seeds crushed in any one year only amounted to a few 
hundred tons. Some of these seeds are crushed to 
provide high quality cake for cattle-food. Cattle-
food seems to be the major enterprise of these two 
firms. 
The activity of these Kenyan millers is in some 
ways similar to that of the smaller Ugandan millers, 
who have a variety of other enterprises, apart from 
milling, in order to maintain the mill premises 
functional throughout the year. 
The total amount of cottonseed crushed by the 
six mills from 1961—5 is estimated in Table 7.5* 
This includes all purchases by the six millers from 
the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian Marketing Boards. 
Table 7*5 (in tons) 
Purchases 
from LMB 
of Uganda 
Purchases 
from L & SMg 
of Tanzania 
Purchases 
from CL & SMB Q of Kenya 
Total 
Purchases 
1961 _ 1 ,050 6,568 7,618 
1 962 200 4,326 2, 162 6,688 
1963 419 2,670 1 ,154 4,243 
1964 1 ,241 1 , 782 1,117 4,1 40 
1965 2,739 1 ,536 4,551 8,826 
Sources: a - Private communication with the Lint 
Marketing Board of Uganda, 
b - Private communication with the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board of Tanzania, 
c - Private communication with the Cotton 
Lint and Seed Marketing Board of Kenya. (Excluding 
purchases of Coast Province seed except in 1965). 
These figures are rather lower than those shown 
in Table 7'3, as amounts sold to other firms in 
Kenya have been excluded. A maximum of 12,000 tons 
of seed (see earlier) is the likely amount of seed 
which has been crushed in Kenya over this period. 
But the maximum may be as low as 9,000 tons as indi-
cated in Table 7-5> as some cottonseed may have been 
used directly as a cattle-food. 
The total capacity of five of the firms in 1965 
was around 30,000 tons of seed per year, assuming 
that each expeller crushes approximately 1,500 tons 
of seed per year. This indicates a utilized capa-
city in 1965 of less than 40 per cent. One firm was, 
however, operating at 90 per cent of capacity in 
1965. This level of overall utilized capacity is 
considerably less than that experienced overall by 
the industries in either Uganda or Tanzania, although 
some of the smaller firms in Uganda probably as 
individuals had utilized capacities of this order of 
magnitude. 
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There is no question of one firm dominating the 
others in Kenya, although as mentioned above one was 
apparently operating at a much higher utilized capa-
city in 1965 than the other five. This firm has 
purchased much larger supplies of seed from Uganda 
and Tanzania than the others, and oil milling seems 
to be a more important enterprise of the firm than 
in the other cases. It seems that it is by this 
firm's efforts that it is able to secure such large 
supplies of seed compared with the small quantities 
which the other Kenyan firms obtain. However, this 
firm only crushed 5,500 tons of seed in 1965, and is 
therefore, by Ugandan and Tanzanian standards, only 
a small miller. The other five mills are small when 
considered in terms of the amount of seed crushed by 
Ugandan and Tanzanian standards, and are of neglig-
ible importance. 
When four of the six firms were questioned 
about their future plans, one appeared to have none 
at all, one was planning to install one further 
expeller in 1967, and two hoped to expand if the 
cotton crop in Kenya expanded. None of the six 
millers were considering the possibility of setting 
up double-refining or hydrogenation plant, which is 
probably a reflection of the small size of the indu-
stry in Kenya and the inability of any of these 
small firms to compete with the large Nairobi produ-
cer of hydrogenated oils and fats. 
The four firms questioned employed a predomin-
antly permanent labour force, which was believed to 
be used for other activities of the firms when the 
expellers were not operative. The number of shifts 
operated by the firms varied from one to three, and 
like the smaller firms in Uganda, the length of time 
for which the extraction machinery was operated dep-
ended on the amount of seed available. 
The wages paid to the labour force appeared to 
be rather higher than Ugandan and Tanzanian wages, 
although there was considerable variation between 
the individual firms. In addition, housing and 
posho was provided by some firms. 
The lower level of extraction for oil in Kenya, 
which was quoted as 12-13 per cent by the millers, 
together with the higher labour costs may make oil 
milling less profitable than elsewhere. Even if 
labour costs increase crushing costs by only a small 
amount, the 1-2 per cent lower output of oil may 
decrease returns by as much as 16-32 shs per ton of 
seed crushed, compared with Uganda and Tanzania. 
Although the prices paid by the Kenyan millers 
for Western Provinces cottonseed were on average 
shs 59 less than prices in Uganda over the period 
1958-9 to 1964-5, only 49 per cent (see Table 7.5) 
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of the cottonseed over that period was purchased 
from the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board of 
Kenya. Of the remainder, 36 per cent was purchased 
from Tanzania and 15 per cent from Uganda. As was 
mentioned earlier, although Tanzanian seed was 
cheaper on average over the period, the price diff-
erential was not sufficient to cover the cost of 
transport from Mwanza to the Western Provinces 
mills and thus the overall cost of Tanzanian seed 
would have been greater than that of Western 
Provinces seed. The cost of the Ugandan seed pur-
chased would have been considerably above that of 
the Kenyan and Tanzanian seed. 
If the price of the cottonseed from the diff-
erent sources is weighted by the amount purchased, 
with allowance also being made for transport costs, 
an average figure for any year for the price of 
cottonseed to the Kenyan millers can be obtained. 
These figures are shown in Table 7«6, together with 
estimates of total costs. 
/ , ,, Table 7.6 (shs/ton) 
Average Price 
for Cottonseed Price + 50 shs Price + 60 shs 
in Kenya Crushing Costs Crushing Costs 
1961 426 476 486 
1962 397 447 457 
1963 440 490 500 
1964 384 434 444 
1965 466 516 526 
The minimum returns for the oil from one ton of 
cottonseed would be Shs 192 (allowing a 12 per cent 
extraction rate, a 5 per cent refining loss and a 
price of 75 cts per lb). The maximum returns for 
the oil from one ton of cottonseed would be Shs 250 
(allowing a 13 per cent extraction rate, a 5 per 
cent refining loss and a price of 90 cts per lb). 
The returns for cake, allowing for a 50 per 
cent extraction rate are based on figures in the 
trade figures, with an allowance of Shs 60 per ton 
for transport to the coast. These returns, to-
gether with the overall returns from one ton of 
cottonseed are shown in Table 7>7« 
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Table 7-7 ,. . s (in shs) 
Maximum Returns Minimum Returns 
Returns Prom From Oil & Cake From Oil & Cake 
1120 lbs of From One Ton of From One Ton of 
Cake Cottonseed Cottonseed 
1961 188 438 380 
1962 217 467 409 
1963 241 491 433 
1964 210 460 402 
1965 244 494 436 
A comparison of Tables 7*6 and 7*7 shows that 
although returns were probably sufficient in most 
years to cover the cost of the cottonseed, it is 
unlikely that there would have been sufficient 
returns from the production of semi-refined oil over 
the period 1961-5 to cover crushing costs. In this 
respect the Kenyan millers are in a similar position 
to the smaller millers in Uganda, although in Uganda 
the position was found to be slightly more critical 
as seed costs could not be covered in some years. 
The possibilities of technological development 
in the industry are naturally limited by its small 
size. The amount of seed available for crushing in 
Kenya is only expected to increase to 3 0 , 0 0 0 tons by 
1970, see page 116, and thus the existing capacity 
in Kenya is almost sufficient to deal with this seed. 
With pressure for cottonseed coming from millers in 
both Mwanza and Uganda, it is doubtful if Kenya can 
increase her supplies of seed from other sources. 
With only one mill crushing more than 5 , 0 0 0 
tons of seed in 1965, it is doubtful whether the 
replacement of old expellers by more modern ones 
would be worthwhile. Further, the small size of the 
firms makes any investment in double—refining or 
hydrogenation plant impractical. Thus little or no 
investment is at present justified amongst the 
Kenyan millers. 
However, as demand for ghee and solid fats is 
likely to increase over time, it may be worthwhile 
for a firm such as the one in Nairobi to expand its 
hydrogenation plant. As this firm was unwilling to 
give any information, it is not possible to estimate 
present or future demand for these products, nor to 
judge whether the existing plant in Nairobi is suff-
icient to fulfil future demands for vegetable ghee 
and solid fats. 
C. Supply and Demand for Products of the Oil Milling 
Industry in Kenya 
It is not possible to give any precise figures 
for production of by-products, oil products or cake 
in Kenya, as information was not obtained from all 
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millers. However, rough estimates based on the 
amount of cottonseed crushed can be made. 
If a 13 per cent extraction rate is taken for 
oil from cottonseed, and allowing for a 5 per cent 
refining loss, figures can be obtained for the prod-
uction of refined oil in Kenya. These are shown in 
Table 7-8. 
Source: See Table 7.2 and Table 7*3• (Amount 
equals total seed sold, less exports, plus purchases 
from Uganda and Tanzania). 
These figures show that the production of liquid 
oils in Kenya only amounted to just over 1,000 tons 
between 1963-5, compared with around 13,000 tons in 
Uganda and Tanzania. Evidence from the millers 
shows that when prices are high, most of this oil is 
sold locally in the Western Provinces as semi-
refined oil. However, when prices locally are low, 
the millers make contracts with the firm in Nairobi 
with hydrogenation plant. The prices received by 
the millers for their oil in the Western Provinces 
of Kenya are undoubtedly strongly influenced by 
prices in Mwanza and Uganda. Like the smaller firms 
in Uganda, the Kenya millers must accept the ruling 
market price, or the price quoted by the Nairobi 
firm. 
It is interesting to note here the dependence 
of this large Nairobi firm on the millers producing 
semi-refined oil in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. 
Almost certainly, the amount of oil produced in 
Kenya itself is quite insufficient to satisfy this 
firm's requirements of cottonseed oil, and oil must 
genex^ally be bought from either Tanzania or Uganda. 
The actual quantities required by this firm annually 
are unknown. 
The amount of liquid oils produced by Kenya is 
far below that required for consumption purposes and 
also for conversion into hydrogenated oils and fats. 
Thus Kenya is a large purchaser of liquid oils from 
Uganda and Tanzania. Quantities of cottonseed oil 
purchased are shown in Table 7«9* Some groundnut 
and sesame oils were also purchased, but the amounts 
involved were generally less than 100 tons per year. 
Table 7.8 
Amount of Cottonseed 
Crushed 
(in tons) 
Production of 
Refined Oil 
1963 
1964 
1965 
11,501 
10,399 
10,197 
1,395 
1 ,287 
1 ,262 
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T a b l e 7.9 ( t o 
Purchases From Purchases From 
Uganda Tanzania Imports Total 
1955 3,126 259 _ 3,385 
1956 2,205 522 - 2,727 
1957 3,313 251 - 3,564 
1958 5,364 181 - 5,545 
1959 7,025 461 - 7,486 
1960 6,686 268 - 6,954 
1961 5,751 423 - 6,174 
1962 3,916 268 98 4,282 
1963 6,168 704 - 6,872 
19 64 6,805 1 ,954 - 8,759 
1965 7,260 2,868 - 10,128 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955~<?5 (Commissioner of Customs and Excd.se, East 
Africa). 
These figures show that the quantity of cotton-
seed oil purchased by Kenya has been steadily 
increasing. Although the amount of cottonseed oil 
sold by Kenya has also been increasing, the amounts 
involved are relatively small. Total sales by Kenya 
to all other countries are shown in Table 7.10, tog-
ether with the net purchases. 
Table 7-10 /. + n ! (in tons) 
Total Sales of Total Purchases 
Cottonseed Oil by Kenya Less Total Sales 
1955 54 3,331 
1956 59 2,668 
1957 87 3,477 
1958 436 5,109 
1959 999 6,487 
1960 1 ,478 5,476 
1 961 1 ,420 4,754 
1962 677 3,605 
1963 740 6,132 
1964 568 8,191 
1965 1 ,089 9.039 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika,.Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-65(Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
These figures, together with those of Table 7.8, 
indicate that the total amount of liquid oils either 
consumed or converted into hydrogenated oils and 
fats in Kenya from 1963-5 amounted to 7,500-10,300 
tons. Unfortunately, the amount converted into 
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hydrogenated oils and fats is unknown, and therefore 
no estimate can be made of the consumption of liquid 
oils in Kenya. Similarly, it is not possible to 
make estimates of the production or consumption of 
vegetable ghee or solid fats in Kenya. The Nairobi 
firm is believed to be the largest producer of these 
products in East Africa, but no figures for product-
ion are available. Figures for sales and purchases 
of vegetable ghee and solid fats by Kenya are shown 
in Table 7.11. 
Table 7•1 ' 
Vegetable Ghee /, , , \ — " (to nearest ton) 
Purchases Sales 
From From To To 
Uganda Tanzania Imports Uganda Tanzania Exports 
1964 1,978 56 27 152 497 3 
1965 2 , 2 3 1 172 1 165 165 11 
Solid Fatsa 
Purchases Sales 
From From To To 
Uganda Tanzania Imports Uganda Tanzania Exports 
1964 225 1 47 388 771 14 
1965 294 4 61 521 1 , 1 5 2 10 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1964-5" (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
Note: a - These fats include other liquid oils, 
apart from cottonseed oil. 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, the Nairobi 
firm holds a monopoly with two Ugandan firms in the 
hy lrogenated oils and fats market, and it appears 
from the trade figures that the Nairobi firm is the 
larger producer of solid fats, while the Ugandan 
firms together are the larger producers of vegetable 
ghee . 
Undoubtedly, the Nairobi firm suffers from the 
disadvantage of having to purchase supplies of 
liquid oils from other millers, while the Ugandan 
millers can utilize their own supplies, but on the 
other hand the cost of transport from Jinja to 
Nairobi is such that the Nairobi firm can overcome 
this disadvantage to some extent on the Kenyan 
market. As palm oil and other oils are used in the 
production of solid fats, and these oils must be 
bought from the Coast area, the Nairobi firm can 
probably produce loiter cost solid fats than its 
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Ugandan counterparts, but it is doubtful whether the 
Nairobi firm can compete so effectively in the ghee 
market. 
With the new production of hydrogenated oils 
and fats in Mwanza, competition in the hydrogenated 
oils and fats market may increase. As for Ugandan 
firms, the Mwanzan firm should certainly be able to 
produce lower cost ghee than the Nairobi firm. 
The total consumption of all oils and fats in 
Kenya appears to have been between 10,000-11,000 
tons in 1964 and 1 9 6 5 , see Tables 7 , 8 , 7 . 1 0 and 7.11. 
Again, as for oil products, only estimates can 
be given of the total amount of cottonseed cake 
produced in Kenya. Assuming a 50 per cent extract-
ion rate for cake from cottonseed, figures can be 
obtained for the total production of cake. These 
figures, together with the total amount of cotton-
seed cake sold by Kenya are shown in Table 7.12. 
Table 7-12 , . ^ s (in tons) 
Estimated Exports of Sales of Cake 
Production Cottonseed to Uganda Total 
of Cake Cake and Tanzania Sales 
1 9 5 5 1 , 2 6 9 17 1 ,286 
1956 2,496 2,924 171 3,095 
1 9 5 7 3,380 477 1 478 
1958 4,064 4,072 16 4,088 
1959 6,374 4,330 175 4,505 
1960 4,723 2 , 0 6 9 110 2,179 
1 961 4,084 1 ,430 72 1 ,502 
1962 2,586 1 ,209 
706 
30 1 ,239 
1963 5,751 117 823 
1 964 5,200 1,104 35 1 ,139 
1965 5,099 1 , 1 5 1 52 1 ,203 
Sources: a - See Table 7.2 and 7 . 3 . 
b - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-^5 (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
These figures show that the production of cott-
onseed cake in Kenya is very small compared with 
production in both Uganda and Tanzania. 
A comparison of the figures in the last column 
of Table 7-12 with those in the first column shows 
that in the 1960's possibly around 70 per cent of 
the cake produced in Kenya was consumed as a cattle-
food within Kenya itself. However, not too much 
accuracy should be attached to the figures in the 
first column, as it is known that some millers prod-
uce the 31 per cent type cottonseed cake, giving an 
extraction rate of around 80 per cent. The amount 
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of such cake produced is unknown. But this factor 
implies that the figures in Table 7*12 are probably 
under-estiinates . 
In addition to the home produced cake sold for 
cattle-food on the Kenyan market, some cake is pur-
chased from Uganda and Tanzania. Figures for purch-
ases of this cottonseed cake are shown in Table 7-13, 
together with minimum estimates of the total amount 
of cottonseed cake consumed within Kenya. 
Table 7.13 < . . , (xn tons) 
Total Purchases Minimum Estimate 
of Cottonseed of Home Consumption 
Cake of Cake 
1960 58 2 , 6 0 2 
1961 72 2,654 
1962 30 1,377 
1963 72 5,000 
1964 35 4,096 
1965 53 3,949 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1960-5 (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
These figures indicate a minimum amount of 
4,000-5,000 tons of cake sold on the Kenyan market. 
Most of this cake will have been sold to the cattle-
food manufacturers in Kenya, at a similar price to 
that ruling for cake on the world market. Some 
would have been sold direct to the Kenyan farmers. 
It is interesting to note that most of the cot-
tonseed cake used in Kenya for cattle-food appears 
to come from the Kenyan millers, while large 
quantities of the finished animal food are sold to 
Uganda and Tanzania. 
As for Uganda and Tanzania, prices received for 
exported cottonseed cake which was mainly sold to 
European cattle-food manufacturers, ranged between 
shs 480-550 f.o.b. Mombasa, which prices are in line 
with those received by Uganda and Tanzanian millers. 
Obviously the Kenyan millers have no power to affect 
the prices or conditions in the world market for 
cake . 
No sales of groundnut cake are-recorded for 
1964 and 1965 in the trade figures, but in 1965 
Kenya purchased a total of 1l4^tons of groundnut 
cake from Uganda and Tanzania. It is presumed that 
this cake was used by the cattle-food manufacturers 
in Kenya. The production of groundnut cake or any 
other oilseed cake within Kenya itself is unknown. 
The total value of Kenya's sales of oil products 
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and cake to other countries is shown in Table 7.14. 
Table 7.14 
Oil Products 
(in £) 
Cottonseed Cake Total 
1963 
Sales to: 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
Exports 
Total 
1964 
Sales to: 
Uganda 
• Tanzania 
Exports 
Total 
1965 
Sales to : 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
Exports 
Total 
3,055 
77,880 
1 ,358 
82,293 
106,193 
306,862 
5,824 
418,879 
205,499 
385,887 
10,196 
601,582 
640 
1 , 2 0 0 
17,025 
18,865 
536 
23,255 
23,791 
851 
2 8 , 1 0 9 
28,960 
3,695 
79,080 
18,383 
101,158 
106,193 
307,398 
29,079 
442,670 
205,499 
386,738 
38,305 
630,542 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1963-5 (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Ea.st 
Africa). 
Notes: a - This includes liquid cottonseed oil, and 
for 1964 and 1965 vegetable ghee and solid fats. 
b - A deduction of shs 2.50 per cental for 
oil products and shs 2.65 per cental for cake has 
been made for the cost of transport to the Coast. 
The year 1963 is not directly comparable with 
1964 and 1965 in Table 7.14, as figures for sales of 
ghee and solid fats are not available for 1963- It 
is interesting to note from this table the relative 
importance of sales of oil products within East 
Africa as compared with exports of oil products. 
Exports only accounted for 7 per cent of the total 
value of all sales of oil products over the period 
1963-5. Sales of oils and fats to Tanzania, most of 
which consisted of hydrogenated oils and fats, 
formed the greatest percentage of these sales. 
Total sales by Kenya in 1964 and 1965 amounted 
to only around £0.5 million, compared with sales to 
a value of over £1 million and £2 million by 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
The Kenyan sales formed only 0.9 per cent of 
the total domestic-exports of Kenya in 1964, and 1,3 
per cent in 1965. However, most of these sales 
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consisted of hydrogenated oils and fats produced by 
the Nairobi firm, for which large supplies of liquid 
oils will have had to have been purchased from 
Tanzania and Uganda. The oil milling industry in 
Kenya is of rather less importance to the economy 
than its counterparts in Uganda and Tanzania. 
Future trends in the supply of oils and fats 
by the Kenyan industry will depend on the amount of 
seed which the industry can obtain for crushing. It 
has been implicitly assumed in making projections 
for Uganda and Tanzania that these two countries 
would crush in future years all available seed in 
their own countries, and therefore we must assume in 
making these projections that Kenya will also be 
limited to her own supplies of cottonseed, despite 
the fact that Kenyan millers are permitted to import 
cottonseed from other countries. 
The target production given in the Kenya Devel-
opment Plan for the production ofgcotton lint, is 
for a production of 95,000 bales (17,000 tons) by 
1970, which, taking cottonseed as being 175 per cent 
by weight of the lint, would give around 30,000 tons 
of cottonseed. 
The total production of crude oil from this 
seed would be around 4,080 tons, (assuming that 10 
per cent of the seed is 'BR1, 90 per cent 'AR' and 
that there is a 14 per cent extraction rate for 'AR' 
seed and a 10 per cent extraction rate for 'BR' 
seed). Allowing 5 per cent for refining losses, 
this gives a production of only around 3,900 tons of 
refined oil. 
Total demand for oils and fats in 1971 was est-
imated in Appendix 7 as between 14,000 and 15,000 
tons, and thus it is to be expected that Kenya will 
purchase in 1971 between 10,000-11,000 tons of oils 
and fats. 
The projections for Uganda and Tanzania for 
1971 show that Uganda will have a surplus production 
of 11,000-12,000 tons of oils and fats in 1971, and 
Tanzania will have just sufficient to cover her own 
demand. Thus for East Africa as a whole, supply and 
demand should be more or less equal in 1971> much of 
the demand in Kenya being supplied by the Ugandan 
industry. 
Unfortunately, no predictions are made in the 
Kenya Development Plan as to cotton production, or 
the levels of gross domestic product and population 
by 1980. Thus the estimates of supply and demand in 
1980 as calculated for Uganda and Tanzania cannot be 
made. However, total demand in Uganda and Tanzania 
increased by around 10,000 tons in each country. 
Assuming a similar increase in demand for oils and 
fats in Kenya, and assuming that the best Kenya 
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could do would be to double her supply of oils and 
fats, this would imply that Kenya would need to pur-
chase around 16,000 tons of oils and fats in 1980. 
This will obviously be mainly supplied by Uganda and 
Tanzania, but it is uncertain whether this demand 
will be sufficient to take up all the surplus produ-
ction of oils and fats in Uganda and Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE USE OF OILSEED CAKE 
AS A HIGH PROTEIN HUMAN FOOD1 
Most of the oilseed cake produced within East 
Africa is sold to European countries, and is used 
for the production of high protein feedingstuffs for-
domestic animals. However, as well as providing a 
high quality feedingstuff for domestic animals, 
suitably prepared oilseed cake may be used as an 
ingredient for a high protein food for human 
consumption. 
In parts of Uganda, and undoubtedly also in 
parts of Kenya and Tanzania, there is a serious lack 
of protein in the diet of the people, particularly 
in the diets fed to young children, pregnant and 
nursing mothers, and invalids. In the 1960's, the 
clinics have relied on the use of dried skimmed milk 
to treat and prevent malnutrition, but in future 
years the skimmed milk may prove both difficult and 
costly to buy. Until 1966, no food product has 
been produced commercially within East Africa to 
meet this need, although high protein foods making 
use of oilseed cakes are produced commercially in 
other parts of the world. 
Although flour produced from oilseed cakes does 
not have such a high protein content as animal prod-
ucts such as eggs, milk, meat and fish, it has been 
found that such flours have a high nutritive value, 
and further it has been found that oilseed flours 
are cheaper per lb of protein than the animal prod-
ucts. Thus the oilseed flours may be a means of 
providing a low cost, high protein food for those in 
need. 
The most common and simplest protein food which 
can be formed from oilseeds is a flour produced from 
the cake. This may have certain vitamins and miner-
als added, and may be supplemented with any essent-
ial amino acids, mainly lysine and methionince, in 
which the particular flour is deficient. In prac-
tice, most of the protein foods used in other parts 
of the world consist of a mixture of products, often 
containing both oilseed flours and cereals. The 
advantage of such mixtures is that an amino acid 
lacking in one constituent of the mixture may be 
supplemented by the presence of that amino acid in 
another constituent, and thus the nutritive value of 
the mixture may be greater than that of any of its 
constituents. 
Cottonseed flour, marketed as "Proflo" has been 
produced in the U.S.A. for around 25 years, and is 
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mainly sold to the bakery industry. The first dev-
elopments in the production of cottonseed flour by 
the developing countries were sponsored by the 
Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama, 
who developed formulae for 11 Incaparina" . "Incapar-
ina" was mainly based on whole corn, cottonseed 
flour and/or soya flour, with small quantities of 
yeast, calcium carbonate and vitamin A added. This 
product has been sold commercially in several 
countries in Central and South America, and has been 
used as a beverage or for incorporation in soups, 
puddings, baby food, or for use in non-bread recipes 
as a part substitute for wheat flour. It was found 
that obtaining cottonseed flour of the required 
standards was a problem in some countries, and it 
was also found that the degree of acceptability of 
the product by the people varied considerably from 
country to country. 
Groundnut flour has also been used in high pro-
tein foods in different parts of the world. In 
India two plants for producing human-grade groundnut 
meal were provided by UNICEF, and groundnut flour 
has been used in manufacturing the biscuits "Nutro", 
and a compound consisting also of dried skimmed milk 
known as "Arlac", which has been used in the treat-
ment of cases of kwashiorkor. Groundnut flour was 
also a constituent of "Amama", which it is believed 
was at one time sold in East Africa as a medicine. 
Many other high protein foods rely on the use 
of full-fatted or defatted soya flours. 
The Production of Human-Grade Cottonseed Meal in 
East Africa 
The production of cottonseed cake in the 1960's 
in East Africa amounted to over 100,000 tons annual-
ly, and thus plentiful supplies of this cake are 
available for use as a basis for a low cost high 
protein food. 
Certain adjustments must be made to the stand-
ard procedures for the extraction of oil and cake 
from the cottonseed if the cake is to be used as a 
human and not an animal food. This will mean care-
ful selection of seed prior to crushing and adequate 
cleaning to remove all dirt, stones and tramp, iron, 
so that the resultant meal is sanitary and free from 
bacteriological infections. Throughout the crushing 
process, standards of hygiene and cleanliness must 
conform with those acceptable in other food manufac-
turing industries. It is necessary to ensure that 
in the decortication process the hulls and meats are 
almost completely separated by the use of aspirators, 
so that the fibre content of the meal is reduced to 
a minimum, and for the same reason delinting of the 
seed is necessary. Care must be taken in the 
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heating of the meats prior to pressing, to ensure 
that essential amino acids are neither destroyed nor 
become less available. Finally, it is necessary in 
the case of cottonseed to ensure that the toxic 
element gossypol is only present in very small 
quantities in the meal. 
The standards given by the Protein Advisory 
Group of WHO/FAO/UNICEF for the production of cotto-
nseed meal for human consumption are shown in Table 
8.1 . 
Table 8.1 
Moisture percentage (maximum) 
Crude fat percentage (maximum) 
Protein percentage (Nx6.25, minimum) 
Crude fibre (maximum) 
Total gossypol (maximum) 
Free gossypol (maxiirrum) 
Free fatty acids ( as percentage of oil, 
maximum) 
Available lysine (g/l6.N, maximum) 
Free of E. Coli, Salmonella and pathogens. 
Total bacterial plate count less than 20,000 per gm. 
Acid insoluble ash less than 0.1 per cent. 
Insect and rodent contamination - essentially free. 
These conditions make the production of meal 
for human consumption considerably more expensive 
than the production of cake for cattle-food. As 
mentioned above, the pretreatment of the seed, selec-
tion, cleaning, delinting and decortication, needs 
to be particularly thorough, and apart from the 
capital outlay involved, the ovei^ll costs of prod-
uction will undoubtedly be raised. Further, care-
fully controlled production making use of labora-
tory facilities will also be required if meal of the 
specified standards is to be produced. It is diffi-
cult to estimate the exact extra costs of production 
for producing human-grade meal, but experience of 
producing human-grade soya flour in the U.S.A. 
suggests that production costs may be 150 per cent 
more for producing a human-grade product. 
Much the most pressing problem in the product-
ion of human-grade cottonseed meal in conformity 
with the standards, is to reduce the toxic element 
gossypol in the meal to a level of 0.06 per cent. 
Most of the cottonseed meal available in world, 
including that produced in East Africa, exceeds this 
gossypol limit, and cottonseed flour fulfilling the 
standards of Table 8.1 has so far only been produced 
in El Salvador, Colombia and the U.S.A. 
There are two approaches to the removal of 
gossypol from the meal, the first relying on reduc-
ing the level in the meal itself by careful process-
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ing, and the second of reducing the level of gossy-
pol in the original cottonseed. 
The level of gossypol in the meal may be 
reduced by binding the gossypol with some of the 
lysine in the meal. The gossypol and lysine react 
to form a substance which is then non-available. 
The extent of the binding which takes place depends 
on the conditions under which the seed was crushed, 
higher temperatures, higher moisture and longer 
cooking leading to greater rupturing of the glands 
in the seed, and thus to increased binding. Lyman 
and co-workers recommend that cottonseed meats be 
brought to a moisture content of at least 14-15 per 
cent before cooking, that the cooking be for at 
least 90 minutes, and that the final temperature be 
not less than 115 C. 
This approach to the elimination of gossypol 
leads to a fall in the level of available lysine in 
the meal. The amount of available lysine is one of 
the most important factors in determining the prod-
uct's nutritive value, and this factor is the more 
important when the meal is to be used in conjunction 
with cereals which are deficient in lysine. 
Martinez and Frampton have shown that the quantity 
of lysine destroyed in the processing of cottonseed 
meal depends on the severity of the processing, and 
it is quite probable that the amount of heating etc. 
required to reduce gossypol to the desired level 
will also cause the amount of available lysine to 
fall below the minimum of 3*8 per cent given in the 
standards, see Table 8.1. 
The gossypol may also be removed from the meal 
by a solvent extraction method, using a mixture of 
hexane, acetone and water as the solvent. The 
gossypol is then removed with the oil. This method 
should not lead to the same loss of lysine as in the 
case of expeller processing, but toxicity may arise 
from the use of organic solvents on the cottonseed. 
The second approach, of removing the gossypol 
from the seed itself, depends on the use of a 
glandless variety of cottonseed, which is then free 
of gossypol. The absence of glands is independent 
of other genetic characteristics, and therefore may 
be transferred to various types of cottonseed with-
out modifying other characteristics. There appears 
to be no ill effects from glandless seed, and there 
is in fact evidence to show that glandless seed has 
an improved protein content and produces cleaner 
oil. Glandless plants, though, are not as resist-
ant to rodents and insects as conventional varieties. 
Certainly if this approach were adopted to overcome 
the problem of gossypol, time and money would need 
to be spent on research and on the production of 
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suitable seed varieties. The most appropriate 
method of removing gossypol in East Africa would 
seem to be by extraction with expellers under care-
fully controlled conditions. 
One further problem with regard to cottonseed 
meal is the presence of cyclopropenoid fatty acids 
in the meal. These acids are part of the fat 
content of the meal, and thus the lower the level of 
the fat content of the meal the less the problem. 
Some of these acids are in fact destroyed by the 
heat generated in the expelling process. 
Most of the cottonseed cake being produced 
within East Africa has a profat (protein and fat) 
content of 46 per cent. As in general the cake was 
found to contain 6—7 per cent oil, this indicates a 
protein content of 39-40 per cent, which is conside-
rably below the protein content given in the stand-
ards, see Table 8,1. Further, the level of gossypol 
in East African cake is almost certainly above the 
minimum set in the standards. 
These factors indicate that human—grade cotton-
seed meal could only be produced in East Africa if 
there were some change in the techniques of product-
ion in the oil mills, This would undoubtedly mean 
capital expenditure on cleaning equipment and modern 
separators for removing the hulls from the meats 
prior to extraction. It would also mean using 
delinting equipment where this is not already used, 
and carefully controlling the extraction process. 
Laboratory facilities would be necessary in 
order to select the seed carefully, and to ensure 
the required standards were met throughout the prod-
uction process. 
The minimum size of plant which could be opera-
ted would consist of either one expeller or one sol-
vent extractor together with the necessary cleaning, 
delinting and decortication equipment. However, 
there are some problems concerned with the extract-
ion of cottonseed oil and cake by the solvent extra-
ction process, and as no miller has any experience 
of solvent extract! on in East Africa, the expeller 
process would seem to be the better choice. One 
advantage of the expeller process is that its capac-
ity is fairly low, and initially small quantities of 
the human-grade meal could be produced, other 
expellers being added as the demand increased. 
However, the problem of beginning production on only 
a small scale is that the cost of the ancillary 
equipment is high, and it may not prove economic to 
use this equipment for small amounts of seed. There-
fore it has been suggested that costs could be 
reduced by initially producing the human-grade meal 
at an existing mill in conjunction with the product— 
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ion of cake for cattle-food. This system would have 
the additional advantage in that there would be no 
difficulty in selling the oil from an established 
mill, whereas a completely new mill might find the 
marketing of its oil a problem. This is important 
because the revenue from the oil will decrease the 
cost of producing human-grade cottonseed flour. 
Within East Africa there is probably only one 
firm in the 1960<s, this being the leading miller in 
Uganda, which has the technical ability to operate 
such a mill. This miller already uses laboratory 
facilities, and carefully controls his production. 
All other millers operate in a rather haphazard 
fashion with regard to quality. Thus if it were 
decided that cottonseed meal for a high protein food 
should be produced in East Africa, the most economic 
way of beginning production would be through this 
firm. Alternatively, at rather higher cost, one of 
the other existing mills could be re-organised or a 
completely new mill constructed. 
An examination of the amino acids in cottonseed 
flour indicates that methionine is the limiting 
amino acid, and that to provide the essential amino 
acids in their required amounts for human consump-
tion, 1.k times more cottonseed flour in terms of 
bulk would need to be given than dried skimmed milk. 
The exact cost of production for human-grade 
cottonseed meal is uncertain. However, assuming a 
50 per cent extraction rate for cake, a 14 per cent 
extraction rate for oil, allowing for a 5 per cent 
refining loss, a price of 90 cts per lb received for 
oil, a price of shs 500 per ton paid for cottonseed, 
and crushing costs of shs 150 per ton crushed, this 
indicates that a price of jk cts per lb must be 
charged for the cottonseed cake if the miller is to 
break even. It should be noted here, though, that 
no allowance has been made for the capital costs of 
setting up the additional plant required for produc-
ing human-grade cottonseed meal. 
With a milling charge of 2-3 cts per lb, this 
gives the overall cost of producing the cottonseed 
flour as 36—37 cts per lb. Although no allowance 
has been made in these calculations for packaging 
and marketing costs, the price of the cottonseed 
flour compares very favourably with that of dried 
skimmed milk, which is around 1.50 shs per lb. 
It should be remembered that for every 1.4 lbs 
of cottonseed flour produced in Uganda, 1 lb less of 
dried skimmed milk needs to be imported, and 1.4 lbs 
less of cottonseed cake can be exported. This would 
mean that around 3° cts would be lost in foreign 
exchange from the cake, but that this would be more 
than offset by the 1.50 shs of foreign exchange 
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saved from not importing the skimmed milk. Thus 
there would be a net saving in foreign exchange if 
cottonseed flour were substituted for dried skimmed 
milk. 
Even though the advantages of making use of 
cottonseed cake as a low cost high protein food may 
seem to be clear-cut, care must be taken in the 
early stages of production, and it is recommended 
that only small amounts of the human-grade meal be 
produced initially. This would enable tests to be 
carried out on both the feasibility of producing 
such cake economically, and of the acceptability of 
the product to the people. Untreated cottonseed 
flour has a yellowish colour which may not prove 
acceptable, and further treatment may be required to 
produce a lighter coloured product. 
Other Oilseed Meals 
Apart from cottonseed cake, groundnut, sesame 
and sunflower cake is also produced in East Africa, 
and may be used for high protein foods. However, 
in the 1960's, only small quantities of these cakes 
were produced by the East African oil milling 
industry. 
The chief problem of groundnut meal is the pre-
sence in the meal of aflatoxin, resulting from the 
mould Aspergillus flavus,developing on the nuts 
prior to crushing. The critical period for the dev-
elopment of aflatoxin is the storage period, when 
the moisture in the groundnut must be held below a 
certain level. Groundnuts of low aflatoxin content 
can be produced if the nuts are harvested at the 
correct time, if they are rapidly dried and stored 
in a place where humidity is low, and if efforts are 
made to avoid damaging the nuts. Fluorescence tech-
niques can be used to test for the presence of afla-
toxin in the meal, and the safety of the meal as a 
human food can be tested by feeding the meal to one-
day old ducklings. 
Probably over 1,000 tons of groundnut cake are 
produced annually in East Africa, but it is known 
that in the past this cake has been found to contain 
aflatoxin. If groundnut meal is to be used as a 
human food in East Africa, there will need to be 
much greater control and selection of those nuts to 
be used for this purpose, so that nuts unaffected by 
aflatoxin are obtained. 
As in the case of cottonseed, the techniques of 
production used for producing cake would need to be 
adapted in order to produce a human—grade product. 
The problem of aflatoxin in groundnut meal is much 
more serious than that of gossypol in cottonseed, as 
once present it is almost impossible to remove. 
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This provides a severe limitation on the use of 
groundnut cake as a high protein food in East Africa 
unless carefully selected nuts free of aflatoxin can 
be obtained. 
Sesame seed meal is another potential source of 
high protein food which does not suffer from the 
same draw-backs as groundnuts. However, the price 
of sesame seed is such in East Africa that crushing 
for oil has become uneconomic, and the human-grade 
product produced from this seed would undoubtedly be 
more expensive than cottonseed flour. As for cotton-
seed, the extraction process would need to be care-
fully controlled if human-grade sesame flour was to 
be produced. 
Only very small quantities of sunflower seed 
were being crushed by the millers in East Africa, 
this being the seed rejected for export. If human-
grade sunflower meal were to be produced, this would 
mean crushing the higher quality seed which is 
normally exported, and as in the case of sesame seed, 
the final product would undoubtedly be fairly 
expensive. 
Although soya beans have not been of importance 
to the oil milling industry in East Africa, these 
may also be crushed, using similar techniques as for 
other oilseeds, so as to produce human-grade soya 
meal. Only the two Kenyan firms who concentrated on 
producing cattle-food for the local market appeared 
ever to have crushed soya beans, but it is believed 
that at least 1,000 tons annually are produced in 
East Africa. Thus the crushing of soya beans may 
also be considered as a possible source of low cost 
high protein foods. 
However, in order to produce human-grade soya 
meal not only must the extraction be under similar 
conditions to those described for cottonseed meal, 
but special heat treatment must be used to destroy 
the trypsin inhibitors, reduce the bacterial count, 
and give the meal a nutty flavour. 
A Low Cost High Protein Food for East Africa? 
Cottonseed flour probably has the greatest 
potential of the oilseed flours available in East 
Africa for use as or incorporation in a high protein 
food. Obviously other foods such as soya beans, and 
the cereals could also be useful for such a product. 
If a low cost high protein food is to be 
produced in East Africa, trials with various mixes 
of products must be carried out and carefully tested. 
Considerable experience could be drawn from 
countries already producing these high protein foods. 
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Footnote 
This Chapter is based on information obtained 
from: 
(a) the News Bulletins (No.3-5) of the 
WHO/FAO/UNICEF Protein Advisory Group. 
(b) Elizabeth Orr and David Adair, The Product-
ion of Protein Products from Oilseeds 
(Ministry of Overseas Development, Tropical 
Products Institute, August, 1966). 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
The study has shown that there have been signi-
ficant developments in the seed crushing industry in 
East Africa over the past twenty-five years, most of 
the expansion being in the 1950!s and 1960's. While 
in the 19^0's there had only been a handful of oil 
mills operating in the three East African countries, 
by 1965 there were forty-one such mills, and in the 
late 1950 ' s the total probably approached sixty. 
Cottonseed has been the only oilseed yielding 
soft edible oil which has been available in quantity 
for crushing by the millers. Other oilseeds grown 
within East Africa were both exported and consumed 
directly locally, but only very small quantities 
were crushed by the millers. Only small quantities 
of cottonseed were found to have been exported from 
East Africa, most of this exported seed coming from 
the Coast Areas of Tanzania and Kenya. 
The main cottonseed areas in East Africa are 
Uganda and the Lake Area of Tanzania, and this has 
led to the concentration of the oil milling industry 
in these two areas. Uganda is the largest producer 
of cottonseed, but production of cottonseed in the 
Lake Area of Tanzania has nearly doubled in the 
1960's. A few oil mills are also located in the 
Western Provinces of Kenya but the amount of cotton-
seed here is small. 
Bans on the import of cottonseed into both 
Uganda and Tanzania have led to the development of 
separate markets for the cottonseed in the two 
countries, and to widely different prices being paid 
for the cottonseed. The cheapest seed supplies have 
come from the Lake Area of Tanzania, and the most 
expensive from Uganda, with the price for the small 
amount of Kenyan seed being somewhere between the 
two. The high prices for cottonseed in Uganda have 
mainly been the l'esult of extreme competition among-
st the Ugandan millers for cottonseed, and have 
resulted in many smaller millers going into volunt-
ary or forced liquidation. The import of cottonseed 
into Kenya is not banned, and the Western Provinces 
millers purchased supplies from both Uganda and 
Tanzania. The largest amount was bought from 
Tanzania which was the cheaper source. 
Throughout East Africa it was found that oil 
milling was closely associated with other enter-
prises. Activities such as cotton ginning, soap 
manufacture, grain milling and groundnut shelling 
were particularly important in different areas. 
1 29 
Most of the East African millers produced only the 
semi-refined type of oil which was saleable locally. 
Six Ugandan millers and three Tanzanian millers had 
plant for producing the double- or fully-refined oil 
and two Ugandan millers plant for producing hydroge-
nated oils and fats. In addition, a large Nairobi 
firm was buying in liquid oils to produce hydrogena-
ted oils and fats. 
The operation of the Ugandan industry contrasts 
sharply with that of the Lake Area industry in two 
respects. Firstly, the milling industry in Uganda 
is not located close to the source of seed as it is 
in the Lake Area. Over 90 per cent of the cotton-
seed was found to be crushed in the Eastern Region 
of Uganda, the source of only 50 per cent of the 
cottonseed, while there was no crushing capacity in 
the Northern Region which was the source of 30 per 
cent of the cottonseed. It was shown that the 
existing location of the industry has led to losses 
of around £.80,000 per year, and it was suggested 
that this mislocation of the industry should be 
corrected by the establishment of an oil mill in the 
Northern Region, preferably under the management of 
an existing miller. 
A second difference between the Lake Area and 
Ugandan industries lies in the structure of the 
firms in the industries. The Lake Area industry 
consisted of a total of seventeen oil mills in 1965 
of more or less equal size. Although seven of these 
firms in 1966 were found to be under the ownership 
of the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions, 
this group of firms could not be said to be dominat-
ing the industry. However, the industry in Uganda, 
consisting of eighteen firms in 1965, was definitely 
dominated by 'the big four'. These four firms have 
purchased a high percentage of the cottonseed avail-
able in Uganda in the 1960's, and accounted for 70 
per cent of the total utilized capacity of the 
Ugandan industry. The remaining fourteen firms were 
mainly very small in size and operating with low 
utilized capacities. There is some evidence to sup-
port the view that 'the big four' have deliberately 
outbid the smaller millers at the cottonseed auct-
ions, causing cottonseed prices to rise to such a 
level that an economic return could not be obtained 
from the production of semi-refined oil alone. 
However, it was found that an economic return would 
in most years have been obtained from the production 
of double-refined oil, which could only be produced 
in Uganda by 'the big four' and two other firms. 
Thus the smaller firms in Uganda, most of whom only 
have semi-refining plant, are at the mercy of the 
four largest millers. 
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There are, though, many points of similarity 
between the industries in the Lake Area and Uganda. 
Both industries are using similar techniques of pro-
duction,and in both cases no technological develop-
ments would seem to be warranted except for possibly 
in a few cases the replacement of old expellers by 
their more modern counterparts. 
Overall costs of production in the two indust-
ries appeared to be at about the same level, but a 
major factor affecting the profitability in the 
industries was the price of the cottonseed itself. 
The much lower prices for cottonseed in the Lake 
Area as compared with those in Uganda, made it poss-
ible for adequate returns to be obtained from semi-
refined oil in the Lake Area, while such returns 
could not be obtained by the smaller Ugandan millers. 
The six mills in Kenya were operating at rather 
lower utilized capacity than the mills in either 
Uganda or Tanzania, and it was found that as in 
Uganda, it was doubtftil whether the production of 
semi—refined oil provided an adequate return. 
Large quantities of Ugandan liquid oils as well 
as some ghee and solid fats were sold on the Kenyan 
market, nearly all the remainder being sold within 
Uganda. Tanzanian millers relied mainly on their 
home market for selling their liquid oils, most of 
the residual being sold to Kenya. Kenya was only a 
small producer of liquid oils, but the Nairobi firm 
was selling large quantities of ghee and solid fats 
to both Uganda and Tanzania. Exports of oil prod-
ucts have been relatively unimportant. 
The prices for liquid oils in East Africa were 
found to be determined by the interaction of the two 
competing groups of millers centred on Mwanza and 
Jinja. Due to the cost advantage of the Lake Area 
millers in terms of their seed purchases, it seemed 
probable that the prices at least for seini-refined 
oil have been dictated by the Lake Area millers in 
the 1960's. Within Uganda itself, there is evidence 
to show that the smaller firms follow the pricing 
policy of 'the big four'. 
It is interesting to note the dependence of 
Uganda on Kenya for marketing its surplus production 
of oil, and of Kenya on both Uganda and Tanzania for 
purchasing sufficient supplies of liquid oils both 
for direct consumption and for conversion to hydrog-
enated oils and fats. If in future years tariff 
barriers or bans on imports should interfere with 
this trade, Uganda could be seriously embarrassed by 
surplus supplies of oil, and Kenya may find herself 
in short supply of liquid oil. 
Most of the cottonseed cake produced in East 
Africa was sold to European countries for the prod-
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uction of cattle—food, and particularly for Uganda 
and Tanzania the cake was an important source of 
export revenue. Some cottonseed cake was sold to 
cattle-food manufacturers or directly to farmers 
in Kenya, but the amounts involved were small 
compared with the total production of cake. Prices 
received by millers for their cake f.o.b, Mombasa or 
Dar es Salaam depended on world market conditions, 
which have in the past been good. 
For both Uganda and Tanzania, the returns from 
sales of oil products and cake to other East African 
countries or exported have been considerable. In 
the case of Uganda, the sales consisted mainly of 
exported cake and oil products sold to Kenya. These 
latter were of considerable importance because of 
the trade deficit of Uganda with Kenya. In the case 
of Tanzania cake sales were particularly important, 
sales of oil products being rather low in value. 
Kenya obtained considerable revenue from her sales 
of ghee and solid fats to both Uganda and Tanzania. 
Projections of the total supply and total 
demand for oils and fats to 1971 showed that Uganda 
would still have a large surplus of oils, which 
should be absorbed by the Kenyan market. Tanzania 
will only be producing sufficient oils to meet her 
home demand. However, by 1981, it is possible that 
East Africa as a whole may be producing a surplus of 
oil products, which must be market elsewhere in 
Africa. 
The use of cottonseed and groundnut cake as a 
low cost high protein food was finally put forward 
as a suggestion for a means of providing protein 
mixes suitable for the undernourished. The use of 
cake for this purpose could be an important welfare 
project in East Africa in future years. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PRODUCTION, SALES AND CONSUMPTION OF OIL PRODUCTS: 
UGANDA 
Production of Oils and Fats, 1963. 
A total of 99,581 tons of 'AR' cottonseed and 
probably around 11,600 tons of 'BR' cottonseed was^ 
sold to the Ugandan millers in the 1962-3 season. 
In addition, around 2,700 tons of groundnuts, see 
Chapter II, Section C.2, and a few tons of other 
oilseeds, see Chapter II, Section C.3, were also 
crushed by the millers in 1963 • 2 
The 1963 Survey of Industrial Production, 
claims that a total of 107,180 tons of cottonseed 
was bought by the millers in 1 9 6 3 . The slight diff-
erence between this figure and that given by the 
Lint Marketing Board is probably due to the differ-
ent period covered by the two figures, the Lint 
Marketing Board's season operating from October 1962 
to September 1963, while the survey figures apply to 
the calendar year 1963. 
Using a 14 per cent extraction rate for oil 
from 'AR' cottonseed (an average yield received by 
millers) a 10 per cent extraction rate for oil from 
'BR' seed, and a 36 per cent extraction rate for oil 
from groundnuts, (also based on evidence of millers) 
production of crude oil in 1963 would have been 
16,073 tons. 
Assuming that a total of 2,132 tons of this 
crude oil are hydrogenated, (based on production 
figures for ghee and solid fats from millers and 
allowing a 6.4 per cent refining loss) this leaves a 
total of 13,941 tons of crude oil for producing 
liquid oil products. Allowing 5 per cent refining 
losses, this gives a production of around 13,277 
tons of semi- and double-refined oil. 
Production figures for all oils and fats for 
1963 are shown in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 
Production of semi- and double-refined oil 13,277 
Production of ghee 1,854 
Production of solid fats 284 
(tons) 
13,277 
 
Total 15,415 
Note: a - This includes fats made from palm and 
copra oil as well as cottonseed and groundnut oil. 
Production of Oils and Fats, 1964. 
A total of 106,259 tons of 'AR' cottonseed and 
13,235 tons of 'BR' cottonseed was sold to the 
Ugandan millers in the 1963-4 season. In addition, 
a total of around 2,900 tons of groundnuts, see 
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Chapter II, section C.2, and a few tons of other 
oilseeds, see Chapter II, section C.3, were crushed 
in 1964. 
Using the same extraction rates for oil from 
seed as for 1963, this gives an overall production 
of 17,244 tons of crude oil. Assuming that a total 
of 2,833 tons of this crude oil is hydrogenated, on 
the same basis as for 1963, this leaves a total of 
14,411 tons of crude oil for producing liquid oil 
products. Allowing a 5 per cent refining loss, this 
implies that around 13,725 tons of semi- and double-
refined oil were produced in Uganda in 1964. 
Production figures for all oils and fats for 
1964 are shown in Table A.2. 
Table A.2 ,. \ (tons) 
Production of semi- and double-refined oil 13,725 
Production of ghee b 2,450 
Production of solid fats 404 
Total 16,579 
Note: b - This includes fats made from palm and 
copra oil as well as cottonseed and groundnut oil. 
1965. 
The following estimates of production shown in 
Table A.3, are based on the evidence of the millers. 
T a b l e (tons) c 
Production of semi-refined oil 3,911 
Production of double-refined oil 11,330 
Production of ghee ^ 3,624 
Production of solid fats 696 
Total 19,561 
Notes: c - Excluding 580 tons resold to mills for 
re-refining. 
d - This includes fats made from palm and 
copra oil as well as cottonseed and groundnut oil. 
The total amount of crude cottonseed and ground-
nut oil required to produce this output of oils and 
fats, when allowance has been made for refining 
losses and for palm and copra oil used, would be 
around 20,290 tons. 
The millers purchased a total of 1 1 6, 7'1 4 tons 
of •AR'^cottonseed and 12,082 tons of 1 BR' seed in 
1965' l n addition around 2,000 tons of ground-
nuts were crushed in 1965, see Chapter II, section 
C.2. 
Assuming the same extraction rates as for 1963 
and 1964, this implies an overall production of 
18,268 tons of crude oil. The difference between 
this total, and that estimated as being required to 
give the production figures quoted by the millers, 
may indicate one of three things. Either the amount 
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of seed crushed by the millers in 1965 has been 
under-estimated, or the extraction rates used are 
pessimistic, or production has been exaggerated. 
The millers themselves claimed to crush around 
1 3 5 , 0 0 0 tons of cottonseed in 1 9 6 5 , rather than the 
129,000 tons quoted, but this difference only 
accounts for around 800 tons of crude oil. It is 
unlikely that the extraction rate is too high, and 
therefore it seems most likely that the error is in 
the production figures. One possible source of 
exaggeration in these figures is that some oil sold 
for refining has been double-counted. 
Bearing these factors in mind, and taking the 
production figures for ghee and solid fats as being 
reliable, it is probably that the total production 
of semi- and double-refined oil in 1965 only amount-
ed to around 13,000 tons, and not the 15,000 tons 
given by the millex's. A figure for production of 
liquid oils of 13,315 tons in 1965 would correspond 
to the crude oil thought to be produced, and this 
figure will be used in later calculations. 
Sales of Oils and Fats, 1963-5. 
Table A.4,. . , v (to nearest ton; 
1 9 6 3 1964 1965 
Semi- and double—refined oil 
Production 
Sales to Kenya 
Sales to Tanzania 
Sales for export 
Home consumed 
Ghee 
Production 
Sales to Kenya 
Sales to Tanzania 
Sales for export 
Home consumed 
Solid fats 
Production 
Sales to Kenya 
Sales to Tanzania 
Sales for export 
Home consumed 
1 3 , 2 7 7 1 3 , 7 2 5 1 3 , 3 1 5 
6 , 2 9 2 6 , 9 1 2 7 , 3 0 5 
9 2 3 8 5 9 461 
8 6 4 1 , 5 7 4 871 
5 , 1 9 8 4 , 3 8 0 4 , 6 7 8 
1 , 8 5 4 ^ 2 , 4 5 0 3 , 6 2 4 
1 , ^ 8 3 , 1 , 9 7 8 2 , 2 3 1 
93v! 116 82 
- I 1 
278 3 5 6 1 . 3 1 0 
2 8 4 ^ 4 o 4 696 
199^ 225 294 
2 8 , 4 3 3 2 
- ? - 1 2 
5 7 136 3 5 8 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 1963-5, 
(Commissioner of Customs and Excise, East Africa). 
Notes: a - This is a residual figure. 
b - Data not available in Trade Reports for 
1963, and therefore figures based on evidence from 
millers. 
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APPENDIX 2 
PRODUCTION AND SALES OF OIL-CAKE: UGANDA 
Production of Cake, 1963. 
The total amount of cottonseed crushed in 1963 
was around 111,000 tons, and of groundnuts 2,700 
tons, see Appendix 1. The Kampala Produce Exctjange 
shows sales of 1,355 tons of 31 per cent cake, ''and 
thus assuming a 50 per cent extraction rate for 46 
per cent cake, an 80 per cent extraction rate for 31 
per cent cake, and a 55 per cent extraction rate for 
groundnut cake, this gives the figures for product-
ion of cake shown in Table A.7. 
Table A. 7 , . s, (tons) 
Production of 31 per cent cottonseed cake 1,355 
Production of 46 per cent cottonseed cake 5 6 , 1 3 8 
Production of groundnut cake 1,485 
Total 58,978 
The 1963 Survey of Industrial Production^ gave 
a figure of 54,550 tons of cake sold in 1 9 6 3 , where-
as the East African Customs and Excise Annual Trade 
Report for 1963 shows total sales of cottonseed 
cake alone of 59,791 tons. (This figure should 
account for nearly all the cake produced, as it is 
all either exported or sold to Kenya). The total 
sales of all cake registered in the Kagpala Produce 
Exchange only amounted to 49,827 tons, but a few of 
the millers are not members of the Exchange, and 
even if they are, all their sales of cake need not 
necessarily be registered in the Exchange. In the 
light of this evidence, it seems reasonable to 
accept a figure of around 60,000 tons as the total 
production of cake in 1963-
1964. 
The total amount of cottonseed crushed in 1964 
was around 119,500 tons, and of groundnuts 2,900 
tons, see Appendix 1. The Kampala Produce Exchange 
shows sales of 2,775 tons of 31 per cent cake, and 
therefore assuming the same extraction rates for 
cake from seed as in 1963, this gives the figures 
for production of cake shorn in Table A.8. 
Table A.8 ,, \ (tons) 
Production of 31 per cent cottonseed cake 2,775 
Production of 46 per cent cottonseed cake 58,015 
Production of groundnut cake 1,595 
Total 62,385 
The total sales of cottonseed and groundnut 
cake recorded in the trade figures for 1964 amounted 
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to 63,326 t o n s , a n d sales registered w^th the 
Kampala Produce Exchange to 58,840 tons. 
It seems probable that around 63,000 tons of 
cake was produced in 1964. 
Production of cake, 1965. 
Evidence from the millers in 1965 gave the fol-
lowing figures in Table A.9» for the production of 
cake . 
Table A.9 
Production of 31 per cent cottonseed cake 
Production of 46 per cent cottonseed cake 
Production of groundnut cake 
Total 
The total sales of cottonseed cake registered 
with the Kampala Produce Exchange in 1965 '"amounted 
to 53,760 tons, of which only 1,400 tons was 31 per 
cent cake. This rather low figure though results 
from not all sales being recorded in the Exchange. 
Total saXes of cottonseed cake recorded in the trade 
figures amounted to 68,725 tons. 
The Lint Marketing Board's figures show that a 
total of 129,000 tons of cottonseed was crushed by 
the millers in 1965, which using the same extraction 
rates as for 1964 and assuming that 11,600 tons was 
crushed as whole seed, would indicate a production 
of around 69,000 tons of cottonseed cake. 
Only 1,050 tons of groundnut cake were registe-
red f o ^ sale through the Kampala Produce Exchange in 
1965, and 801 tons were recorded in the trade 
figures. It therefore seems unlikely that as much 
as 2,650 tons of groundnut cake was produced in 1965 
as there is little market for the cake in Uganda. 
Assuming the figure given by the Kampala Produce 
Exchange for sales of groundnut cake is the correct 
one, this gives an overall figure of around 70,000 
tons for the production of all cake in 1965. 
(tons) 
11,600 
55,850 
2,650 
7 0 , 1 0 0 
vii 
Table A.10 , (to nearest ton) 
Sales of Cottonseed Cake to: 
Kenya Tanzania Export Total 
1955 9 2 2 _ 4 7 , 7 7 0 4 8 , 6 9 2 
195 6 9 9 0 - 5 8 , 6 3 5 5 9 , 6 2 5 
1 9 5 7 2 , 3 0 3 4 0 5 2 , 2 9 3 5 4 , 6 3 6 
1 9 5 8 8 5 2 - 6 5 , 1 5 4 6 6 , 0 0 6 
7 3 , 3 8 4 1 9 5 9 1 , 6 5 3 - 7 1 , 7 3 1 
7 1 , 6 4 3 1 9 6 0 2 , 4 9 4 - 7 4 , 1 3 7 
1961 2 , 2 1 8 - 62,166 6 4 , 3 8 4 
1 9 6 2 1 , 1 3 1 - 2 8 , 6 2 2 2 9 , 7 5 3 
1 9 6 3 1 , 3 7 9 - 5 8 , 4 1 2 5 9 , 7 9 1 
1 9 6 4 9 0 2 - 6 1 , 8 3 4 6 2 , 7 3 6 
1 9 6 5 6 9 9 1 6 8 , 0 2 5 68,725 
Sales of Groundnut Cake to: , . (to nearest ton) 
Kenya Tanzania Export Total 
1964 - - 590 590 
1 9 6 5 101 - 7 0 0 8 0 1 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-61T (Commissioner for Customs and Excise, East 
Africa). 
Table A.11 
Prices in shs/ton f.o.b. Mombasa 
Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Average for 
of highs of lows of highs of^lows all cake^ 
46 d/o cakea 31 $ cake exported 
1 9 5 5 - - - - 5 6 9 
1 9 5 6 - - - - 5 2 4 
1 9 5 7 - - - - 470 
1 9 5 8 - - - - 3 2 7 
1 9 5 9 - - - - 452 
1 9 6 0 - - - - 4 6 6 
1961 - - - - 42.1 
1962 - - - - 4 7 5 
1 9 6 3 5 9 0 4 1 7 . 5 0 3 6 5 300 520 
1 9 6 4 5 7 0 4 5 7 . 5 0 3 4 2 . 5 0 3 3 0 4 9 7 
1965 5 9 0 4 3 0 4 o o 3 9 5 5 2 9 
19 66 6 1 5 4 4 o 4 8 0 405 -
Sources: a - Kampala Produce Exchange, Monthly Rep-
orts, 1 9 6 3 - 6 (excluding January-June, I964)(unpub-
lished . ) 
b - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1955-<?5"I (Commissioner for Customs and Excise, E.A.) 
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Table A. 12 
Groundnut Cake, Prices ill shs/ton f.o.r.Uganda 
Q Maximum of Highs Q Minimum of Lows 
Average for 
Exported 
Cake 
1963 600 520 
1964 650 530 558 
1965 681/25 620 616 
1966 662/50 560 -
Sources: c - Kampala Produce Exchange, Monthly 
Reports 1963-6 (excluding January-June,1964) 
(unpublished). 
d - East African Customs and Excise, Annual 
Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya, 1964-5~^ (Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise, East Africa). 
Note: d - shs 65 has been deducted for the cost of 
transport from Jinja to Mombasa. East 
African Railways and Harbours, Tariff Book 
No.4, Part II (Aread Lithographic Printers, 
East Africa). 
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APPENDIX 6 
PROJECTIONS FOR SUPPLY AND DEMAND: UGANDA 
Table A.13 
Production of Cotton Lint 
Total 
Cottonseed 
Available 
$ of Lint 
Formed by 
Cottonseed^ in Bales ' 0 0 0 " in Tons 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 3 6 0 5 9 , 0 1 6 1 1 8 , 5 1 2 201 
1 9 6 0 - 1 3 7 0 6 6 , 0 7 1 1 1 7 , 9 9 2 179 
1 9 6 1 - 2 181 3 2 , 3 2 1 4 4 , 3 0 1 137 
1 9 6 2 - 3 3 5 9 6 4 , 1 0 7 112,659 1 76 
1 9 6 3 - 4 3 7 9 67,679 118,265 175 
1 9 6 4 - 5 
1 
1 
438 
t 
1 
7 8 , 2 1 4 
1 
1 
131,830 
1 
1 
169 
t 
t 
! 
1 9 7 0 - 1 
1 
1 
5 7 5 ° 
t 
1 
102,679 
t 
I 
1 7 7 , 6 3 5 d 
1 
1 
173 
Sources: a - Private communication with the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Co-operatives, Entebbe. 
b - Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, 
1955-65. (Uganda Argus, Kampala). 
Notes: c - Estimated production in 1971• Work for 
Progress, Uganda's Second Five Year Plan, 1966-71. 
^Government Printer, Entebbe, Uganda). 
d - Based on the estimate for the period 
1959-60 to 1964-5 that on average cottonseed forms 
173 per cent by weight of the cotton lint. 
Projections for demand to 1971 and 1981. 
This attempt to estimate the trend in the level 
of consumption for some years in the future is based 
on a semi-logarithmic demand equation of the form: 
y = a + b log x 
where y is the level of per caput demand 
x is the level of per caput income. 
1 6 
The exact demand equation used by the F.A.O. 
to project per caput demand for oils and fats takes 
the form: 
y 1/y - 1 = 2.3026 plog x 1/x 
1 
where y,y are the levels of per caput demand in the 
base and projected years. 
x,x are the levels of per caput income in the 
base and projected years. 
p is the elasticity of demand for oils and 
fats in the base year. 
Total demand may then be estimated by assuming 
that a 10 per cent increase in population, say, will 
lead to a 10 per cent increase in total demand. The 
V 
effect of all other factors on the level of demand 
has been excluded. 
The information required, therefore, in order 
to make these projections is (i) the increase in per 
capita gross domestic product between the base and 
projected years, x /x (ii) the elasticity of 
demand in the base year, |^,(iii) the level of per 
caput demand for oils and fats in the base year, y, 
and (iv) the increase in 
population between the base and projected years. 
This data is set out below for making projections of 
total demand for oils and fats for Uganda for the 
period 1965-71 and 1965-81. 
Monetary Gross Domestic Product per capita at 1964 
prices" 
1966 £ 2 5 . 7 
1971 £31.8 
1981 £52.6 
Average annual rate of growth 1966-71 '.3 per cent. 
Average annual rate of growth 1966-81 4.9 per cent. 
These figures indicate, assuming a 4.3 per cent 
rate of growth between 1965 and 1966, a total 
increase of 29.3 per cent for 1965-71, and of 113.8 
per cent for 1965-81. 
The income elasticity of demand for oils and fats. 
In his work on expenditure patterns in Kenya, 
B.F. Massell has found an average income elasticity 
net of household size for oils and fats o^ fg .87 for 
three districts in the Central Province. In 
further work, Mr Massell has found an income 
elasticity for oils and fats in Central Province as 
a whole^based on a sample of 800 rural households) 
of .9^5 ' • Further, Mr Massell has found an income 
elasticity for middle income African households in 
Nairobi (b^ped on a sample of 300) of .525 for oils 
and fat s, 
With this information in mind, it has been 
decided in the calculations that follow that proje-
ctions should be made for a range of elasticities 
for oils and fats from 0.5 to 0.95, and thus a pro-
jected range for total demand estimated. The idea 
of using a weighted elasticity based on the number 
of persons with any specific elasticity is rejected 
on the grounds of insufficient information on both 
elasticity levels, and the number of persons at any 
such level. 
Level of demand for oils and fats in 1965. 
The total consumption of all oils and fats in 
1965 amounted to 8,293 tons, see Table A.5 of 
Appendix 1. 
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Projection 1965-1981 
y1/y = 1 + 2.3026 p iog 1 Q (2.138) 
= 1 + p 0.759858 
y /y 100 Total 
Index Of Index of Demand 
per caput Total 1 demand 1981 
p 0 .759858 p demand 1981 * 1981* (tons) 
0. 5 0.380 138 .0 214 • 3 17,772 
0. 55 0.418 141 .8 220 .2 18,261 
0 . 6 0.456 145 .6 226 . 1 18,750 
0 . 65 0.494 149 .4 232 .0 19,240 
0 . 7 0.532 153 .2 237 .9 19,729 
0 . 75 0.570 157 .0 243 .8 20,218 
0 . 8 0.608 160 .8 249 • 7 20,708 
0. 85 0.646 164 .6 255 .6 21,197 
0 . 9 0.684 168 .4 261 .5 21,686 
0. 95 0.722 1 72 .2 267 .4 22,175 
* 1965 : = 100 
These estimates for projected demand in 1971 
and 1981 were based on a given model, and not one 
which had been found to fit the consumption data in 
the past. This was done because the data available 
did not allow for the construction of a demand model 
for oils and fats in Uganda. 
However, to show that the model used is rele-
vant to the data, it is now planned to use the model 
to project demand from 1960 to 1965- Again a range 
of elasticities will be used. 
The total amount of cottonseed sold to the 
millers in 1960 amounted to 105,19g2tons of 'AH' 
seed and 13,322 tons of 'BR' seed."' Using a 14 per 
cent extraction rate for oil from 'AR' seed and a 10 
per cent extraction rate for oil from 'BR' seed, 
this gives an overall production of 16,059 tons of 
crude oil, or 15,294 tons of refined oil, allowing 5 
per cent for refining losses. Unfortunately, data 
for sales and purchases of ghee and solid fats are 
not available for 1960, but total sales of liquid 
oils amounted to 8,179 tons, and "tyxtal purchases of 
liquid oils amounted to 130 tons. These figures 
indicate a total consumption of oil in 1960 of 
around 6,985 tons. 
The level of population in 1960 was 6.7 million 
and in 1965 7-6 million. This indicates an 
increase in population of 13-1 per cent between 1960 
and 1965. 
The gross domestic product per capita was £16.6 
in 196Q3 ,at 1960 prices, and £18.0 in 1965 at 1960 
prices. This gives an increase in gross domestic 
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APPENDIX 6 
PRODUCTION, SALES AND CONSUMPTION OF OIL PRODUCTS: 
TANZANIA 
Production of cottonseed oil, 1963-
The total amount of cottonseed crushed by the 
Lake Area millers in 1963 was 52,920 ^ tons of 'AR' 
seed and 12,538 tons of 'BR' seed. Taking a 14 
per cent extraction rate for oil from 'AR' seed and 
a 10 per cent extraction rate for oil from 'BR' seed, 
the total production of crude cottonseed oil would 
be around 8,663 tons, and of refined oil 8,250 tons, 
allowing for 5 per cent refining losses. 
Production of cottonseed oil, 1964. 
The total amount of cottonseed crushed by the 
Lake Area millers in 1964 was 65, 1 „L7 tons of 'AR' 
seed and 10,466 tons of 'BR' seed. Using the sam^ 
extraction rates as for 1963, the total production 
of crude cottonseed oil would be around 10,163 tons, 
and of refined oil 9,679 tons. 
Production of cottonseed oil, 1965-
The total amount of cottonseed crushed by the 
Lake Area millers in 1965 was 84,3,^ tons of 'AR' 
seed and 7)367 tons of 'BR' seed. Using the same 
extraction rates as for 1963, the total production 
of crude cottonseed oil would be around 12,541 tons, 
and of refined oil 11,944 tons. 
The millers themselves claimed to have produced 
a total of 648,169 tins (of 36 lbs) of semi-refined 
oil and 176,159 tins of double-refined oil. This 
gives a total production of 13,248 tons of refined 
oil. The difference between this and the earlier 
figure is probably due to some exaggeration on the 
part of the millers, and in the calculations that 
follow, the first figure will be taken. 
Table A.14 
Sales of Cottonseed Oil (to nearest ton) 
1963 1964 1965 
Production 8,250 9,679 11,944 
Sales to: 
Kenya 704 1 ,954 2,868 
Uganda 557 188 349 
Export 1 ,052 1 ,491 643 
Home consumed 5,937 6,046 8,084 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, 
Annual Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 
1963-5• (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, E.A.). 
X V 
Table A.15 
Consumption of Cottonseed Oil 
1963 1964 
(to nearest ton) 
1 9 6 5 
Home Produced 5 , 9 3 7 6 , 0 4 6 8 , 0 8 4 
Purchased from: 
Kenya 6 9 4 531 5 8 9 
Uganda 9 0 8 832 4 4 6 
Imported - 88 3 9 3 
Total 7 , 5 3 9 7 , 4 9 7 9 , 5 1 2 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, 
Annual Trade Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya 
1963-5~ (Commissioner of Customs and Excise, E.A.). 
Table A.16 
(to nearest ton) Vegetable Ghee 
Purchases from: Sales to: 
1 9 6 4 4 9 7 116 2 , 1 7 8 56 _ 
1965 165 82 2 , 4 0 3 172 6 4 
Solid Eatsa 
Purchases from: Sales to: 
Kenya Uganda Imports Kenya Uganda Exports 
1964 771 4 3 4 0 1 1 _ 
1965 1 , 1 5 2 32 62 4 1 -
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, T 9 6 4 - 5 . 
(Commissioner of Customsand Excise,EastAfrica). 
Note: a - These figures may include purchases and 
sales of animal fats. 
Table A. 17 t 4. 4. \ ^ (to nearest ton) 
1964 1 9 6 5 
Consumption^ of ghee c 
Consumption of solid fats 
2 , 7 3 5 2 , 4 6 8 
8 5 2 1 , 2 4 1 
No t e s : b 
c 
- Consumption equals total purchases 
less total sales 
- May include some animal fats. 
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APPENDIX 6 
PRODUCTION AND SALES OF OIL-CAKE: TANZANIA 
Production of cake, 19^3-
The total amount of cottonseed crushed in 1963 
by Lake Area millers was 65,458 tons, see Appendix 4, 
which, using a 46 per cent extraction rate for cake 
from cottonseed gives a production of 29,456 tons of 
cottonseed cake. The trade figures show sales of 
cottonseed cake amounting to 28,740 tons for 1963* 
It therefore seems probable that around 29,000 tons 
of cottonseed cake were produced in 1963. 
Production of cake, 1964. 
The total amount of cotto^aeed crushed in 1964 
by Lake Area millers was 75,58X tons, see Appendix 4, 
indicating a production of 34,012 tons of cottonseed 
cake. Sales recorded in,nthe trade figures in 1964 
amounted to 33,134 tons. Production was probably 
around 33,500 tons in 1964. 
Production of cake, 1965. 
The total amount of cottonseed crushed in 1965 
by Lake Area millers was 91,686 tons, see Appendix 4, 
indicating a production of 41,259 tons of cottonseed 
cake. Sales recorded in the trade figures amounted 
to 41,801 tons, while the millers themselves 
claimed to produce a total of 43,543 tons. Product-
ion was probably around 42,500 tons. 
Table A.18 
Sales of Cottonseed Cake 
Sales to Sales for Price for Price 
Kenya 
(tons) 
Export 
(tons) 
Exports 
shs/ton 
Received 
in Lake Area 
1955 81 10,508 560 492 
1956 46 17,528 506 438 
1957 106 12,523 448 380 
1958 - 22,637 372 304 
1959 80 22,823 470 402 
1960 66 24,684 470 402 
1961 - 18,760 444 376 
1962 - 21 ,620 497 42.9 
1963 20 28,720 587 519 
1964 - 33,134 533 465 
1965 100 41,701 551 483 
Source: East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade 
Reports of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 1955-65. 
Xcommissioner of Customs and Excise, East Africa). 
Notes: See overleaf. 
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Notes to Table A.18: a - Price f.o.b. Dar es Salaam. 
b - Allowing Shs 68 per ton for 
transport from Mwanza to Dar es Salaam. East African 
Railways and Harbours, Tariff Book No.k.Part II 
(Aread Lithographic Printers, East Africa). 
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APPENDIX 6 
PROJECTIONS FOR SUPPLY AND DEMAND: TANZANIA 
The projections of demand to 1971 and 1981, 
taking 1965 as the base year, were made using the 
same model as was described in Appendix 3-
Monetary Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Average 1960-2 £13.2 3 2 
1970 £23.o 3 2 
1980 £38.9 3 2 
Assuming the 1961 figure as £13.2, this indicates a 
rate of growth of 6.4 per cent per year between 1961 
and 1970, and of 5.4 per cent per year between 1970 
and 1980. This gives a level of monetary gross 
domestic product per capita of £16.9 in 1965 and of 
£24.2 in 1971. This implies an increase of 43 per 
cent between 1965 and 1971, and assuming the same 
increase from 1980-1 as from 1970-80, an increase of 
143 per cent between 1965 and 1981. 
Population 
Average 1960-2 9.4 million 
1970 11 .3 million3-' 
1980 14.1 million 3 3 
Assuming the 1961 level of population as 9*4 million, 
this indicates a rate of growth of 2.1 per cent 
between 1961 and 1970, and of 2.3 per cent between 
1970 and 1980. These figures imply a 13.2 per cent 
increase in population between 1965 and 1971, and a 
41.2 per cent increase between 1965 and 1981. 
Elasticity 
As was done in the case of Uganda, the project-
ions will be made using a range of elasticity assum-
ptions from 0.5 to 0.95* 
Level of total demand, 1965. 
The level of total demand for oils and fats in 
1965 was 13,221 tons, see Tables A.15 and A.17 of 
Appendix 4. 
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in that year. This gives a figure of around 8,000 
tons. Unfortunately ghee and solid fats are exclu-
ded from this total as the trade figures are not 
available for 1960. 
The same range of elasticity assumptions was 
made as for the other projections. 
Projections 1960-5 
y 1 / y = 1 + 2 . 3 0 2 6 9 l o g 1 Q ( 1 . 3 6 ) 
= 1 + 0.3097 9 
y 1 / y 100 Total Index of Index of Demand 
per caput Total demand 1965 
p 0 . 3 0 9 7 r> Demand 1965* 1965* (tons) 
0 . 5 0 . 1 5 5 115.5 128. 1 10,248 
0 . 5 5 0. 1 7 0 1 1 7 . 0 129.8 10,384 
0.6 0.186 118.6 131 .5 10, =520 
O . 6 5 0.201 120.1 133.2 10,656 
0.7 0.2.17 121 .7 135.0 10,800 
0.75 0.232 123.2 136.6 10,928 
0.8 0.248 124.8 138.4 11,072 
0 . 8 5 0.263 126.3 1 40. 1 11,208 
0.9 0.279 127.9 141 .8 11,344 
0.95 0.294 129.4 143.5 11,480 
* 1960 : = 100 
These projections suggest that total demand for 
oils should have been between 10,000 and 11,500 tons 
in 1 9 6 5 . In fact the consumption of cottonseed oil 
was 9,500 tons in 1965, and of all oils and fats 
13,000 tons, see Appendix Thus the model would 
not seem to give an unreasonable fit, in view of the 
fact that fats have been excluded, and there is 
likely to have been some substitution by consumers 
of fats for liquid oils over this period. 
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APPENDIX 6 
PROJECTIONS FOR SUPPLY AND DEMAND: KENYA 
The projections of demand to 1971 taking 1965 
as the base year were made using the same model as 
was used in Appendices 3 and 6 for Uganda and 
Tanzania. Projections could not be made to 1981, as 
insufficient data was available. 
Monetary Gross Domestic Product per capita 
35 
1<)62 £ 2 0 . 9 
1970 £25 • 4 
The annual rate of growth of monetary gross domestic 
product per capita between 1962 and 1970 is given in 
the Kenya Development Plan as 2.6 per cent. This 
indicates an increase of 15*5 per cent between 1965 
and 1971. 
Population 
1965 9.4 million35 
1970 11.0 million35 
Assuming a rate of growth of population between 1970 
and 1971 the same as between 1969 and 1970, 3-> this 
gives a population of 11.4 million in 1971, and an 
increase in population of 21.3 per cent between 1965 
and 1971. 
Elasticity 
A range of elasticity assumptions from 0.5 to 
0.95 will be used as for Uganda and Tanzania. 
Level of total demand, 19^5 
This will be taken as 11,000 tons, see 
Chapter VII. 
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T h i s is a s tudy of the vege tab le oil c ru sh ing indus t ry . A l t h o u g h 
it dea l s p r imar i ly wi th U g a n d a it a l so inc ludes c o m p a r a t i v e in-
f o r m a t i o n f r o m o t h e r pa r t s of E a s t A f r i c a . It is suggested tha t a 
re locat ion of the indus t ry wi th in U g a n d a would save m o n e y spent 
on t r anspo r t a t i on of co t tonseed f r o m ginnery to oil mill . 
At the present t ime U g a n d a ' s su rp lus of semi-ref ined oil is 
sold to Kenya , but by 1980 there will be a su rp lus of oil c rea t ing 
a ser ious p rob lem for the indus t ry . H o w e v e r , oil c a k e has a good 
expor t m a r k e t and the d e m a n d for this is l ikely to increase wi th in 
Eas t Af r i c a . In pa r t i cu la r , the c a k e m a y be used as a high pro te in 
food for ch i ldren suffer ing f r o m ma lnu t r i t i on . 
Shs. 20/- (East Africa only) 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
